People ex rel. Newcomb v. Metz

• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Writing for the Court: Before SWEENEY; LARKIN; SWEENEY
• Citation: People ex rel. Newcomb v. Metz, 409 N.Y.S.2d 554, 64 A.D.2d 219 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978)
• Decision Date: 19 October 1978
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York ex rel. Hayward NEWCOMB, Appellant-Respondent, v. Paul METZ, as Superintendent of Great Meadow Correctional Facility, et al., Respondents-Appellants.

Page 554

409 N.Y.S.2d 554

64 A.D.2d 219

The PEOPLE of the State of New York ex rel. Hayward NEWCOMB Appellant-Respondent, v. Paul METZ, as Superintendent of Great Meadow Correctional Facility, et al., Respondents-Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

Oct. 19, 1978.

Lewis B. Oliver, Jr., Albany, for appellant-respondent, Prisoners Legal Services of New York.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (Frederick R. Walsh and Ruth Kessler Toch, Albany, of counsel), for respondents-appellants.

Before SWEENEY, J. P., and STALEY, MAIN, LARKIN and MIKOLL, JJ.

OPINION FOR REVERSAL

LARKIN, Justice.

The petitioner is an individual who, as appears from this record, has had a history of mental illness. His maximum period of imprisonment for various felony convictions expires in 1984. After serving approximately 10 years in Dannemora State Hospital, he was transferred to Clinton Correctional Facility and then paroled on May 31, 1972. On July 1, 1975 he was arrested upon charges of three violations of parole: (1) failure to report to his parole officer; (2) failure to secure employment and (3) behavior which had become a menace to the safety of his family and others.

After lengthy administrative and judicial proceedings relative to petitioner's parole revocation, a final parole revocation hearing was scheduled for September 20, 1977. Petitioner's counsel sought to produce medical testimony regarding petitioner's mental incompetency, both as it pertained to his fitness to proceed with the hearing and his understanding of the nature of his actions which led to parole revocation. The board refused to proceed on the grounds that it had no statutory authority to make a determination of mental competency and that there could be no final revocation hearing until the competency issue had been resolved. The judgment which is the subject of this appeal was rendered upon an application for habeas corpus which was essentially based upon the failure of the board to afford petitioner a parole revocation hearing as mandated by statute (Executive Law, § 259-i, subd. 3) and regulation (7 NYCRR Part 1925).

By the judgment which is the subject of this appeal Special Term ordered an examination of the petitioner by two certified psychiatrists pursuant to section 402 of the Correction Law. If the psychiatrists both certified petitioner as mentally ill and in need of care and treatment, the court directed the superintendent of Great Meadow Correctional Facility to petition for an order of commitment to a hospital for the mentally ill in accordance with section 402 of the Correction Law. This statute affords the person whose mental condition is in issue with extensive due process rights including notice in writing, a hearing, a judicial determination and, upon appeal, either a jury determination or a second judicial decision. Finally, Special Term directed that if petitioner were found to be mentally ill but not requiring confinement in a mental hospital, he be released on parole upon condition that he participate as an outpatient in an appropriate course of treatment prescribed by the Department of Mental Hygiene.

Initially, we note that it is well established that habeas corpus is a proper remedy for review of parole revocation proceedings (People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 27 N.Y.2d 376, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449, 267 N.E.2d 238; People ex rel. Warren v. Mancusi, 40 A.D.2d 279, 339 N.Y.S.2d 882). The petitioner's arguments under CPLR 7010 (subd. (a)) to the contrary, it is clear from the cases in which the courts have examined parole revocation proceedings in the context of habeas corpus that a determination favorable to petitioner does not necessarily require his discharge from custody (Id. See also, People ex rel. Hutchings v. Smith, 50 A.D.2d 1097, 377 N.Y.S.2d 336, app. dsmd. 38 N.Y.2d 904, 382 N.Y.S.2d 754, 346 N.E.2d 555; cf. People ex rel. Kamenstein v. Beckenstein,26 A.D.2d 669, 272 N.Y.S.2d 641).

The primary issue which must be decided by this court is whether due process mandates consideration of a person's mental competency in the context of the parole revocation process. Other issues have been presented by the parties, but in view of our determination to remand this application for further administrative proceedings we do not consider these questions at this time.

The respondents have taken the position that they have no statutory authority to determine mental competency in the context of a parole revocation proceeding, that such a determination is unnecessary and that they will not proceed if the petitioner insists upon such determination. We find no New York cases dealing with the relationship between mental competency and parole revocation in such a way as to be applicable to the facts of the case at hand. Accordingly, we must be guided by general principles applicable to parole revocation as enunciated by the New York Court of Appeals and by the United States Supreme Court.

In People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison (supra), in holding that the due process clause of the New York Constitution (N.Y.Const., art. I, § 6) guaranteed the right to counsel at a final parole revocation hearing, the Court of Appeals characterized the...