People ex rel. Morris v. Skinner
| Decision Date | 09 August 1971 |
| Citation | 67 Misc.2d 221,323 N.Y.S.2d 905 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of New York ex rel. Ronald Elmer MORRIS, Petitioner, v. Albert SKINNER, Monroe County Sheriff, Respondent. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
The petitioner was arrested on a warrant based upon an information charging him with the crime of falsely reporting an incident in violation of section 240.50 of the Penal Law. Awaiting trial, he brings this habeas corpus proceeding seeking his release on the ground that the information fails to state any crime. The respondent contends that the writ of habeas corpus may not be used to test the sufficiency of an indictment and, in any event, the information does state a crime.
]The right to challenge an indictment or an information by the writ of habeas corpus is strictly limited. It is not to be employed as a substitute for a demurrer or a motion to dismiss an indictment or information' (25 N.Y.Jur. Habeas Corpus § 44). Nevertheless, 'the remedy (of habeas corpus) is available where the indictment is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court * * * as where the information * * * fails to charge any crime' (25 N.Y.Jur. Habeas Corpus § 44, citing, People ex rel. Koons v. Elling, 190 Misc. 998, 77 N.Y.S.2d 103; People ex rel. Prudhomme v. Superintendent of New York State Reformatory, Sup.Ct., 21 N.Y.S.2d 563; also People ex rel. Guido v. Calkins, 9 N.Y.2d 77, 211 N.Y.S.2d 166, 172 N.E.2d 549, where the court, without discussing the propriety of the remedy of habeas corpus, determined that the information was sufficient and dismissed the writ).
Here, the information charges that the petitioner 'did commit the Crime of Falsely reporting an Incident, a Class B Misdemeanor in violation of Sec. 240.50(3) of the Penal Law of the State of New York in that he did on or about the 31st day of March 1971, at about 11 o'clock P.M. in the Town of Greece, County of Monroe, State of New York at 85 Greenfield Road did falsely report false information relating to an actual incident to the police, knowing at the time that such information was false, by reporting that he did not know what caused the death of one Donald Janneck and reporting that said Donald Janneck died on the living room floor, when he in fact died in an upstairs bedroom and defendant did assist with moving the body to the living room floor at 85 Greenfield Road to conceal the fact that they had been sniffing Carbona in the upstairs bedroom at said address.'
Section 240.50 of the Penal Law reads in part as follows:
'A person is guilty of falsely reporting an incident when, knowing the information reported, conveyed or circulated to be false or baseless, he:
3. Gratuitously reports to a law enforcement officer or agency (a) the alleged occurrence of an offense or incident which did not in fact occur; or (b) an allegedly impending occurrence of an offense or incident which in fact is not about to occur; or (c) false information relating to an actual offense or incident or to the alleged implication of some person therein.'
It is undisputed that the petitioner and some of his friends were sniffing Carbona and one of them lost consciousness and died. Someone called the police and when they arrived they questioned the petitioner and the others present. In response to this questioning the petitioner gave the information alleged to be false.
Petitioner contends that the information fails to state any crime since it does not allege, nor from the facts stated can it be inferred, that the false report was made 'gratuitously.' The merit of this argument depends upon the meaning, in the context of subdivision 3 of section 240.50, of the word, 'gratuitously.'
Most dictionaries assign to the word 'gratuitous' two primary meanings: 1. Given without cost to the recipient; free of charge. 2. Without sufficient cause, reason or ground; groundless; baseless. (See e.g., Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language.)
It is illogical to assume that the legislature here intended the word 'gratuitously' to mean, 'without pay or recompense'. Surely, the legislature in prescribing false reporting as a crime, did not intend to create an exception where the person making a false report expected to be paid.
It is also illogical to assume that the legislature meant that word to be synonymous with 'groundless' or 'baseless.' The first sentence of section 240,50 requires, as an element of the crime of false reporting, that the person charged knew 'the information reported, conveyed or circulated to be false or baseless.' It was not...
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Choi v. State
...response to inquiries initiated by law enforcement officials, punishable conduct." (Ibid.) See also People ex Rel. Morris v. Skinner, 67 Misc.2d 221, 222-224, 323 N.Y.S.2d 905 (Sup.Ct.1971). In our view, even if Nancy's statement to the police detective on January 4, 1987, contained false r......
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...527; People v. Oliver, 193 Misc.2d 250, 750 N.Y.S.2d 449; People v. Li, 192 Misc.2d 380, 745 N.Y.S.2d 683; People ex rel. Morris v. Skinner, 67 Misc.2d 221, 323 N.Y.S.2d 905). Moreover, even assuming that the evidence was legally sufficient, I believe that the defendant was also deprived of......
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...of Penal Law § 240.50(3)(a) is to prevent the waste of the time and resources of law enforcement ( see People ex rel. Morris v. Skinner, 67 Misc.2d 221, 224, 323 N.Y.S.2d 905). The defendant's contention that the trial court's Sandoval ruling ( see People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 357 N.Y......
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United States ex rel. Best v. Warden
...not exhausted his state review process. The cases that Best cites in his letter requesting reconsideration, People ex rel. Morris v. Skinner, 323 N.Y.S.2d 905 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971) (holding that habeas relief is warranted where detention is by virtue of a subject matter jurisdictionally defe......