People ex rel. State Bd. of Charities v. New York Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children

• Decision Date: 09 January 1900
• Citation: 161 N.Y. 233,55 N.E. 1063
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. STATE BOARD OF CHARITIES v. NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

161 N.Y. 233

55 N.E. 1063

PEOPLE ex rel. STATE BOARD OF CHARITIES

v.NEW YORK SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Jan. 9, 1900.

Appeal from supreme court, appellate division, First department.

Mandamus by the people, on relation of the state board of charities, against the New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children. From an order of the appellate division (58 N. Y. Supp. 953) granting the writ and reversing an order of the special term (53 N. Y. Supp. 1017) refusing the writ in part, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Martin, Haight, and Vann, JJ., dissenting.

David B. Hill, for appellant.

Theodore E. Hancock, for respondent.

O'BRIEN, J.

On the application of the relator, the state board of charities, the courts below have awarded a peremptory mandamus commanding the defendant to permit the relator to visit the buildings and grounds and to inspect the books and papers of the former, and to give full information concerning the operations of the society, and to comply with the rules and regulations of the board in the management of its corporate affairs. The question presented by this appeal is whether there was power in the courts to award the writ.

The state board of charities asserts that the defendant is subjectto visitation, and to such rules and regulations as that body may enact for the government of certain corporations and the better management of their affairs, and the defendant denies the existence of any such power. By the provisions of the constitution (article 8, §§ 11, 14) and the statutes enacted in pursuance thereof (Laws 1895, c. 771; Laws 1896, c. 546), the right of visitation with respect to all ‘charitable institutions' is conferred upon the state board of charities, with power to enact rules and regulations for their government and the management of their affairs. It follows, therefore, that, if the defendant is a charitable institution within the meaning of the constitution and the statute, the writ was properly granted, but, if it does not properly fall within that particular class of corporations, the board of charities has no jurisdiction over it. The contention of the defendant is that it does not belong to the class of corporations subjected by these provisions of law to visitation and regulation, and hence the only question to be considered is whether the defendant is a charitable institution or corporation within the meaning of the constitution and the statute. On the argument here, and in the discussion in the courts below, various considerations were urged and discussed that we think have no legitimate bearing upon this question. It may be useful to notice them now, since the discussion of any question of this character will always be advanced by excluding at the outset all arguments and considerations that are manifestly irrelevant.

It is said that this corporation, in order to promote the objects of its incorporation, has been given legal capacity to take and administer gifts and bequests that would be called charitable under the statute of Elizabeth and under general rules of law applicable to trusts; and all that is quite true. But it is an error to conclude that a corporation must necessarily be of a charitable nature because it has capacity to take and administer such gifts. A very large class of corporations may do that without affording the slightest ground for an argument that they are or must be charitable institutions or corporations.Colleges, academies, and nearly all institutions of learning or of a literary character, and even cities, villages, and other municipal corporations, may take nad administer such gifts, but that fact cannot in the least affect their true character, or convert them into charitable institutions; and, of course, this observation applies to all those receiving voluntary donations as well as bequests, properly so called, in testamentary instruments. The fact that the property of this corporation is exempt by statute from taxation only shows that it enjoys a special privilege in common with a great many other corporations that no one can claim to be of a charitable nature. Indeed, the manner in which the exemption was made tends only to show that the lawmakers did not consider the defendant as embraced in the class of corporations designated as charitable, since, if it did, there could be no necessity for enacting the statute of 1890, which gave the exemption to this corporation by name. Charitable institutions were already exempt, and it is only on the theory that the defendant did not belong to that class that a new and special law was necessary.

The defendant receives, under the charter of New York, the sum of $30,000 annually from the city treasury, to promote the objects of its organization. But in receiving and disbursing that sum of money it neither receives nor administers any charity, but is simply allowed something by the city for doing work that otherwise would devolve, as we shall see hereafter, on the police department, and which the society can do better, and with much less expense, than the police. The fact that the president of this corporation and the then mayor of New York, when commending its work to the public, described it as an institution founded on the broadest principles of charity, has no weight in the determination of the question involved in this appeal. A corporation cannot be classified by what its friends or promoters may say about it, but only from the nature of the powers which it may lawfully exercise and the business in which it is lawfully engaged. It is manifest, therefore, that in any inquiry concerning the nature, character, or classificationof any particular corporation the only safe guide is the charter or law of its creation prescribing the powers that it may exercise, and defining the nature of the business or the duties for which it was created. The defendant was incorporated under a general law enacted for the express purpose of giving to such societies a corporate organization (Laws 1875, c. 130). This act provided that any five or more persons of full age, a majority of whom shall be citizens of and residents within this state, who shall desire to associate themselves together for the purpose of preventing cruelty to children, may become incorporated by making and acknowledging a certificate, in which, among other things, the name of the corporation shall be given, with the particular business and objects of the corporation, and filing the same in the proper county clerk's office and in the office of the secretary of state, after having first procured the written consent of a justice of the supreme court to the incorporation. The certificate of the founders of this corporation was filed April 27, 1875. The name selected was that which the defendant now bears, and the objects of the corporation are stated in the following words: ‘The particular business and objects of this society are the prevention of cruelty to children and the enforcement by all lawful means of the laws relating to or in anywise affecting children.’ This corporation was, therefore, created for the purpose of enforcing laws enacted to prevent cruelty to children, and that is the only object or purpose of its existence. The means by which it is enabled to fulfill the purpose of its creation were also provided in the law of its creation, and are there stated as follows:

‘Sec. 3. Any society so incorporated may prefer a complaint before any court or magistrate having jurisdiction for the violation of any law relating to or affecting children, and may aid in bringing the facts before such court or magistrate in any proceeding taken.

‘Sec. 4. All magistrates, constables, sheriffs and officers of police shall, as occasion may require, aid the society so incorporated, its officers, members and agents in the enforcement of all laws which now are or may hereafter be enacted, relating to or affecting children.’

The powers and functions of the corporation have been enlarged from time to time by additional statutes that operate as amendments to the general law under which it was formed, and these statutes, or most of them, are found in the Criminal Code. Code Cr. Proc. §§ 154, 292, 749; Laws 1888, c. 490; Pen. Code, § 293. The learned judge who gave the opinion below summarized in clear and concise language the various and extensive powers and functions that this corporation may exercise under these statutes substantially as follows: ‘The society receives on commitment, upon and subject to the order of the court, all children charged with the commission of crime in the county of New York, who otherwise would be sent to the city prison; that it also receives temporarily, upon the order of a court, children who are the victims of physical violence in the county, or who are held as witnesses there pending the criminal prosecution of an offender; that it has authority to receive under commitment to itself, at its own expense, children under the age of sixteen,-an authority which, however, is but rarely exercised; that the children so committed are retained temporarily, and, as soon as circumstances permit, transferred to other institutions. While thus temporarily retained, they are properly cared for. Isolating rooms are provided for those who suffer from contagious disease, and a skilled nurse is always in attendance, who enforces every ordinance of the board of health, and every suggestion of the society's physicians relative to the health of the children. The society also receives, and takes to court without delay, children found in a state of destitution, for disposition by the court as prescribed by the statute. It maintains two officers in every police court, who, upon the order of the magistrate, investigate applications for the commitment of the children, and make written reports in regard thereto for the information of the magistrate. It receives the money which...