People v. Perez

• Decision Date: 18 September 2014
• Docket Number: No. 115927.,115927.
• Citation: 18 N.E.3d 41
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Ivan PEREZ, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

18 N.E.3d 41

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant
v.
Ivan PEREZ, Appellee.

No. 115927.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 18, 2014.

18 N.E.3d 42

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Joseph H. McMahon, State's Attorney, of St. Charles (Carolyn E. Shapiro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Garson S. Fischer, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Patrick Delfino, Lawrence M. Bauer and Joan M. Kripke, of the Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of counsel), for the People.

Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg and Alison L.S. Shah, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 At issue is whether the circuit court complies with the 90–day requirement of section 122–2.1(a) of the Post–Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122–2.1(a) (West 2012)) when it signs and dates an order of dismissal on the ninetieth day after the petition is filed and docketed, but the order is not filed by the clerk until the

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ninety-first day. We hold that, because section 122–2.1(a) specifically requires the “entry” of an order, an order that is signed by the judge during the 90–day period, but not file-stamped until the ninety-first day, is not timely for purposes of section 122–2.1(a).

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 A jury convicted defendant, Ivan Perez, of first degree murder. The Appellate Court, Second District, affirmed his conviction and sentence (People v. Perez, No. 2–07–0347, 392 Ill.App.3d 1136, 368 Ill.Dec. 486, 984 N.E.2d 211 (2009) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23 )), and this court denied defendant's petition for leave to appeal (People v. Perez, 235 Ill.2d 600, 338 Ill.Dec. 253, 924 N.E.2d 459 (2010) (table)).

¶ 4 On November 9, 2010, defendant filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief. On February 7, 2011, a circuit court judge signed and dated an order dismissing the petition as frivolous and patently without merit. February 7 was the ninetieth day after the petition was filed. The clerk stamped the order filed on February 8.

¶ 5 Defendant appealed, and the appellate court reversed and remanded for second stage proceedings. 2013 IL App (2d) 110306, 370 Ill.Dec. 355, 988 N.E.2d 131. The appellate court held that the dismissal order was untimely because it was not entered until it was filed by the clerk, which occurred on the ninety-first day after the postconviction petition was filed and docketed. The appellate court relied on authority from this court that holds that, for a judgment to be effective, it must be publicly expressed in some manner, at the situs of the proceeding. See Granite City Lodge No. 272, Loyal Order of the Moose v. City of Granite City, 141 Ill.2d 122, 152 Ill.Dec. 247, 565 N.E.2d 929 (1990) ; People ex rel. Schwartz v. Fagerholm, 17 Ill.2d 131, 161 N.E.2d 20 (1959). The court noted that the record did not reflect the presence of any party, any party's counsel, or any other court personnel on February 7, 2011, the date that the trial court signed the order, and therefore the first public expression of the court's order was on February 8 when it was file-stamped by the clerk. 2013 IL App (2d) 110306, ¶¶ 13–14, 370 Ill.Dec. 355, 988 N.E.2d 131.

¶ 6 Justice Hudson dissented. The dissent did not find the Fagerholm line of cases relevant because the Post–Conviction Hearing Act mandates a specific form of procedure. The dissent found the relevant question to be what it means to “enter” an order pursuant to section 122–2.1(a). Id. ¶ 41 (Hudson, J., dissenting). The dissent believed that, because section 122–2.1(a) uses the terms “filing” and “docketing” with respect to the petition, but “enter” with respect to the dismissal order, “enter” cannot be synonymous with filing. According to the dissent, the legislature's use of these different terms signified that it intended the entry of the order to be when the court signed and dated it. Id. ¶ 35. The dissent acknowledged that the definition of “enter” means “[t]o put formally before a court or on the record” (Black's Law Dictionary 552 (7th ed.1999)), but claimed that the trial court formally placed its decision on the record on February 7, 2011, when it signed the dismissal order. 2013 IL App (2d) 110306, ¶ 36, 370 Ill.Dec. 355, 988 N.E.2d 131 (Hudson, J., dissenting).

¶ 7 We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S.Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2013).

¶ 8 ANALYSIS

¶ 9 The issue requires us to construe section 122–2.1(a) of the Post–Conviction

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Hearing Act. 725 ILCS 5/122–2.1(a) (West 2012), and the principles guiding our review are familiar. When construing a statute, this court's primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent, keeping in mind that the best and most reliable indicator of that intent is the statutory language itself, given its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Lloyd, 2013 IL 113510, ¶ 25, 369 Ill.Dec. 759, 987 N.E.2d 386. A court must view the statute as a whole, construing words and phrases in light of other relevant statutory provisions and not in isolation. People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 36, 377 Ill.Dec. 1, 1 N.E.3d 888. Each word, clause, and sentence of a statute must be given a reasonable meaning, if possible, and should not be rendered superfluous. Id. Where a term has a settled legal meaning, this court will normally infer that the legislature intended to incorporate that settled meaning. People v. Smith, 236 Ill.2d 162, 167, 337 Ill.Dec. 700, 923 N.E.2d 259 (2010). The court may consider the reason for the law, the problems sought to be remedied, the purposes to be achieved, and the consequences of construing the statute one way or another. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 36, 377 Ill.Dec. 1, 1 N.E.3d 888. Also, a court presumes that the General Assembly, in its enactment of legislation, did not intend absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice. Because the construction of a statute is a question of law, our review is de novo. People v. Elliott, 2014 IL 115308, ¶ 11, 378 Ill.Dec. 424, 4 N.E.3d 23.

¶ 10 Neither the appellate court majority nor the dissent analyzed the issue correctly. Although it reached the correct result, the appellate court majority relied on the public expression doctrine, which, as we will see, could lead one to an erroneous conclusion about what the statute requires. By contrast, the dissent correctly identified the issue as what it means to “enter” an order for purposes of section 122–2.1(a) of the Act. However, the dissent incorrectly concluded that a judge enters an order the moment he or she signs it.

¶ 11 We begin our analysis by considering the plain language of the statute. Section 122–2.1(a) provides as follows:

“Within 90 days after the filing and docketing of each petition, the court shall examine such petition and enter an order thereon pursuant to this Section.

(1) If the petitioner is under sentence of death and is without counsel and alleges that he is without means to procure counsel, he shall state whether or not he wishes counsel to be appointed to represent him. If appointment of counsel is so requested, the court shall appoint counsel if satisfied that the petitioner has no means to procure counsel.

(2) If the petitioner is sentenced to imprisonment and the court determines the petition is frivolous or is patently without merit, it shall dismiss the petition in a written order, specifying the findings of fact and conclusions of law it made in reaching its decision. Such order of dismissal is a final judgment and shall be served upon the petitioner by certified mail within 10 days of its entry.” 725 ILCS 5/122–2.1(a) (West 2012).

¶ 12 Section 122–2.1(a) is very clear about what the court must do within 90 days if it is dismissing a petition pursuant to this section. The court must “enter an order” on the petition within 90 days. If the court is dismissing the petition, the order must be a “written order” that contains “findings of fact and conclusions of law,” and this written order is a “final judgment” that must be served on the petitioner within 10 days of its entry. The date the final judgment order is entered

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commences the 30–day period during which the petitioner may file a notice of appeal. See Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606(b) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013).

¶ 13 The question we must answer, then, is when did the trial court “enter an order” pursuant to this section. The State contends that this happened when the trial court signed the order dismissing the petition, while defendant claims that the order was entered when it was file-stamped by the circuit clerk. We begin by looking at the plain meaning of the word “enter.”

¶ 14 When used in a legal sense, “enter” clearly connotes some sort of formalizing of the decision. Webster's defines “enter” in this sense as “to place in regular form before a law court usu. in writing: put upon record in proper form and order .” Webster's Third New International Dictionary 756 (1993). It has also been explained that, “Courts have...