People ex rel. Schwartz v. Fagerholm

• Decision Date: 22 May 1959
• Docket Number: No. 35176,35176
• Citation: 17 Ill.2d 131,161 N.E.2d 20
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. Carl M. SCHWARTZ, Commissioner of Highways, Appellee, v. Albert R. FAGERHOLM, Town Clerk, Appellant, (Woodrow Wood et al.,Intervenors-Separate Appellants.)
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 20

161 N.E.2d 20

17 Ill.2d 131

PEOPLE ex rel. Carl M. SCHWARTZ, Commissioner of Highways, Appellee, v. Albert R. FAGERHOLM, Town Clerk, Appellant, (Woodrow Wood et

al.,Intervenors-Separate Appellants.)

No. 35176.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 22, 1959.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 22, 1959.

William C. O'Brien, Aurora (Wilson D. Burnell, Aurora, of counsel), for appellant Albert R. Fagerholm, Town Clerk, Town of Aurora.

Sidney D. Podolsky, Aurora, for intervenors-separate appellants.

Roy J. Solfisburg, Sr., Aurora, for appellee.

HOUSE, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment order of the circuit court of Kane County for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent, the town clerk for the town of Aurora, to perform certain official duties pertaining to the issuance of bonds for the construction of two township bridges. A constitutional question was presented to and passed upon by the trial court.

At the annual meeting of the town of Aurora on April 1, 1958, a special election was held at the request of the highway commissioner for the borrowing of money for the construction of two township bridges. The borrowing of $1,553,050 was approved by secret ballot vote, the result of which was 299 for the proposition, 288 against, ans six spoiled ballots.

The town clerk refused to join with the highway commissioner in the issuance of the bonds. The commissioner, therefore, on May 14, 1958, originated this action by filing a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the clerk to join in the issuance of the bonds. The town clerk in his answer alleged that section 18-17 of the Election Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, chap. 46, par. 18-17) was applicable to the special election and since the election was not held in conformity therewith, he asked that the prayer of the petition be denied.

The intervenors, Woodrow Wood, W. P. Mast and Paul Egan, filed a motion for leave to intervene stating that the highway commissioner and town clerk were both proponents of the proposition to construct the bridges and that the suit is a friendly one. They were permitted to intervene as defendants upon stipulation of the parties and after the court had found that they are representative of all residents and taxpayers of the township. The intervenors in their amended petition merely charge technical irregularities in the conduct of the election. Their amended petition was ordered to stand as their answer.

A motion to strike certain paragraphs of respondent's answer was filed by the petitioner. The motion alleged that section 18-17 of the Election Code is not applicable to the type of election here involved; and that if it is applicable, it is contrary to the State and Federal constitutions. Petitioner also filed a motion to strike certain paragraphs of the intervenors' amended answer. The intervenors then moved for a summary judgment

The court entered an order denying intervenors' motions, granted petitioner's motion and ordered the writ of mandamus to issue.

The intervenors contend that when Judge Poust rendered his decision he was in DeKalb County and not Kane County where the proceedings were held. They argue that since this judicial function was not exercised in the proper forum, the purported order is null and void.

The record shows that the entire cause was heard in Kane County. On January 6, 1959, Judge Poust appeared in the court room where the cause had been heard and orally announced that he would deny defendant-intervenors' moktions and would grant petitioner's motion. He then requested that a draft order be prepared. A form of order was submitted to Judge Poust on January 8 in DeKalb County, where he approved it by placing his signature thereon, it was filed for record that same day with the circuit clerk of Kane County.

A judgment is generally defined as 'the official and authentic decision of a court of justice upon the respective rights and claims of the parties to an action or suit therein litigated and submitted to its determination.' (Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed.) It is the expression of the court's decision that constitutes the rendition of the judgment. The real and obvious purpose of the rendition is to show the litigants and persons interested in the cause that the judge has arrived at a decision and what the decision is. It is this reflection of the judge's state of mind that makes the judgment or decree effective.

Where, when and how this expression of decision should be made before it can be considered a rendition has been the subject of many statutes, rules and decisions. 30 Am.Jur., Judgments, secs. 48-53; 4A C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 445; 49 C.J.S. Judgments, §§ 100-102, 113, 114; State ex rel. Ruth v. Hoffman, 82 Ohio App. 266, 80 N.E.2d 235, 4 A.L.R.2d 579. Thus, in some jurisdictions it must be in writing before it may be considered a rendition; while in others, oral expression by the judge is sufficient. 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 102, 113. In all jurisdictions, however, the expression of the judge's decision must be in words. In addition to the requirement that the decision be in words, it is necessary that the decision be made publicly and at the situs of the proceedings before it will be considered a rendition. There is a divergence of practice, however, as to what is sufficient to make the decision public. Hence, in some jurisdictions it is sufficient if the pronouncement of decision is made in open court, in others, if the clerk is authorized to enter the determination on the minutes and, in still others, if the decree or judgment is filed and becomes a part of the public record of the case. 4A C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 445. In final analysis then, there are at least three essential elements that must coincide in order to have a rendition: namely, the decision must be expressed publicly, in words, and at the situs of the proceeding.

Whether the manifestation of decision must be written or merely oral to give it effect has long been recognized in this State to depend upon whether the decision is a judgment at law or a decree in equity. In the case of a declaratory judgment, it is determined by the nature of the relief declared. At law, a judgment becomes effective at the time it is pronounced. Chicago Great Western Railroad Co. v. Ashelford, 268 Ill. 87, 108 N.E. 761; Anastaplo v. Radford, 14 Ill.2d 526, 153 N.E.2d 37. In equity the mere oral pronouncement of a decision is of no effect until the order is reduced to writing, approved by the chancellor and filed for record. Miller v. Miller, 376 Ill. 628, 35 N.E.2d 62; Anastaplo v. Radford, 14 Ill.2d 526, 153 N.E.2d 37. In the case of a declaratory judgment, the decision is effective only after it is reduced to writing, approved and filed for record, if the nature of the relief declared is equitable; while it is effective at the time it is pronounced, if the nature of the relief declared is legal. Freeport Motor Casualty Co. v. Tharp, 406 Ill. 295, 94 N.E.2d 139.

We are concerned with the question of whether a purported judgment order, approved by the presiding judge in a place other than the situs of the proceeding, can be considered an effective judgment after it has been filed with the clerk of the court.

It is common practice for a trial judge to send his decision to the clerk, directing him to file and enter it and to notify the attorneys in the case. When a judge takes a matter under advisement he continues to hear other cases and decides the matter under advisement when his work schedule permits. In the down-State circuits, however he may be many miles away from the place where the cause is pending when he reaches a determination. If he cannot send the clerk his decision, he may have to drive 50 or more miles to merely perform the mechanical act of signing the decree or announcing his judgment and then return to the place where he is presently sitting. His only alternative would be to wait until he returns to the court in his normal schedule of sittings before signing the decree or announcing his judgment.

The law favors simplicity and speed in the determination of an action, when in harmony with the effective protection of the interest of the parties and the public. There can be no argument but that simplicity and speed would be enhanced if the presiding judge be permitted to send his decretal or judgment order to the clerk to be filed for record. The only question then is whether this gain in simplicity and speed is consonant with the protection of the interest of the litigants and the public. In order to protect such interests it is necessary that they be apprised that a decision has been made by the judge and what the decision is. They would be so apprised when it has been expressed publicly, in words and at the situs of the case.

We are of the opinion that a judgment or decree approved by the presiding judge in a place other than the situs of the proceeding becomes an effective judgment or decree at the time it is filed with the clerk of the court. Such a decree or judgment is an expression of the judge's decision in written words and it becomes public at the situs of the proceeding when it is filed with the clerk of the court. It is the coincidence of these elements and not the place where the judge signs the judgment or decree that apprises the parties and the public of the decision.

Trial judges have generally interpreted the holding in Freeport Motor Casualty Co. v. Tharp, 406 Ill. 295, 94 N.E.2d 139, to mean that they must return to the situs of the cause to pronounce a judgment or approve a decree. There it was stated that until there is a pronouncement in open court the judgment order cannot be considered the judgment of the court. To require an oral pronouncement of a judgment at law loses sight of the purpose of a rendition, as hereinbefore stated, and would at times sacrifice simplicity and speed in the determination of the action without any resulting benefit to the parties or general public to...