People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones

Decision Date29 May 1968
Docket NumberNo. 40938,40938
Citation40 Ill.2d 62,237 N.E.2d 495
PartiesThe PEOPLE ex rel. John J. STAMOS, State's Attorney, Petitioner, v. Sidney A. JONES, Judge, Respondent.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

John J. Stamos, State's Atty., Chicago (Elmer C. Kissane and James S. Veldman, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for petitioner.

Charles A. Bellows, Harry J. Busch and R. Eugene Pincham, Chicago, Ill. (Jason E. Bellows and Sherman C. Magidson Chicago, Ill. of counsel), for respondent.

Stanley A. Bass and Melvin B. Goldberg, Chicago, amicus curiae.

SCHAEFER, Justice.

This original Mandamus action arises from a conflict between the Rules of this court governing admission to bail upon appeal in criminal cases and a legislative enactment dealing with the same subject.

Rule 609(b) provides that upon appeal from a judgment sentencing a defendant to imprisonment, 'the defendant may be admitted to bail and the sentence * * * stayed by a judge of the trial or reviewing court.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1967, chap. 110A, par. 609(b).) Section 121--6(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as amended by an Act effective September 5, 1967, provides: 'If an appeal is taken from a judgment or order on an offense other than a 'forcible felony', and the defendant is admitted to bail, the sentence of imprisonment shall be stayed by the trial court. If an appeal is taken from a judgment or order on an offense defined as a 'forcible felony' the defendant shall not be entitled to a continuation of his bail and the sentence of imprisonment shall not be stayed by the trial court.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1967, chap. 38, par. 121--6(b).) Section 2--8 of the Criminal Code defines 'forcible felony' as follows: "Forcible felony' means treason, murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, robbery, burglary, arson, kidnaping, aggravated battery and any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual.' Ill.Rev.Stat.1967, chap. 38, par. 2--8.

The defendant in this case is the Honorable Sidney A. Jones, an associate judge of the circuit court of Cook County. On September 12, 1967, he found Major McNeal guilty of two charges of aggravated battery, and imposed concurrent sentences of not less than two nor more than four years imprisonment in the penitentiary. Judge Jones then fixed the amount of the appeal bond at $5,000, and admitted McNeal to bail upon the filing of a bond in that amount.

Thereafter we granted leave to the State's Attorney of Cook County to file an original petition for a writ of Mandamus. The petition recited the 1967 amendment to section 121--6 and the action taken by the defendant; it charged that the defendant was without jurisdiction to fix the amount of the appeal bond and to admit McNeal to bail, and it prayed for the issuance of a writ of Mandamus directing him to expunge the order that he had entered. The defendant's answer alleged 'that in setting said appeal bond, Respondent considered the nature of the offenses, the background of the defendant, the likelihood that said defendant would respond to further orders of court and abide by the conditions of the said appeal bond, the possibility that said judgments of conviction would be reversed or reversed and remanded by the reviewing courts on appeal, the length of sentence imposed, the length of time usually and commonly elapsing between judgments of conviction and final orders of all reviewing courts, including this Court and the Supreme Court of the United States, and the economic hardships imposed upon persons seeking appellate review when said persons are denied bail pending appeal; that further, bail as aforesaid, was granted in the sound exercise of Respondent's discretion.'

The arguments have covered a broad range. The legislative classification of 'forcible felony' has been challenged as arbitrary, and hence invalid under the equal-protection clause. And it has been urged that at least in cases that present substantial issues, there is a constitutional right to release upon bail pending appeal. We have concluded,...

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  • People ex rel. Sheppard v. Money
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • September 22, 1988
    ...with a rule of this court. E.g., People v. Jackson (1977), 69 Ill.2d 252, 13 Ill.Dec. 667, 371 N.E.2d 602; People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones (1968), 40 Ill.2d 62, 237 N.E.2d 495. Article II, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 declares: "The legislative, executive and judicial bran......
  • Albaugh v. Cooley
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • May 28, 1980
    ...power to render decisions inasmuch as it restricted the court's power to render a judgment of dismissal. In People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones (1968), 40 Ill.2d 62, 237 N.E.2d 495, the supreme court invalidated a legislative enactment governing admission to bail which was in conflict with a sup......
  • Crim v. Dietrich
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • April 2, 2020
    ...319, 391 N.E.2d 582 (1979) :"The foregoing constitutional provisions and the decisions of the supreme court in People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 62, 237 N.E.2d 495, and People v. Taylor (1971), 50 Ill. 2d 136, 277 N.E.2d 878, make clear that the legislature no longer has pow......
  • DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp.
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • February 20, 1992
    ...the doctrine of separation of powers, whether the legislation has any effect upon litigants or not. See People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones (1968), 40 Ill.2d 62, 66, 237 N.E.2d 495. The majority also fails to recognize several key distinctions between Rule 137 and section 2-622. Rule 137 is a re......
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