People ex rel. Vuagniaux v. City of Edwardsville

• Decision Date: 16 October 1996
• Docket Number: No. 5-95-0655,5-95-0655
• Citation: 672 N.E.2d 40,284 Ill.App.3d 407
• Parties: , 219 Ill.Dec. 725 The PEOPLE ex rel. Earl L. VUAGNIAUX and Alice G. Vuagniaux, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF EDWARDSVILLE, A Municipal Corporation of the State of Illinois, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 40

672 N.E.2d 40

284 Ill.App.3d 407, 219 Ill.Dec. 725

The PEOPLE ex rel. Earl L. VUAGNIAUX and Alice G. Vuagniaux Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF EDWARDSVILLE, A Municipal Corporation of the State of Illinois, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 5-95-0655.

Appellate Court of Illinois Fifth District.

Oct. 16, 1996.

Earl L. Vuagniaux, Earl L. Vuagniaux, A Professional Corporation, Edwardsville, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Debra J. Meadows, Reed, Armstrong, Gorman, Coffey, Gilbert & Mudge, P.C., Edwardsville, for Defendant-Appellee.

Justice MAAG delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiffs, the People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Earl L. Vuagniaux and Alice G. Vuagniaux, appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant, the City of Edwardsville (City).

The relevant facts are as follows. In 1968, the City purchased a parking lot located at Second and St. Louis Streets. This parking lot was used for public parking. In December of 1987, the City's planning department prepared a tax-increment-financing (TIF) redevelopment plan. This plan was revised on January 20, 1988. The City then adopted ordinance No. 4162-3-88 approving the central-area tax-increment redevelopment plan and redevelopment project on March 15, 1988. It is undisputed that the subject parking lot is located within the physical boundaries of the TIF district and is within the redevelopment project area. In May of 1988, ordinance No. 4177-5-88 was passed, authorizing the City's issuance of central-area redevelopment-project-area general obligation bonds in the principal amount of $1,400,000 for the purpose of funding the tax-increment redevelopment plan and project approved by City ordinance No. 4162-3-88 and providing for a tax levy for the payment of said bonds. In July 1988, the redevelopment plan was amended. On July 28, 1988, Garrett A. Balke, Inc. (Korte-Balke), sent a letter to Nina Baird, the City's clerk, stating its development concept. Within its development concept, Korte-Balke stated that it intended to relocate Earl Vuagniaux "to a new building of approximately 10,000 square feet in the City Parking Lot at Second and St. Louis Streets." The letter also requested the City to "[v]acate Second Street between St. Louis and Vandalia [and] [c]onvey to [Korte-Balke] fee simple title to Lot 55 (the City parking lot) for $1.00 and other considerations." The City then passed ordinance No. 4197-8-88 on August 16, 1988, authorizing the transfer of certain real property pursuant to the Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 24, par. 11-74.4-1 et seq. (now see 65 ILCS 5/11-74.4-1 et seq. (West 1994))). This ordinance stated as follows:

"Section II: Prior to the execution and delivery of title instruments, the City, District and the developers shall execute an agreement setting forth the terms upon which the City and the Tax Increment Financing District shall transfer the real estate to the developers and the developer's agreement for development and purchase of the parcels. Said terms shall include, but not be limited to:

A. Purchase price: One Dollar ($1.00) per parcel.

* * * * * *

C. Developers shall, upon the Second and St. Louis Street parking lot site, construct at least 10,000 square feet of office, retail or compatible general commercial space within two years of said parcel being transferred to developer."

The City then solicited and received proposals for the parking lot in 1989. One of those proposals was submitted by the Vuagniauxes.

In August of 1989, a report on the TIF district was prepared by the City's TIF committee. This report discussed the fact that there had been considerable debate over parking in the downtown area and the fact that the new county administration building was going to worsen the problem. The report stated, inter alia, as follows:

"L. Conversion of Free Parking

In order to enhance district revenue, the City should consider temporarily transferring title to the Second and St. Louis Street parking lot to the district. The lot could then be upgraded and converted into a leased parking lot. I believe that the market downtown would support $25-50 per month fees for each spot."

On October 12, 1989, Terry Smith, Edwardsville's City Planner, prepared a letter to the City's finance committee regarding the "TIF Update" and stated as follows:

"The district should consider the disposal of the parking lot at St. Louis and Second Street. At the present time no official action has been taken * * *. I would like to recommend that serious consideration be given to the development of this city owned lot. I am making this recommendation in light of the recent notification of the cancellation of the Michael's Chevrolet redevelopment project. I believe that the development of this lot would greatly enhance the overall financial stability of the TIF district. I believe that the potential financial gains through the development of this lot far exceeds [sic ] the effects of the loss of 24 public parking spaces. The Council should consider the possibility of making a counteroffer to the offer made by the Vaugniaux [sic ]/Winfield Partnership. It would be interesting to have their reaction to the city's offer of the City Parking lot * * * [at] Second Street for free if they would construct [a] 15,400 square foot building. If this type of an arrangement could be made[,] * * * the district would profit by obtaining a greatly increased tax increment as well as the elimination of the existing Vaugniaux [sic ] building. [The] Vaugniaux[sic ]/ Winfield Partnership would benefit by obtaining the property at no cost."

Hence, a review of the record shows that the parking lot was a part of the "redevelopment project area" and the "redevelopment plan." See 65 ILCS 5/11-74.4-3(n), (p) (West 1992). The record also shows, however, that the parking lot never became a "redevelopment project." See 65 ILCS 5/11-74.4-3(o ) (West 1992). On July 19, 1994, the City passed ordinance No. 4735-7-94. This ordinance authorized a lease of the aforementioned parking lot to Florists' Mutual, one of Edwardsville's largest employers. The ordinance states that the lease of the parking lot to Florists' Mutual would economically benefit the City's TIF district. According to the ordinance, all of the income generated by the lease of the parking lot was to be deposited into the City's motor fuel tax fund.

On July 21, 1994, the plaintiffs filed a petition for leave to file a complaint in quo warranto, alleging that the City failed to comply with certain statutes of the State of Illinois when it leased the aforementioned City parking lot, located 52 feet from the Vuagniauxes' property, to tenants of Mark Twain Plaza, a TIF development. The City filed an answer and motion to dismiss, raising the Vuagniauxes' lack of standing to file a quo warranto action. On July 29, 1994, the court determined that plaintiffs had standing, and the court granted plaintiffs leave to file a complaint in quo warranto and denied the City's motion, made under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1992)), to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint due to lack of standing. On September 7, 1994, the plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a first amended complaint to add an additional count for injunctive relief. The next day, the court granted this motion. The City filed its answer on December 12, 1994, and its motion for summary judgment on December 15, 1994. In support of its motion, the City filed the affidavits of John Brancaglione, an urban planner employed by a private firm of architects and planners, and Gary Niebur, the City's mayor. On March 23, 1995, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment. That same day, the plaintiffs also filed a motion to strike the City's two supporting affidavits and deny the City's motion for summary judgment. The court entered an order on May 30, 1995, granting the City's motion for summary judgment, denying plaintiffs' motion to strike the affidavits filed by the City, and denying plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. In its order, the court stated, "Nothing in the TIF statutes prohibits the City['s] * * * leasing of the subject parking lot * * * [and] [n]othing in Section [11-]76-1 [of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11-76-1 (West 1992)) ] prohibits the City['s] * * * leasing of the subject parking lot." The plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied on July 31, 1995. Plaintiffs then filed a notice of appeal on August 30, 1995.

The plaintiffs claim that the City's two affidavits, filed in support of its motion for summary judgment, violated Supreme Court Rule 191 (145 Ill.2d R. 191), and that they should have been stricken. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 191(a) (145 Ill.2d R. 191(a)):

"Affidavits in support of * * * a motion for summary judgment * * * shall be made on the personal knowledge of the affiants; shall set forth with particularity the facts upon which the claim, counterclaim, or defense is based; shall have attached thereto sworn or certified copies of all papers upon which the affiant relies; shall not consist of conclusions but of facts admissible in evidence; and shall affirmatively show that the affiant, if sworn as a witness, can testify competently thereto."

When reviewing a summary judgment order, the reviewing court should construe the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits in support of the motion strictly against the moving party and liberally in favor of the opponent. Rinchich v. Village of Bridgeview, 235 Ill.App.3d 614, 627, 176 Ill.Dec. 504, 512-13, 601 N.E.2d 1202, 1210-11 (1992). Because summary judgment is a drastic means of disposing of litigation, it should be allowed only when the right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt. Rinchich, 235 Ill.App.3d at 627, 176 Ill.Dec. at 513, 601 N.E.2d at 1211.

In a summary judgment proceeding, the purpose of affidavits is to...