People v. Deatherage

• Citation: 401 Ill. 25,81 N.E.2d 581
• Decision Date: 24 September 1948
• Docket Number: No. 30580.,30580.
• Parties: PEOPLE v. DEATHERAGE et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

401 Ill. 25

81 N.E.2d 581

PEOPLE

v.DEATHERAGE et al.

No. 30580.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 24, 1948.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Morgan County; Clem Smith, Judge.

Quo warranto proceedings by the people of the State of Illinois by the State's Attorney of Morgan County against Charles F. Deatherage and others as members of the Board of Education of Waverly Community School District No. 6, questioning the validity of the organization of the district and the right of defendants to hold office. From an adverse judgment, the people of the State of Illinois appeal.

Judgment affirmed.

William L. Fay, State's Attorney, of Jacksonville (W. R. Bellatti, of Jacksonville, and Murphy & Murphy, of Carlinville, of counsel), for appellant.

Barber & Barber, of Springfield (Clayton J. Barber, Alton G. Hall, and Samuel C. Fielden, all of Springfield, of counsel), for appellees.

Fred H. Kelly and Craig Van Meter, both of Mattoon, amici curiae.

F. E. Merrills, of Belleville, for Board of Education of Community High School District No. 195, St. Clair County, amici curiae.

CRAMPTON, Justice.

The legislature in 1947 enacted a statute whereby the organization of community unit school districts, to maintain gardes one to twelve, inclusive, was permitted. This became sections 8-9 to 8-14, inclusive, of article 8 of the School Code.

The State's Attorney of Morgan County by quo warranto questioned the validity of the organization of the Waverly Community School District No. 6, and the right of defendants as members of the board of education to hold office. They, by answer, endeavored to justify by pleading the successive steps taken to organize the district, and to place them in office. The plaintiff moved to dismiss the answer as legally insufficient to justify and asked for judgment. This the circuit court of Morgan County denied, and the plaintiff elected to stand by its motion. The judgment held the district to be legally organized and the defendants the lawful incumbents of their offices. The appeal is direct to this court because questions of the validity of a statute and a right of franchise are involved.

The plaintiff has attacked the act as violative of several provisions of the constitution of 1870, Smith-Hurd Stats., and also points to several alleged failures to comply with requirements of the act, both being equally fatal insofar as the Waverly unit district is specifically involved. This court, on motion, allowed certain individuals to file briefs as amici curiae, all supporting the plaintiff-appellant.

Section 1 of article VIII of the constitution of 1870 provides: ‘The general assembly shall provide a thorough and efficient system of free schools, whereby all children of this state may receive a good common school education.’ The plaintiff contends the section is violated by the community unit school act when it is utilized to create such district by the inclusion of territory which constitutes only a fraction of an existing and partially underlying elementary or high school district. Such fractionated underlying district would, plaintiff argues, be left with such a small segment of territory and population as to make it impossible for the district to maintain a school at the prior level of efficiency and thoroughness. Plaintiff believes such to constitute considerably less than the ‘thorough and efficient system’ required by the constitution. Plaintiff admits this is the first time the court has been called upon to determine the validity of a statute allowing such alleged situation to be developed, or of any similar enactment. We are asked to do the above, and much alse, on the foundation of issues developed by the pleadings only, unsupported by any evidence adduced in the case.

We must first ascertain whether this court has the duty and the power to determine whether a specific school system is thorough and efficient. Where issues before this court involve the constitutionality of statutes permitting the creation of school districts, the court is necessarily limited in decision to a narrow field. This is true because of the inherent power of the legislature and section 1 of article VIII of the constitution. The section simply operates as a mandate to the legislature to exercise its inherent power to carry out a primary, obligatory concept of our system of government, i. e., the children of the State are entitled to a good common-school education, in public schools, and at public expense. Prior decisions of this court have held the section to also place upon the legislature two limitations when implementing that concept: the schools established, i. e., the system, must be free and must be open to all without discrimination. Fiedler v. Eckfeldt, 335 Ill. 11, 166 N.E. 504;Keime v. Community High School District No. 296, 348 Ill. 228, 180 N.E. 858;People ex rel. Tuohy v. Barrington Consolidated High School District No. 224, 396 Ill. 129, 71 N.E.2d 86. This court has consistently held the section to impose the two limitations, and no more. People ex rel. Tuohy v. Barrington Consolidated High School District No. 224, 396 Ill. 129, 71 N.E.2d 86.

This court has also been consistent in holding that the question of the efficiency and thoroughness of the school system established by legislative permission is one solely for the legislature to answer and that the courts lack power to intrude. Wilcox v. People ex rel. Lipe, 90 Ill. 186;Owners of Lands v. People ex rel. Stookey, 113 Ill. 296;People ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson, 155 Ill. 451, 40 N.E. 307;Chicago, Wilmington and Vermilion Coal Co. v. People, 181 Ill. 270, 54 N.E. 961,48 L.R.A. 554. In Fiedler v. Eckfeldt, 335 Ill. 11, 166 N.E. 504, 509, we said, it is not for the court to determine if the system is the best which could be brought forth. School problems are essentially practical ones,-what is best, cannot be easily answered. ‘It is no more within the authority of the court to pass judgment upon the thoroughness and efficiency of the system, or any part of it, than to determine whether the laws enacted for the protection of operative miners, in compliance with section 29 of article 4 of the Constitution, are such as are necessary for that purpose; whether the action of the Governor in removing an officer for incompetency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office, under section 12 of article 5, is justified by the facts; * * * All these questions have been held to be matters for legislative determination, with which the courts have no right to interfere. * * * Even if the legislative intent might be thought crude or unwise and the law unjust or oppressive, errors of legislation are not subject to judicial review unless they exceed some limitation imposed by the constitution. Within those limitations the legislative power is supreme, and judicial power cannot interfere with it.’

A community unit school district, like any other school district established under enabling legislation, is entirely subject to the will of the legislature thereafter. With or without the consent of the inhabitants of a school district, over their protests, even without notice or hearing, the State may take the school facilities in the district, without giving compensation therefor, and vest them in other districts or agencies. The State may hold or manage the facilities directly or indirectly. The area of the district may be contracted or expanded, it may be divided, united in whole or in part with another district, and the district may be abolished. All this at the will of the legislature. The ‘property of the school district’ is a phrase which is misleading. The district owns no property, all school facilities, such as grounds, buildings, equipment, etc., being in fact and law the property of the State and subject to the legislative will. People ex rel. Taylor v. Camargo, Community Consol. School Dist. No. 158, 313 Ill. 321, 145 N.E. 154, and cases cited therein.

The legislature has always adhered to the policy of never creating school districts by direct action. The policy has been to enact enabling legislation, whereby the resident voters of a defined area proposed for a school district of a certain type were given the responsibility of determining whether such district should be established. The intent of the people concerned was found by an election or by a petition. This policy is undoubtedly predicated upon the legislature's belief that persons primarily affected are the best judges of what type of school will best serve, or not serve them, within the bounds of the proposed district; this to be done against the background of local needs, desires and conditions. This policy caters to the concept of local selfgovernment. People ex rel. Taylor v. Camargo Community Consol. School District No. 158, 313 Ill. 321, 145 N.E. 154;Husser v. Fourth, 386 Ill. 188, 53 N.E.2d 949.

We take judicial notice of the fact that the whole area of the State has been divided into school districts. Therefore the territory described in the petition for the organization of the Waverly Community Unit School District No. 6 must have included the territories of several whole school districts. No evidence was heard in this case in the court below, and we cannot tell from the record whether the organization of the Waverly district resulted in the fractioning of one or more underlying districts. In any event, the mere fact of a school district being fractioned when a community unit school district is organized does not ipso facto establish that the school system, within the emasculated district, lacks efficiency and thoroughness.

In People ex rel. Russell v. Graham, 301 Ill. 446, 134 N.E. 57, the constitutionality of the act enabling the establishment of community consolidated school districts was under attack. (Laws of 1919, p. 904; Ill.Rev.Stat.1947, chap. 122, art. 8). It was charged the act did not provide a thorough and efficient system of free schools, so all the children of the State may...