People ex rel. Taborski v. Illinois Appellate Court, First Dist.

• Decision Date: 28 January 1972
• Docket Number: No. 44647,44647
• Citation: 50 Ill.2d 336,278 N.E.2d 796
• Parties: The PEOPLE ex rel. Adolph S. TABORSKI, Petitioner, v. The ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT, FIRST DISTRICT, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 796

278 N.E.2d 796

50 Ill.2d 336

The PEOPLE ex rel. Adolph S. TABORSKI, Petitioner, v. The ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT, FIRST DISTRICT, et al., Respondents.

No. 44647.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 28, 1972.

Louis V. Kiefor, Calumet City, for petitioner.

Edward V. Hanrahan, State's Atty., Chicago (Vincent Bentivenga, Jr., Chief, Civil Div., and James A. Rooney, Asst. State's Atty., of counsel), for respondents.

UNDERWOOD, Chief Justice.

This is an original petition for writ of prohibition filed on the relation of Adolph S. Taborski against the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, and Justice George N. Leighton of said court. At issue is the validity of the appellate court's entry of an order staying a judgment entered in the circuit court of Cook County ousting Joseph W. Nowak from the office of mayor of Calumet City, Illinois, as a consequence of his conviction of a felony in the United States District Court.

The facts are not in dispute. On January 29, 1970, Joseph W. Nowak, the mayor of Calumet City, was convicted in the United States District Court of participating in a conspiracy to violate four sections of the Criminal Code of the United States (18 U.S.C. secs. 657, 1001, 1006, 1008) in violation of 18 U.S.C. sec. 371. A sentence of imprisonment for three years was imposed. However, he had remained free on bond pending appeal of his conviction and continues to hold the office of mayor. Subsequent to the Federal conviction, a Quo warranto action was instituted in the circuit court of Cook County by the State's Attorney seeking to oust Nowak from the office of mayor on the grounds that he had been convicted of an infamous crime and was thereby disqualified from holding public office pursuant to constitutional and statutory provisions. (S.H.A.Ill.Const.1870, art. IV, sec. 4; Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 46, par. 25--2 (Fifth); Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 38, par. 124--2(a).) On July 26, 1971, the United States Court of Appeals affirmed Nowak's conviction, and on August 2, 1971, judgment was entered in the circuit court of Cook County finding that Nowak stood convicted of an infamous crime which had caused forfeiture of his right to hold public office as of January 29, 1970, the date of his conviction. The order directed his immediate ouster from the office. Nowak appealed from this judgment to the Illinois Appellate Court and made a motion for stay of the judgment of ouster pending the disposition of the appeal therefrom. The appellate court granted the motion pursuant to a provision in the act relating to Quo warranto actions which states that 'Where an appeal is taken from a judgment of ouster of any person from any office, upon motion of the appellant the judgment of ouster shall be stayed pending final disposition of the appeal, and such person may, subject to the order of the Court, hold or execute any such office pending such final disposition of the appeal.' Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 112, par. 14.

In our opinion, the interpretation of the above-quoted statutory provision is governed by section 4 of article IV of the 1870 constitution which was in effect at the time of Nowak's conviction in the Federal court. This section provided in pertinent part that 'No person who has been, or hereafter shall be, convicted of bribery, perjury, or other infamous crime, * * * shall be eligible to the general assembly, or to any office of profit or trust in this state.' The intent of this provision and those statutes enacted in implementation thereof is very clear. Our system of government depends in large part upon trust and confidence in public officials. When a public official is convicted of an infamous crime, there can be no doubt that public confidence in him and in his future performance in the unit of government in which he serves is seriously damaged, if not totally destroyed. To prevent such a breakdown in respect for the law and confidence in government, the 1870 constitution effectuates the very strong public policy of this State that no public official who stands convicted of an infamous crime is eligible to hold public office. People ex rel. Keenan v. McGuane, 13 Ill.2d 520, 150 N.E.2d 168.

It is apparent therefore, that the stay provisions of section 6 of the Quo Warranto Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 112, par. 14) must be construed to apply only to those instances where the judgment of ouster was not predicated on conviction of an infamous crime. If the statute were otherwise construed, a clear inconsistency with the intent of section 4 of article IV of the 1870 constitution would result, since the effect of a stay order in such cases would be to keep in office an individual who was constitutionally 'ineligible' to hold public office.

Consequently, the determinative issue in the case before us is whether Joseph W. Nowak was convicted of an infamous crime within the meaning of section 4 of article IV of the 1870 constitution. Our decision in People ex rel. Keenan v. McGuane, 13 Ill.2d 520, 150 N.E.2d 168, is in point. In that case, a county assessor was convicted in the Federal district court of income tax evasion. On advice of the State's Attorney that the conviction had caused a vacancy in the office of assessor, the county board declared the office vacant and appointed another...