People ex rel. Neville v. Ragen

• Decision Date: 19 March 1947
• Docket Number: No. 29948.,29948.
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. NEVILLE v. RAGEN, Warden.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

396 Ill. 565

72 N.E.2d 175

PEOPLE ex rel. NEVILLE

v.RAGEN, Warden.

No. 29948.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 19, 1947.

Original habeas corpus proceeding by the People, on the relation Irene Neville, for and on behalf of William O'Brien, against Joseph E. Ragen, warden.

Petitioner remanded to custody of warden.

James M. Burke, of Chicago, for petitioner.

George F. Barrett, Atty. Gen. (Edward Wolfe, of Chicago, of counsel), for respondent.

MURPHY, Justice.

On motion of Irene Neville, leave was granted to file an original petition for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of her brother, William O'Brien, who is being held in the Illinois State Penitentiary. The petition and answer of the warden of the penitentiary show the following facts. On March 11, 1920, petitioner entered a plea of guilty in the criminal court of Cook county, to the crime of robbery while armed. He was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of years ‘not to exceed the maximum term fixed by statute’ for such crime.

After entering the penitentiary, petitioner's case was frequently before the parole board. In the first four hearings parole was denied but, at the fifth hearing, was allowed. He was admitted to parole March 18, 1930, and the usual parole agreement was executed. Among other things, it contained the statement that to attest petitioner's ability to abstain from crime and lead an upright life, he was ‘paroled and permitted to temporarily and conditionally go outside the enclosure of the penitentiary for the period of his maximum’ sentence. The parole was granted on the usual terms and conditions, which was that on a violation of the same he should be returned to the penitentiary to serve out the maximum sentence.

On September 23, 1932, petitioner violated his parole agreement. On that day, he and four others became involved in a robbery, in the course of which a police officer was killed. On September 27, 1932, the warden's warrant was issued for his arrest as a parole violator. The date he was taken into custody does not appear, but before being returned to the penitentiary for violation of his parole, petitioner pleaded guilty in the criminal court of Cook county to the crime of murder. On December 22, 1932, he was sentenced to the penitentiary for twenty-five years on such charge. By credit of time allowed for good behavior, he completed the murder sentence and on September 26, 1946, was discharged from serving further time for that crime. However, the warden continued to hold him in prison as a parole violator under the sentence for robbery entered in March, 1920. The last order of the Board of Pardons and Paroles was entered October 15, 1946. It denied parole and continued his case to December 27, 1956.

When petitioner was sentenced to the penitentiary for robbery while armed in March, 1920, the penalty for such offense was imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than ten years or for life. Hurd's Stat.1919, chap. 38, par. 246. An indeterminate sentence is a sentence for the full term fixed by law for the crime. People ex rel. Ross v. Becker, 382 Ill. 404, 47 N.E.2d 475;People ex rel. Barrett v. Dixon, 387 Ill. 420, 56 N.E.2d 816. The robbery sentence was a sentence for life. People ex rel. Michaels v. Bowen, 367 Ill. 589, 12 N.E.2d 625;People v. Connors, 291 Ill. 614, 126 N.E. 595. Full satisfaction of such sentence meant imprisonment in the penitentiary for life, less earned good time, unless he was discharged in the manner provided by law. The two methods by which the sentence for life might have been terminated were, release on parole and compliance with the conditions of his parole followed by a discharge granted by the parole authorities with the approval of the Governor; (People v. Bowen, 367 Ill. 589, 12 N.E.2d 625) or by a pardon or commutation of sentence by the Governor. People v. Dixon, 387 Ill. 420, 56 N.E.2d 816.

Petitioner refers to the well-established rule that two or more sentences of a defendant to the same place of confinement run concurrently in the absence of specific provision in the judgment to the contrary,...