People ex rel. Port Chester Sav. Bank v. Cromwell

• Decision Date: 01 June 1886
• Citation: 102 N.Y. 477,7 N.E. 413
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. PORT CHESTER SAV. BANK v. CROMWELL, Treasurer.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

102 N.Y. 477

7 N.E. 413

PEOPLE ex rel. PORT CHESTER SAV. BANK

v.CROMWELL, Treasurer.¹

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 1, 1886.

Appeal from order and judgment of general term supreme court, Second department, reversing order denying mandamus, and granting it.

Isaac N. Mills, for the People, etc.

Wilson Brown, Jr., for appellant, David Cromwell, Treasurer.

RUGER, C. J.

In the consideration of this appeal the defendant is entitled to have the facts determined in accordance with the relation thereof contained in his opposing affidavits. The statements of the affidavits are conflicting, and as the relator, notwithstanding that fact, still demanded a peremptory mandamus, it could only be granted upon the assumption that there were no disputed facts. Its action was equivalent to a demurrer to the case presented by the opposing affidavits, and the question thus presented must be determined upon the assumption of their truth. People v. Richards, 99 N. Y. 620; S. C. 1 N. E. Rep. 258; People v. Supervisors, etc., 73 N. Y. 175;People v. Supervisors, etc., 64 N. Y. 600. The facts thus presented are that Masterton & Co. were the legal depositaries of the moneys of the county of Westchester applicable to the redemption of its bonded indebtedness, and, before November 1, 1884, had been put in funds by defendant, its county treasurer, to redeem the coupons for interest on its debt maturing on that day. The relator held such coupons, to the amount of upwards of $500, and on November 6, 1884, presented them to Masterton & Co. for payment, and, upon being interrogated as to the manner of payment, stated that it wished a draft for the amount. Thereupon Masterton & Co. delivered to the relator their sight draft upon the National City Bank of New York for the amount thereof, and it surrendered to Masterton & Co. its coupons, which were immediately charged to the defendant's account as paid, and the coupons were afterwards delivered to the county treasurer. At the time of this transaction Masterton & Co. had on hand cash sufficient to pay the amount of such coupons, and would have paid them in currency but for the election of the relator to take the amount in a draft. The draft was presented by the relator to the National City Bank, sometime in November thereafter, and was protested for non-acceptance and non-payment; Masterton & Co. having failed in the mean time. That fact was made public on the 8th, although Masterton & Co. were insolvent on the 6th, and remained so until after the draft was presented. Upon these facts the relator applied for a peremptory mandamus against the county treasurer requiring him to pay the coupons. The defendant alleges that he had no money in his hands with which to pay them, and no means for raising the amount from the tax-payers of the county by virtue of any statutory authority. The remedy sought is of doubtful propriety in its application to the circumstances related, and it might well be said that payment of the general indebtedness of a county cannot be enforced by the punishment of its financial officers; but, as we are of the opinion that the relator has not shown a case entitling him to recover upon the merits, we prefer to dispose of the appeal upon that ground.

The claim of the relator is that the loss occasioned by the insolvency of Masterton & Co. shall be imposed upon the defendant, and enforced by the compulsory process of the court. It is evident that this loss resulted from the voluntary action of the relator in accepting a draft, instead of money, for the obligations of the county then surrendered, and that it thereby intended to discharge its claim upon the county, and to accept in lieu thereof the responsibility of Masterton & Co. This is the plain meaning of the transaction as evidenced by the unequivocal acts of the parties, and it cannot be obscured by supposed analogies to other situations. Masterton & Co. were the special agents of the county to pay their coupons, as a bank is the agent of its depositor to pay his check. If, upon presentation, such agent or bank should refuse payment, the debt remains unpaid; but, if the creditor accepts anything other than legal currency in payment, the debt is discharged. Crawford v. West Side Bank, 100 N. Y. 50; S. C. 2 N. E. Rep. 881. The authority of the depositary is simple, and limited to the act of making payment; and if the creditor goes further, and deals with it for any other transaction than that of receiving payment, he does so upon his own responsibility, and must bear the consequent loss, if any, of such a transaction.

The surrender of the possession of the coupons by the relator was inconsistent with the expectation of any continuance of liability on the part of the county thereon, as it was beyond the power of Masterton & Co. to authorize such an expectation. The county had provided the funds for the payment of its indebtedness; and, if the creditor accepted anything else than cash for its obligations, he was at liability to do it, but acted on his own responsibility in so doing. The entire scope of the agency of Masterton & Co. was to pay out the moneys of the county to its creditors, in the amounts, to the persons, and at the time specified in its obligations, and, outside of the performance of this duty, they had no power to bind or affect the county. The limitations upon their authority arose from the nature of the business they were authorized by statute to transact, and were obvious to all who had financial dealings with the county.

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