People ex rel. Ryan v. Coles
| Decision Date | 10 October 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 77-220,77-220 |
| Parties | , 21 Ill.Dec. 543 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, ex rel. Dennis P. RYAN, State's Attorney of Lake County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald R. COLES, Defendant-Appellant. PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, ex rel. Jack HOOGASIAN, State's Attorney of Lake County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald R. COLES, Lake Villa Town Board of Auditors, a body politic and corporate, Defendants-Appellants. PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, ex rel. Lowell R. LLOYD, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. Ronald R. COLES, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
William C. Marlatt, Jr., Lake Forest, for defendant-appellant.
Dennis P. Ryan, State's Atty., William J. Blumthal, Asst. State's Atty., Waukegan, for plaintiff-appellee.
This appeal presents the question of whether a public official, who has been convicted of extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, is eligible to hold the office of township supervisor.
In March of 1976, Ronald R. Coles was convicted of two counts of extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, in federal court. At the time of his conviction, Coles was supervisor of Lake Villa Township. The Lake Villa Town Board of Auditors, pursuant to section 1 of "AN ACT to require the payment of compensation to any officer or employee of the State of Illinois who has been reinstated in his office or employment after reversal of his conviction for any crime" (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 102, par. 120), declared the office of township supervisor vacant. However, on June 23, 1976, the board appointed Coles to serve the unexpired term. On November 4, 1976, the Lake County State's Attorney instituted a quo warranto proceeding against Coles and the Lake Villa Town Board of Auditors, and on February 10, 1977, an order of ouster was entered by the circuit court of Lake County. Subsequently, a township election was held on April 5, 1977, and Coles was elected township supervisor. The State's Attorney responded by filing a second quo warranto action, and this resulted in another order of ouster entered May 4, 1977. This is a consolidated appeal from the two ouster orders (hereafter appellant will be designated simply as "Coles").
After Coles' brief was filed, the State's Attorney requested and received three extensions of time within which to file a brief, but never did so. Counsel for Coles at oral argument in this court appeared and presented his views but no one appeared on behalf of the People. Then, more than a week after the case was taken under advisement, the State's Attorney filed a motion asking for leave to file a brief. We denied that motion.
Parties to an appeal are not justified in assuming that, as a matter of course, an appellate court will serve both as judge and as an advocate for the appellee, or search the record for the purpose of sustaining the judgment of the trial court. Where the appellee has filed no brief, it is within the discretion of an appellate court to reverse the judgment of the trial court if the appellant's brief demonstrates prima facie reversible error and the contentions of the brief find support in the record. (First Capitol Mortgage Corporation v. Talandis Construction Corporation (1976), 63 Ill.2d 128, 345 N.E.2d 493.) However, in the instant case, a question of considerable public importance is presented and the failure to fully explore the merits could leave Coles in office, but with his position clouded by lingering doubts concerning his statutory eligibility. Further, it is evident from the record that the trial judge gave this cause painstaking and thoughtful attention and it would be a grievous disservice to his conscientious efforts for this court to do less. Thus, we will do our best to fully explore the merits of Coles' contentions on appeal, in spite of the State's Attorney's failure to file a brief pursuant to the rules.
A reading of the constitutional and statutory provisions pertaining to the effect of criminal conviction on an individual's qualifications to hold public office is a prerequisite to the understanding of the various contentions which Coles has raised in this appeal. Article XIII, section 1 of Constitution of the State of Illinois (1970), renders individuals convicted of a broad classification of crimes ineligible to hold constitutional office:
Section 29-15 of the Election Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 46, par. 29-15) provides
Section 124-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, par. 124-1) embraces a narrower classification of offenses than article XIII, section 1 of the constitution:
" 'Infamous crimes' are the offenses of arson, bigamy, bribery, burglary, deviate sexual assault, forgery, incest or aggravated incest, indecent liberties with a child, kidnaping or aggravated kidnaping, murder, perjury, rape, robbery, sale of narcotic drugs, subornation of perjury, and theft if the punishment imposed is imprisonment in the penitentiary."
Section 5-5-5(a), (b), and (c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (), also has reference to the effect of a conviction upon a person's eligibility to hold public office:
"Loss and Restoration of Rights.) (a) Conviction and disposition shall not entail the loss by the defendant of any civil rights, except under this Section.
(b) A person convicted of a felony shall be ineligible to hold an office created by the Constitution of this State until the completion of his sentence.
(c) A person sentenced to imprisonment shall lose his right to vote until released from imprisonment."
The trial court held that the elements of Coles' conviction in federal court under 18 U.S.C. § 1951 were the equivalent of a conviction for the crime of bribery under section 33-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, par. 33-1) and that since bribery is an "infamous crime" under section 124-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, Coles was disqualified from holding office by section 29-15 of the Election Code. On appeal, Coles attacks this holding contending (1) the office of township supervisor is not a constitutional office and he is therefore not disqualified from holding such office by either article XIII, section 1 of the Constitution of the State of Illinois, or by section 5-5-5(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections of 1963; (2) that extortion under 18 U.S.C. § 1951 is not the equivalent of bribery under section 33-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, and Coles is therefore not disqualified from holding office by section 29-15 of the Election Code; (3) that when section 29-15 of the Election Code, and section 5-5-5(a), (b), and (c) of the Unified Code of Corrections of 1963 are read together, it becomes clear that section 29-15 of the Election Code does not prohibit Coles from holding township office; (4) that in any event, section 29-15 of the Election Code is violative of article IV, section 8 of the Constitution of the State of Illinois 1970, because it is not confined to a single subject; (5) that the legislature could not deny Coles his right to hold township office, absent constitutional authorization for such deprivation, and finally, (6) that the People, by failing to file a reply to Coles' answer, admitted the justification of authority pled by Coles in his answer.
At the outset, we find that we are in agreement with Coles' assertion that he is not disqualified from holding the office of township supervisor by reason of article XIII, section 1 of the Illinois Constitution or section 5-5-5(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections, since the office of township supervisor is clearly a creature of legislative enactment (see, Constitution of the State of Illinois 1970, article VII, section 5; Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 139, par. 60) and not an office "created by" the state constitution.
However, we cannot agree with Coles' other contentions. We begin by examining Coles' argument that a conviction for extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 is not the equivalent of a conviction for bribery, for purposes of section 29-15 of the Election Code. Coles argues that if the legislature had intended a conviction of a federal offense to stand as a disqualification for holding public office, it could easily have so provided in the statute, and that it was error for the trial court to "read into the statute what clearly is not there." Coles has also asserted that the conduct which formed the basis for his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1951 would not have constituted the offense of bribery under Illinois law.
In regard to the question of legislative intent, the purpose of section 29-15 of the Election Code is obvious for:
"When a public official is convicted of an infamous crime, there can be no doubt that public confidence in him and in his future performance in the unit of government in which he serves is seriously damaged, if not totally destroyed." (People ex rel. Taborski v. Illinois Appellate Court, First District (1972), 50 Ill.2d 336, 339, 278 N.E.2d 796, 798.)
To assure public confidence in the essential integrity of state and local government, the legislature decided that persons convicted of certain crimes manifesting moral turpitude, as enumerated in section 124-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Musto
...against the United States, although he had not been convicted under the state law. Similarly, in People ex rel. Ryan v. Coles, 64 Ill.App.3d 807, 21 Ill.Dec. 543, 381 N.E.2d 990 1978), the question presented to the court was whether a public official who had been convicted of extortion, in ......
-
People v. Agpawa
...by" the Illinois Constitution; public municipal offices are created by legislative enactment. People ex rel. Ryan v. Coles , 64 Ill. App. 3d 807, 811, 21 Ill.Dec. 543, 381 N.E.2d 990 (1978). We have also previously held that there is no ambiguity in section 29–15 of the Election Code's proh......
-
People ex rel. Wofford v. Brown
...People v. Hofer 363 Ill.App.3d 719, 723, 300 Ill.Dec. 202, 843 N.E.2d 460 (2006) (citing People ex rel. Ryan v. Coles , 64 Ill.App.3d 807, 811-12, 21 Ill.Dec. 543, 381 N.E.2d 990 (1978) ).¶ 17 As such, a quo warranto action is indisputably and generally a proper procedure for seeking Mr. Br......
-
Walker v. Barron
...solely out of a legislative enactment, as municipal offices are created by the legislature. See People ex rel. Ryan v. Coles , 64 Ill. App. 3d 807, 811, 21 Ill.Dec. 543, 381 N.E.2d 990 (1978) ; Hofer , 363 Ill. App. 3d at 723, 300 Ill.Dec. 202, 843 N.E.2d 460 ; Alvarez v. Williams , 2014 IL......