People ex rel. Molinaro v. Warden, Rikers Island
| Docket Number | 94 |
| Decision Date | 15 December 2022 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York EX REL. Sara MOLINARO, on behalf of Wei Li, Respondent, v. WARDEN, RIKERS ISLAND, EMTC, 10-10 Hazen Street, East Elmhurst, NY 11370, or Any Other Person Having Custody of the Defendant, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
39 N.Y.3d 120
203 N.E.3d 1194
183 N.Y.S.3d 338
The PEOPLE of the State of New York EX REL. Sara MOLINARO, on behalf of Wei Li, Respondent,
v.
WARDEN, RIKERS ISLAND, EMTC, 10-10 Hazen Street, East Elmhurst, NY 11370, or Any Other Person Having Custody of the Defendant, Appellant.
No. 94
Court of Appeals of New York.
Decided December 15, 2022
Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn (Julian Joiris and Leonard Joblove of counsel), for appellant.
Lisa Schreibersdorf, Brooklyn Defender Services, Brooklyn (Alexandra Ferlise and Alfred O'Connor of counsel), for respondent.
OPINION OF THE COURT
RIVERA, J.
On this appeal we resolve an open question in this Court and hold that, in accordance with CPL article 730, when a defendant is not in custody, a court only has the authority to either order a competency examination on an out-patient basis or to direct that the defendant be confined in a hospital pending completion of the examination upon proper medical recommendation that such confinement is necessary. The court may not remand a defendant into custody solely because an examination has been ordered.
I.
Wei Li was charged by misdemeanor complaint with several offenses, none of which were "qualifying offenses" under the bail laws (see CPL 510.10[4] ; 530.20[1][b]), meaning that Criminal Court was required to release Wei Li on his own recognizance or set particular conditions in a securing order to ensure his return to court (see CPL 500.10[3–a]–[3–b] ; 510.10[3]; 530.20[1][a]). However, at arraignment, the court ordered a CPL article 730 competency examination and remanded Wei Li into the custody of respondent, the Warden of Rikers Island, pending completion of the examination.
Relator filed the underlying petition for writ of habeas corpus on Wei Li's behalf, requesting his release. As relevant here, relator argued that the remand order was unlawful on the
grounds that Wei Li could not be held under the bail laws because he had not been charged with a bail-eligible offense under CPL 510.10, and CPL 730.20(2) did not separately authorize the court to order defendant held in jail pending the examination. Instead, under CPL 730.20(2), the court could only order an examination on an out-patient basis or, upon recommendation by the appropriate medical official, by hospital confinement. Respondent opposed release.1
Supreme Court denied the petition, relying on ( People v. Suero, 67 Misc.3d 229, 236, 121 N.Y.S.3d 524 [Sup.Ct., Kings County 2020] ), which held that CPL article 730 provided Criminal Court the authority to hold defendant to "ensure that a potentially incapacitated person appears at the competency examination." The Appellate Division reversed and ordered Wei Li's immediate release, holding that CPL article 730 did not authorize Criminal Court to remand Wei Li , 195 A.D.3d 885, 150 N.Y.S.3d 123 (2d Dept. 2021). Thereafter, the psychiatric evaluators concluded that Wei Li was unfit to stand trial and the criminal charges against him were dismissed pursuant to CPL 730.40(2). We granted respondent leave to appeal ( 37 N.Y.3d 915, 2021 WL 5899179 [2021] ).
II.
The appeal is moot because Wei Li is no longer in custody (see e.g. People ex rel. McManus v. Horn, 18 N.Y.3d 660, 663, 944 N.Y.S.2d 448, 967 N.E.2d 671 [2012] ), but both parties urge us to invoke the mootness exception. We agree that the exception applies here because the question presented is significant and novel (see Matter of LaBelle, 79 N.Y.2d 350, 361, 582 N.Y.S.2d 970, 591 N.E.2d 1156 [1992] ), there is a likelihood of repetition, and the issue is likely to evade review because CPL article 730 examinations are usually conducted before the appellate process is completed (see e.g. People ex rel. McManus, 18 N.Y.3d at 663–664, 944 N.Y.S.2d 448, 967 N.E.2d 671 ; City of New York v. Maul 14 N.Y.3d 499, 507, 903 N.Y.S.2d 304, 929 N.E.2d 366 [2010] ; Mental Hygiene Legal Servs. v. Ford, 92 N.Y.2d 500, 506, 683 N.Y.S.2d 150, 705 N.E.2d 1191 [1998] ;
see generally Matter of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 713–714, 431 N.Y.S.2d 400, 409 N.E.2d 876 [1980] ).2
III.
Turning to whether the arraignment court had discretion to remand Wei Li for the sole purpose of conducting the competency examination, we now decide the question left open in ( Matter of LaBelle, 79 N.Y.2d at 361, 582 N.Y.S.2d 970, 591 N.E.2d 1156 ) regarding the scope of the court's discretionary authority under CPL 730.20. For the reasons discussed, we hold that the court has no authority beyond that expressly granted by CPL article 730.
A.
The starting point of our analysis is the statutory text because the words of the statute are the best indicator of the legislature's intent (see People v. Galindo, 38 N.Y.3d 199, 203, 171 N.Y.S.3d 865, 191 N.E.3d 1136 [2022] ; Riley v. County of Broome, 95 N.Y.2d 455, 463, 719 N.Y.S.2d 623, 742 N.E.2d 98 [2000] ; Majewski v. Broadalbin–Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 N.Y.2d 577, 583, 673 N.Y.S.2d 966, 696 N.E.2d 978 [1998] ). Where the language of the statute is unambiguous, we apply its plain meaning (see Columbia Mem. Hosp. v. Hinds, 38 N.Y.3d 253, 271, 172 N.Y.S.3d 649, 192 N.E.3d 1128 [2022] ; Kuzmich v. 50 Murray St. Acquisition LLC, 34 N.Y.3d 84, 91, 108 N.Y.S.3d 431, 132 N.E.3d 624 [2019] ; Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y. v. City of New York, 41 N.Y.2d 205, 208, 391 N.Y.S.2d 544, 359 N.E.2d 1338 [1976] ).
Subdivisions (2) and (3) of CPL 730.20 provide, in relevant part:
"When the defendant is not in custody at the time a court issues an order of examination, because [the defendant] was theretofore released on bail or on [their] own recognizance, the court may direct that the examination be conducted on an out-patient basis, and at such time and place as the director shall designate. If, however, the director informs the court that hospital confinement of the defendant is necessary for an effective examination, the court may direct that the defendant be confined in a hospital designated by the director
until the examination is completed" ( CPL 730.20[2] ).
"When the defendant is in custody at the time a court issues an order of examination, the examination must be conducted at the place where the defendant is being held in custody. If, however, the director determines that hospital confinement of the defendant is necessary for an effective examination, the sheriff must deliver the defendant to a hospital designated by the director and hold [the defendant] in custody therein, under sufficient guard, until the examination is completed" ( CPL 730.20[3] ).3
B.
As a threshold matter, we conclude that Wei Li was not "in custody" during his arraignment for the purposes of subdivision
(3) because he was not charged with a qualifying offense under the bail laws and the court was required to order his release at arraignment (see CPL 510.10[3] ; 530.20[1][a]). As its plain text makes clear, subdivision (3) mandates the location for the examination as either (1) the place where the defendant is in custody at the time the court orders the examination, or (2) at a hospital facility, as might be necessary for an effective examination. The statute's use of the phrase "in custody," like the phrase "hospital confinement," refers, as a practical matter, to where a defendant may be properly examined by psychiatric personnel. Thus, "in custody," as used in subdivision (3), does not broadly refer to custodial control over a defendant at a courthouse.
Notably, a different reading would mandate a remand or hospital confinement in every case where the court at arraignment directs a competency examination. This interpretation would, in turn, render subdivision (2) meaningless, in contravention of our established rules of construction that require...
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