People ex rel. Lichtenstein v. Langan

Decision Date09 November 1909
Citation196 N.Y. 260,89 N.E. 921
PartiesPEOPLE ex rel. LICHTENSTEIN v. LANGAN.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

Application by the People, on the relation of Sol Lichtenstein, against Joseph Langan, lieutenant of police, for a writ of habeas corpus. From an order of the Appellate Division (132 App. Div. 937,116 N. Y. Supp. 720), affirming an order of the Special Term sustaining the writ, respondent appeals. Affirmed.

Robert H. Elder, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellant.

Joseph S. Auerbach and John B. Stanchfield, for respondent.

HAIGHT, J.

The relator was arrested by virtue of a warrant, upon information filed by the district attorney with the Court of Special Sessions in the city of New York, in which information the relator was accused of the crime of engaging in bookmaking. The information charged that ‘the said Sol Lichtenstein, William Brown and Louis Mayer on the [196 N.Y. 263]23d day of September, 1908, at the borough of Brooklyn, of the city of New York, in the county of Kings, on the grounds of a private inclosure known as the race course of the Brooklyn Jockey Club, a domestic corporation, where certain trials and contests of skill, speed, and power of endurance of horses, commonly called horse races, were then and there conducted, did unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly, to many persons, upon the results of said races and upon various and divers horses that were announced to participate and did participate in said races, quote and lay odds-that is to say, did state and publish to said persons the terms on which they, said Sol Lichtenstein, William Brown, and Louis Mayer, were willing then and there to bet with said persons on said results and against said horses-and did then and there quote and lay odds, as aforesaid, of eight to five on one of said horses called Fitz Herbert, and did then and there accept a bet of fifty dollars from a person whose mame to the district attorney is unknown, but who can be identified, on said horse at said odds, that is to say, bet eighty dollars against fifty dollars bet by said person, that said horse would lose, against the form of the statute in such case made and provided.’ Thereupon relator petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in which he claimed that the information filed stated no offense under section 351 of the Penal Code. Upon the hearing at Special Term the writ was sustained and the relator was discharged from custody.

Section 351 of the Penal Code, so far as is now material, provides as follows: ‘Any person who engages in * * * bookmaking at any time or place; or any person who keeps or occupies any room, shed, tenement, tent, booth, or building, float or vessel, or any part thereof, or who occupies any place or stand of any kind, upon any public or private grounds within this state, with books, papers, apparatus or paraphernalia, for the purpose of recording or registering bets or wagers, * * * and any person who records or registers bets or wagers, * * * upon the result of any trial or contest of skill, speed or power of endurance, of man or beast, or upon the result of any political nomination, appointment or election; * * * is guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction is punishable by imprisonment in a penitentiary or county jail for a period of not more than one year.’ Upon the argument of this appeal the learned district attorney stated that in the information by him, in which he charged the relator with laying odds and publishing the same to numerous persons, he did not intend to charge that such laying odds and publishing was by any writing or printed instrument but that it was oral. We thus have the question presented as to whether a person who offers to bet, and so announces to others orally, upon a horse or horses that are about to engage in a race in which he lays odds, is a bookmaker within the meaning of the statute. It will be observed that it is not alleged in the information, nor was it claimed upon the argument of this appeal, that the relator kept or occupied any room, shed, tenement, tent, booth, or building, float, or vessel, or that he occupied any place or stand of any kind, upon any public or private grounds, with books, papers, apparatus, or paraphernalia, for the purpose of recording or registering bets or wagers, nor is it alleged or pretended that he recorded or registered any bets or wagers. The provision relied upon by the district attorney is that he was engaged in bookmaking; that the laying of odds and orally announcing them constituted bookmaking within the meaning of the statute. The term ‘bookmaking’ originally indicated a collection of sheets of paper or other substances upon which entries could be made, either written or printed. But the term has been used in many ways, and, in determining its meaning as used in this statute, we must consider the evident purpose and intention of the Legislature in enacting the provision in question, giving to the term its ordinary and accepted meaning as it was understood at that time.

For many years the racing of horses for the purpose of determining their skill, speed, and power of endurance has been one of the diversions in which a portion of the public has indulged, and no county fair has been considered complete without a race. Generally in large cities associations have been organized which have constructed tracks and inclosed grounds for that purpose, and annually have maintained races by the prominent horses of the day. Of late years, however, these associations have tolerated a system of bookmaking which has come to be regarded as specially vicious and demoralizing to the public. The ordinary bookmaker is a person who follows the races and becomes fully informed with reference to the skill, speed, and endurance of the horses that are entered for races. These horses are taken from one meeting to another of the various racing associations, and thereby the bookmakers are enabled to prepare a list of the horses entered for a race, with the odds so arranged as to percentages as to give them a profit whichever the winning horse may be. These schedules are written out and either posted or circulated by the clerks or agents of the bookmaker among the persons in attendance upon the races and their bets solicited, and, when a customer is found, he is given a check indicating the horse and amount upon which he has placed his money. This was the scheme under which bookmakers were enabled to induce men, women, and persons of immature years to part with their money,...

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17 cases
  • White v. Cuomo
    • United States
    • New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • March 22, 2022
    ...with winners taking a share of the betting pool and the bookmaker taking a percentage of profit (see People ex rel. Lichtenstein v. Langan, 196 N.Y. 260, 264–265, 89 N.E. 921 [1909] ).4 Indeed, it is only the dissent that rejects the ordinary meaning of "gambling" as encompassing games of c......
  • Goncalves v. Regent Intern. Hotels, Ltd.
    • United States
    • New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • February 17, 1983
    ...(McKinney's Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 1, Statutes, § 235, citing Mangam v. City of Brooklyn, 98 N.Y. 585; People ex rel. Lichtenstein v. Langan, 196 N.Y. 260, 89 N.E. 921; and People v. City of Buffalo, 57 Hun. 577.) As previously stated, the principal purpose underlying the enactment of the ......
  • People v. Eulo
    • United States
    • New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • October 30, 1984
    ...construe that term according to "its ordinary and accepted meaning as it was understood at the time" (People ex rel. Lichtenstein v. Langan, 196 N.Y. 260, 264, 89 N.E. 921). If the term at issue has been judicially defined prior to its use in a statute, however, that definition will be assi......
  • Opinion of the Justices
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • September 8, 1947
    ... ... House Bill No. 854 is not a 'lottery.' People v ... Monroe, 349 Ill. 270, 182 N.E. 439, 85 A.L.R. 605; ... Rohan v ... 396; ... People ex rel. Lichtenstein v. Langan, 196 N.Y. 260, ... 89 N.E. 921, 25 L.R.A., N.S., ... ...
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