People ex rel. Riles v. Windsor University
| Decision Date | 29 June 1977 |
| Citation | 139 Cal.Rptr. 378,71 Cal.App.3d 326 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of California ex rel. Wilson RILES, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WINDSOR UNIVERSITY, INC., a California Corporation, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 49115. |
Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., N. Eugene Hill, Asst. Atty. Gen., Anne S. Pressman, and Robert S. Henry, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent.
This is an appeal from a summary judgment granting a permanent injunction to the Superintendent of Public Instruction (plaintiff or Superintendent where appropriate) prohibiting Windsor University (University) from (1) 'offering without the approval of the . . . Superintendent . . . courses that lead to a Vocational objective or . . . issuing . . . any diploma or honorary degree based on completion or participation in said course or courses of study,' more specifically, the granting of a degree for its Respiratory Therapy Technician program and Operating Room Technician program and a diploma for its Home Health Aide program. 1
University has statutory authority to grant degrees under section 29023, subdivision (a)(3), Infra, hereinafter referred to as (a)(3) of the Education Code). 2
Beginning on June 30, 1974, University, a private corporation, offered with the approval of the Superintendent certain courses which are not the subject of this suit. This approval was granted pursuant to section 29025, 3 Infra. Approval for these courses expired on June 30, 1975 as the approval under section 29025 lasts for only one year.
On June 13, 1975, University requested by letter that all courses previously approved be granted new approvals. In the same communication University sought approval for three new courses entitled Operating Room Technician Training Course, Respiratory Therapy Technician Training Course and Home Health Aide Training Course.
In June of 1975 the Bureau of School Approvals, the agency charged with the enforcement of Division 21, 4 informed University that based on the fact that its application was incomplete approval could not be granted. No subsequent application from University was received by the Bureau. An inspection of University on July 25, 1975 by the Bureau of School Approvals revealed that University was nonetheless offering the three new courses listed above without the approval of the Superintendent.
The following month plaintiff filed a complaint for injunction. The complaint alleged in substance that University was in violation of section 29025, Infra, by offering vocational courses without approval of Superintendent. The complaint contended that vocational courses could not be offered without such approval and prayed for a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and a permanent injunction 'enjoining Windsor from offering any course leading to an educational, vocational or professional objective without the approval of the Superintendent of Public Instruction.'
Three different judges ruled in favor of plaintiff in that a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction and permanent injunction were granted. Defendant filed notices of appeal from the orders granting the preliminary and the permanent injunction. Both appeals were consolidated into this appeal.
Section 29023 (now § 94310) provides in pertinent part: 'Except as otherwise provided by law, no . . . corporation may issue, ion of their . . . an academic or honorary 'degree' . . . which signifies . . . or is generally taken to signify satisfactory completion of the requirements of an Academic, technological, or Professional program of study this section.' (Emphasis added.)
The subdivision applicable here provides in pertinent part: '(a)(3) A corporation which has filed with the Superintendent of Public Instruction an affidavit . . . stating that the corporation owns an interest in real or personal property or both real and personal property used exclusively for the purpose of education, of a fair market value of not less than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000). . . .'
Section 29025 (now § 94312), as pertinent here, provides: (Emphasis added.) (The statute then continues to describe the types of schools that are authorized to grant degrees.)
University contends that the trial court erred in granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, arguing that it is authorized to issue, without first obtaining Superintendent's approval, a degree to the students who successfully complete the Respiratory Therapy Technician program of study and the Operating Room Technician program of study under subdivision (a)(3) because they are technological and academic in nature and not vocational. 5 It also argues that Respiratory Therapy is an emerging profession rather than a vocation. In addition, University maintains that it is authorized to issue a diploma for the Home Health Aide program under section 29023, subdivision (c), 6 since it has been accredited by the Department of Public Health for the State of California to educate Home Health Aides.
Plaintiff asserts that the three courses offered by University have a definite vocational objective and fall within the purview of section 29025. Additionally, plaintiff contends that section 29023, subdivision (c) does not give University the authority to offer its Home Health Aide course.
It is elementary that summary judgment is a drastic measure which deprives the losing party of trial on the merits. It therefore may not be invoked unless it is clear from the affidavits (or declarations) filed in connection with the motion that there are no triable issues of fact. (Code Civ.Proc., § 437c.) Doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion. (Lacy v. Laurentide Finance Corp., 28 Cal.App.3d 251, 256, 104 Cal.Rptr. 547; Crescenta Valley Moose Lodge v. Bunt, 8 Cal.App.3d 682, 686, 87 Cal.Rptr. 428; Rafeiro v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 5 Cal.App.3d 799, 804, 85 Cal.Rptr. 701.)
Whether certain courses lead to a technological, professional or academic objective or whether they are vocational in nature is a factual question that must be determined in each particular case. In the present case, from the declarations and papers before the court on the motion for summary judgment, it appears that there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the Respiratory Therapy Technician program and the Operating Room Technician program offered by University are vocational or technological and academic in nature. Thus, summary judgment may not be granted.
In addition, University contends that although its Home Health Aide program has a vocational objective, it is authorized under section 29023, subdivision (c) (now § 94310, subd. (c)) to issue a diploma for such a program without seeking the approval of the Superintendent under section 29025. Section 29023 (now § 94310) states in pertinent part: (Emphasis added).
Superintendent, however, asserts that the 'it' in the above statute refers not to 'a . . . corporation' but to the 'profession, vocation, or occupation.'
Where the construction of a statute is necessary, it should be interpreted so as to produce a result that is reasonable; the court must look to the context of the law and, where uncertainty exists, consideration should be given to the consequences that will flow from a particular interpretation. If two constructions are possible, that which leads to the more reasonable result should be adopted. (Ivens v. Simon, 212 Cal.App.2d 177, 181, 27 Cal.Rptr. 801; see also Alford v. Pierno, 27 Cal.App.3d 682, 688, 104 Cal.Rptr. 110; Vittal v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 8 Cal.App.3d 112, 120, 87 Cal.Rptr. 319.)
Both Superintendent and University agree that the program offered by University has been approved and accredited by the Department of Health. However, Superintendent contends that this is not sufficient because the program is not in a Licensed vocation. Consequently, it is argued that Two elements must be present for recognition: (1) An accreditation of the school by the agency In (2) an occupation licensed by the agency. Thus, it argues that since the Home Health Aides, themselves, are not licensed by the Department of Health, 7 section 29023, subdivision (c) is not applicable.
However, such an interpretation would violate the intent of the statute. When another agency has such a vital interest in an occupation as to be required to 'accredit, approve, or license' schools...
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...constructions are possible, that which leads to the more reasonable result should be adopted." (People ex rel. Riles v. Windsor University, Inc. (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 326, 332, 139 Cal.Rptr. 378.) In this context, application of that rule of construction suggests that conduct that is more, n......
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