People ex rel. Smith v. Fields

• Decision Date: 02 December 2020
• Docket Number: Index No. 51164/20,2020–03809
• Parties: The PEOPLE etc., EX REL. Edward E. SMITH, on behalf of Jose Colon, appellant, v. Leroy FIELDS, etc., et al., respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

189 A.D.3d 866

136 N.Y.S.3d 436

The PEOPLE etc., EX REL. Edward E. SMITH, on behalf of Jose Colon, appellant,

v.Leroy FIELDS, etc., et al., respondents.

2020–03809

Index No. 51164/20

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued—November 2, 2020

December 2, 2020

Laurette D. Mulry, Riverhead, N.Y. (Edward E. Smith, pro se, and Anju Alexander of counsel), for appellant.

Letitia James, Attorney General, New York, N.Y. (Steven C. Wu and Blair J. Greenwald of counsel), for respondents.

ALAN D. SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MARK C. DILLON, HECTOR D. LASALLE, LINDA CHRISTOPHER, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In a habeas corpus proceeding, the petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Hal B. Greenwald, J.), dated May 7, 2020. The judgment denied the petition and, in effect, dismissed the proceeding.

ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed as academic, without costs or disbursements.

In 2012, petitioner was convicted, upon his plea of guilty, of, among other crimes, criminal sex act in the first degree (two counts) and sexual abuse. The petitioner was sentenced, inter alia, to a determinate term of imprisonment of 8 years with a period of postrelease supervision of 20 years.

The petitioner's maximum expiration date for his term of imprisonment expired in October 2019, whereupon his period of postrelease supervision commenced. However, the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (hereinafter DOCCS) did not release the petitioner on that date due to his inability to find housing that complied with the requirements of the Sexual Assault Reform Act (hereinafter SARA) (see Executive Law § 259–c[14] ; Penal Law § 220.00[14] ). DOCCS placed him into a residential treatment facility until he could locate housing that complied with SARA.

The petitioner commenced this habeas corpus proceeding in April 2020. The thrust of his petition was predicated upon his contention that his confinement in the residential treatment facility constituted cruel and unusual punishment due to the COVID–19 virus. However, his petition also questioned whether SARA's residency restrictions apply to persons, such as himself, who were serving periods of postrelease supervision after completing their determinate terms of imprisonment. While arguing that the statutory provisions exclude him from SARA's coverage, he did not argue, until a reply, that a contrary statutory construction would be unconstitutional. The Supreme Court denied the petition and, in effect, dismissed the proceeding.

It is undisputed that, during the pendency of this appeal, the petitioner was released from the residential treatment facility.

It is a fundamental principle of this Court's jurisprudence that "[t]he power of a court to declare the law only arises out of, and is limited to, determining the rights of persons which are actually controverted in a particular case pending before the tribunal" ( People v. Barizone, 179 A.D.3d 713, 715, 113 N.Y.S.3d 585 ; see Matter of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 713, 431 N.Y.S.2d 400, 409 N.E.2d 876 ). "This principle, which forbids courts to pass on academic, hypothetical, moot, or otherwise abstract questions, is founded both in constitutional separation-of-powers doctrine, and in methodological strictures which inhere in the decisional process of a common-law judiciary" ( Matter of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d at 713–714, 431 N.Y.S.2d 400, 409 N.E.2d 876 ). "Thus, ‘[t]he mootness doctrine precludes courts from considering questions which, although once active, have become academic by the passage of time or by a change in circumstances’ " ( Matter of Abbygail G. [Christine Y.-Karen M.], 177 A.D.3d 878, 880, 115 N.Y.S.3d 40, quoting Matter of Melinda D., 31 A.D.3d 24, 28, 815 N.Y.S.2d 644 ; see People ex rel. Rosario v. Superintendent, Fishkill Corr. Facility, 180 A.D.3d 920, 921, 120 N.Y.S.3d 411 ; People ex rel. Booth v. Warden, Otis Bantum Corr. Ctr., 157 A.D.3d 711, 711–712, 66 N.Y.S.3d 647 ; People ex rel. Kneitel v. Warden, Rikers Is. Corr. Facility, 120 A.D.3d 1274, 991 N.Y.S.2d 774 ).

" ‘If academic, an appeal is not to be determined unless it falls within the exception to the doctrine that permits courts to preserve for review important and recurring issues which, by virtue of their relatively brief existence, would otherwise be nonreviewable’ " ( Matter of Abbygail G. [Christine Y.-Karen M.], 177 A.D.3d at 880, 115 N.Y.S.3d 40, quoting Matter of Melinda D., 31 A.D.3d at 28, 815...