People ex rel. Ludens v. Harris

• Decision Date: 20 June 1916
• Docket Number: No. 9514.,9514.
• Citation: 273 Ill. 413,112 N.E. 978
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. LUDENS, State's Atty., et al. v. HARRIS.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

273 Ill. 413

112 N.E. 978

PEOPLE ex rel. LUDENS, State's Atty., et al.

v.HARRIS.

No. 9514.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 20, 1916.

Rehearing Denied June 20, 1916.

Disbarment proceedings by the People, on the relation of Jocob Ludens, State's Attorney, and others, against Arthur G. Harris. Respondent suspended from practice as an attorney for two years and until he may be permitted to resume such practice by order of the court.

Dunn and Cooke, JJ., dissenting.John L. Fogle, of Chicago, and Dixon & Dixon, of Dixon, for relators.

George J. Dreiske, of Chicago, and M. T. Moloney, of Ottawa, for respondent.

DUNCAN, J.

Jacob J. Ludens, state's attorney of Whiteside county, and Robert Nelson and H. L. Dollahan, residents of Lee county, filed to the April term, 1914, of this court an information of eight counts, charging the respondent, Arthur G. Harris, of Lee county, with unprofessional and dishonorable conduct, and praying that his license as an attorney at law be revoked, and that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys. Two additional counts were later filed, and the information as amended was answered, and the issues thus formed were referred to Daniel H. Gregg as a commissioner to take and report the evidence and his conclusions thereon. Evidence was taken on all the counts, and the commissioner reported that the respondent was licensed to practice law by this court October 15, 1901, and set out the facts found by him under every count. His findings on the evidence are, in substance, that the information was not filed in good faith and for the purpose of maintaining the ethics of the legal profession, but rather for the purpose of settling private quarrels and political differences, and that, while the respondent has been exceedingly careless and conducted his business with respect to collections intrusted to him in a loose and slipshod manner, yet the evidence wholly fails to show any conduct of the respondent indicating moral turpitude, and he recommended that the information be dismissed. The relators filed exceptions to the findings of fact by the commissioner. The main evidential facts set out by the commissioner under every count of the information are substantially the same in every particular as those averred in the information. In fact, there is not dispute as to the real facts in this record. The real controversy is as to what conclusion should be drawn from the evidential facts.

The first two counts of the information are based on the conduct of respondent with reference to two claims or accounts sent him for collection by Fairbanks, Morse & Co. The evidence shows that respondent collected the first claim of $71.19 by a check payable to his client for that sum, on which he indorsed the name of his client, and received the full sum in cash on February 1, 1912. On May 19, 1911, he collected on the second claim of said client, which was against Robert Nelson, one of the relators, the sum of $205 as part payment. Almost three years after respondent had collected the latter amount on the Nelson judgment his client sent the claim to another attorney, and then learned for the first time that respondent had collected the $205. Herbert J. Robins, the head of the credit department of Fairbanks, Morse & Co., on March 4, 1914, visited respondent at his office in Dixon and asked him how he was getting along with the Nelson claim. The respondent replied: ‘Well, nothing doing yet, but I hope to get something soon.’ Thereupon Robins showed him the canceled check for $205, and then he admitted collecting that amount, and also the amount of the first (or Rutt) claim. On being asked to make a settlement of both claims, respondent asked Robins to return in an hour, and within that time he went to his bank and borrowed the money, and returned and settled both claims in full for the sum of $250; the remainder being retained as his fees for the collections. Respondent had concealed from his clients the fact that he had made the collections, by making false statements in letters to them and by failing to make report on said collections when requested. After frequent requests had been made for reports and ignored by respondent, on February 5, 1912, nearly a year after he had collected the Nelson claim, he wrote his client:

‘I expect to be able to collect some on the Nelson judgment soon, as have some matters tied up with him. The only danger is his going into bankruptcy in order to wipe out everything. In fact, he wants some one to put him through the bankrupt court.’

On May 24, 1913, he again wrote them:

‘In reference to Mr. Nelson, will say that he is doing a little business in his own name but it is hard to tell if he is paying any of his accounts or not, but I think that is is possible that we can catch him on some of his contracts. He has a great many accounts out against him. I have returned a number, but as soon as anything favorable develops will inform you.’

In like manner he had, after collecting the money on the Rutt claim, been requested frequently by his client to report progress of that collection, and failed to make any response thereto until in October, 1913, 20 months after the collection, he wrote his client:

‘In reference to the Rutt matter of Sterling, I expect to have this adjusted very soon.’

The third count charges, and the proof shows, that respondent neglected and failed to release the Nelson judgment until after demand was made on him to do so. It also charges that such neglect and failure did great injury to Nelson's credit, but the proof shows that his credit was injured, not by the respondent's failure to release the judgment, but by his failure to pay over the money collected to Fairbanks, Morse & Co., as appears from the testimony of W. J. Hintz, salesman for said company. It is rather unusual, we think, for attorneys to enter credits or partial satisfactions on judgments for their clients before demand on them when only partial payments thereon are made to them. The $205 was only a partial payment of the Nelson judgment. The proof under this count does not show such conduct of the respondent as justifies any penalty or censure of this court, and the exceptions to the commissioner's findings thereon are overruled.

The evidence under the fourth count is that respondent received from William H. Winn, an attorney of Dixon, with offices on the same floor and in the same building with respondent, another claim against Robert Nelson in favor of the Western Roofing & Supply Company. He collected on said claim $71.23 in May, 1911, and failed to pay the same over until March 5, 1914. At least on two different occasions between said last two dates Winn asked respondent if he had collected or had done anything in regard to that collection, and respondent's answers were that he had not collected anything on the claim. But immediately after his settlement of the said two claims of Fairbanks, Morse & Co. he called Winn into his office and admitted that he had collected the claim of the Western Roofing & Supply Company, and asked Winn to accept it. Winn refused the money because he had returned the claim, and then on said date it was remitted to the company through another attorney, a mutual friend of both Winn and respondent.

The proof under the fifth count is, in substance, that the Springfield Collection Company sent a claim to respondent for $13.20 in favor of the Bijou Film & Amusement Company against A. T. Manges; that he reduced the same to judgment, which was paid to him December 9, 1910, and neglected and refused to remit the money until January 9, 1912, and deceived his client by misrepresentations leading them to believe he had not collected the claim. Frequent demands were made on him for reports, and on two dates they demanded a remittance of the money in case he had collected it. He ignored the following demand of his client written him April 22, 1911:

‘Can you not favor us with a remittance in the claim of Bijou Film & Amusement Company v. Manges?’

Not until after this claim had been forwarded to another attorney for collection did he remit the money, and then he simply inclosed it in an envelope after deducting his fee, without inclosing any letter with his check.

To sustain the sixth count it was proved that respondent received from Frederick Vose, an attorney of Chicago, a claim for $186.46 in favor of the Mills Electric Company against Dollahan & Co. He collected thereon in January, 1912, three $10 payments, and then wrote Vose:

‘Inclosed find check for $10 on this account. He has promised to pay more soon.’

Failing to get any response to his frequent requests for reports from respondent, Vose made a demand direct on Dollahan & Co., and learned they had paid the respondent on the claim $40. When respondent's attention was called to his failure to remit all he had collected, he replied to Vose on June 28, 1912:

‘I have been away for nearly a week, and find that Dollahan has paid $30. I notice, however, that it is not as he mentioned it. Inclosed find check for same on the electric company...