People ex rel. Seiler v. Calloway

• Decision Date: 18 June 1931
• Docket Number: No. 20599.,20599.
• Citation: 344 Ill. 488,176 N.E. 912
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. SEILER, County Collector, v. CALLOWAY.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

344 Ill. 488

176 N.E. 912

PEOPLE ex rel. SEILER, County Collector,

v.CALLOWAY.

No. 20599.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 18, 1931.

Action by the People, on the relation of J. H. Seiler, County Collector, against Charles Calloway. From the judgment, defendant appeals.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.Appeal from Christian County Court; C. J. Vogelsang, Judge.

Hogan & Coale, of Taylorville, and Stevens & Herndon, of Springfield, for appellant. Harry B. Grundy, State's Atty., and Leslie J. Taylor, both of Taylorville, for appellee.

DUNN, J.

At the June term, 1930, of the county court of Christian county, application was made by the county collector for judgment for school taxes of school district No. 310 against the lands of Charles Calloway, 282.12 acres. He filed the following objections: (1) There is no such school district as No. 310; (2) the levy and extension of the tax and application for judgment is a collateral attack upon Pawnee school district No. 188, in which district the property is located; (3) the extension of the tax amounts to double assessment for high school purposes, the Pawnee district having extended a tax for the past three years for high school purposes which has been paid each year, including the current year; (4) Pawnee school district No. 188 has been a high school district for more than twenty years, and the objector's real estate against which the tax is extended has been a part of that district for three years, during which time taxes have been levied and extended against such district and paid for high school purposes of the Pawnee district; (5) the tax was improperly levied and extended, and is therefore void; (6) the tax for other reasons is informal, improper, illegal, and void.

The gist of the objections is that there is no district 310, and that the land is part of district 188. The levy and extension of the tax and application is not a collateral attack on district 188. The voluntary payment of taxes for which his land was not liable does not make the further payment of taxes for which it is liable double taxation. The fourth objection, that the land is a part of Pawnee district No. 188, is an argumentative statement that it is not located in district 310, under which proof might be introduced. The other two objections state no fact upon which proof could be offered.

No evidence was offered to sustain the objection that there is no such district as district 310, and no claim was made that there is not. The appellant himself testified that his land is in the territory annexed to the Pawnee district, and is also in the district alleged to be organized as district 310. District 310 in South Fork township, in Christian county, includes the land of Charles Calloway, which is in question in this suit. He claims that it is a part of Pawnee district No. 188 by virtue of its annexation to that district through proceedings in April and May, 1927, instituted by petitions filed, followed by elections, all in accordance with sections 94, 95, and 96 of the School Law as revised in 1909. Laws 1909, pp. 368, 369. These sections were all amended in 1917, and in their place were substituted provisions relating only to non-high school districts, providing no method of annexation in place of that repealed. Laws 1917, pp. 742, 743.

The abstract shows that the people introduced the evidence required to establish a prima facie case, and no claim is made to the contrary. It devolved upon the objector to prove some valid objection to the tax. It is well established that, upon an application for judgment against real estate for taxes levied by a municipal or quasi municipal corporation, the validity of the organization cannot be inquired into. Trumbo v. People, 75 Ill. 561;Blake v. People, 109 Ill. 504;People v. Dyer, 205 Ill. 575, 69 N. E. 70;People v. Pederson, 220 Ill. 554, 77 N. E. 251;People v. Bowman, 247 Ill. 276, 93 N. E. 244;People v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 267 Ill. 469, 108 N. E. 706. The same rule applies in the case of a bill in equity against public officers for an injunction to restrain the extension or collection of taxes. In neither case can the landowner or taxpayer in a controversy over taxes raise the question of the corporate organization of the municipality. It has, however, been held that the question whether the property of the objector has been lawfully annexed to the municipality is a proper question to be raised on the application of the county collector for judgment for municipal taxes against the property. Murray v. City of Virginia, 91 Ill. 558;People v. Hausen, 276 Ill. 204, 114 N. E. 596;People v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co., 231 Ill. 463, 83 N. E. 219;People v. Welch, 252 Ill. 167, 96 N. E. 991;People v. Stewart, 281 Ill. 365, 118 N. E. 55;People v. Dunn, 247 Ill. 410, 93 N. E. 305. This latter rule, however, was in People v. McKinnie, 277 Ill. 342, 115 N. E. 526, held to be limited to the first attempt of the municipality to extend its power over the annexed territory. That case was an application by the county collector for judgment against lands of the appellant, to which she objected that her lands were not within the corporate limits. The making of the plat and the passing of the resolution of the city council approving it and including the lands described in the plat within the corporate limits of the city, the recording of the plat, with the certificate of the mayor and city clerk that it had been approved by the city council, all occurred in 1904, and from that time for many years the city had exercised its corporate powers over the land by lighting and improving the streets. The city was exercising its franchise as a city over the lands in addition, and it was held that the question whether the lands had been legally annexed could not be raised in the application for judgment for the special assessment. The cases of People v. Hausen, supra, and Murray v. City of Virginia, supra, were examined, and it was found that in each case the levy of the tax was the first effort to exercise the corporate franchise over the territory. It was again announced that the question whether the lands had been annexed could not be raised in the application for judgment for the special assessment, but could only be tried in a proceeding...