People ex rel. Witte v. Franklin

• Decision Date: 13 June 1933
• Docket Number: No. 21787.,21787.
• Citation: 186 N.E. 137,352 Ill. 528
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. WITTE, County Collector, v. FRANKLIN et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

352 Ill. 528

186 N.E. 137

PEOPLE ex rel. WITTE, County Collector,

v.FRANKLIN et al.

No. 21787.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 22, 1933.

Rehearing Denied June 13, 1933.

Proceeding by the People, on the relation of Arthur F. Witte, County Collector, against the Wabash Railway Company. From a judgment against the Railway Company, the company and Walter S. Franklin and others, receivers, appeal.

Affirmed.

DE YOUNG, J., dissenting in part.

Appeal from Adams County Court; S. S. Groves, Judge.

Wilson & Schmiedeskamp, of Quincy (N. S. Brown and L. H. Strasser, both of St. Louis, Mo., of counsel), for appellants.

Edward P. Allen, State's Atty., and Arthur R. Roy, both of Quincy, for appellee.

ORR, Justice.

This appeal comes from a judgment of the county court of Adams county against the Wabash Railway Company, which, together with its receivers, are the appellants. The issue involves alleged delinquent taxes, interest, penalties, and costs for the year 1931.

Appellants filed objections in the county court to the levy and extension of certain items included in the appropriation and tax levy order of the Adams county board of supervisors adopted at its September, 1931, meeting. Certain of its objections were sustained, but the items to which its objections were overruled, and which are at issuehere, are the following: (a) Maintenance of county home, $16,000, and (b) assessment and collection of revenue, $10,000.

[1] It is contended by appellants that item (a) was unauthorized and constituted a double levy, as the respective towns either had made a levy for the care of poor and indigent persons for the year 1931 or had sufficient funds on hand for that purpose. In support of this position they rely chiefly upon an amendment by the Legislature in 1931 to section 15 of the act entitled ‘An Act to revise the law in relation to paupers,’ requiring towns in counties (such as Adams) under township organization, and of less than 500,000 inhabitants, to relieve and support all poor and indigent persons legally resident within such towns, ‘except as herein otherwise provided.’ Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1931, c. 107, § 15. But this amendment, as is shown by its phraseology and its other related sections, was clearly not intended by the Legislature to impair or abrogate the powers and duties otherwise conferred upon the counties of this state to maintain county homes and county farms. Section 33 of the same amendment (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1931, c. 107, § 34) and passed at the same time provides that ‘when any county shall have provided a suitable poor house for the accommodation of the poor of the county, and the same is ready for the reception and care of the poor, all the poor persons requiring the care and support of the county, or the township, as the case may be, may be cared for and supported at such poor house,’ etc. The statute, in enumerating the powers of counties (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1931, c. 34, § 24, subd. 7), provides that each county shall have power to erect and maintain county hospitals ‘for the care of such sick as may by law be proper charges upon the county.’ Paragraph 1 of section 28 of the Paupers Act (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1931, c. 107, § 29, subd. 1) provides that the county board shall have power ‘to acquire in the name of the county by purchase, grant, gift or devise, a suitable tract or tracts of land upon which to erect and maintain a county poor house and other necessary buildings in connection therewith, and for the establishment and maintenance of a farm for the employment of the poor,’ etc.

From a consideration of these different statutes, and particularly amended section 33 of the Paupers Act above quoted, it seems clear that the chief purpose of the Legislature in amending section 15 of the same act was to impose upon the different townships of each county the power and duty to ‘relieve and support all poor and indigent persons lawfully resident’ therein. Section 33, by providing that ‘all the poor persons requiring the care and support of the county, or the township, as the case may be, may be cared for and supported at such poor house,’ plainly shows the legislative intent in this regard, and makes it possible, as before, for the various townships to place their poor persons in the one central county home, where, if sick or otherwise incapacitated, they may receive proper institutional care. But the township is not thereby relieved of its financial obligation of paying for the support of its own poor, as this it is required to do under section 15. The different statutes above mentioned relating to the establishment and maintenance of county homes and county farms for the care and treatment of sick and indigent persons are distinctly and essentially humanitarian in their purpose, and must therefore receive a liberal construction where no constitutional provision is violated. This court takes judicial notice of the emergency relief measures taken by the state and nation to relieve unemployment and distress during 1931 and 1932. The fact that various townships in Adams county made levies in 1931 for pauper relief does not render the levy by the county for maintenance of the county home void as double taxation, as the levies were made for two distinct purposes by two separate and distinct taxing districts. It would do violence to the intent of the Legislature, so clearly expressed in section 33 of the 1931 amendment to the Paupers Act, to hold that by virtue of amended section 15 the counties of this state could no longer levy taxes to maintain their various county homes and farms for the care of their unfortunates. In fact, when these two sections are read and construed together, little doubt remains that the purpose of the Legislature was not to restrict or abolish the use of county poorhouses, but, on the contrary, was to aid the counties of the state by making each town responsible for the relief and support of its own poor and indigent persons. Under these amendments and the other statutes above referred to, all counties of less than 500,000 population may own, maintain, and operate poorhouses or poor farms, and the various townships, while liable for the support of their own paupers, may nevertheless arrange with the county board of their county for the care and keep of their poor and indigent persons at the county home or poorhouse, under such terms as may be agreed upon.

Appellants further contend that the levy is too uncertain and indefinite, citing People v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co., 256 Ill. 476, 100 N. E. 266. But in that case the levy was only, ‘county farm, $6000,’ and the objection was sustained under the doctrine enunciated in People v. Bowman, 253 Ill. 234, 97 N. E. 304, where this court held that such items as ‘for county farm, $25,000,’ ‘for county jail, $15,000,’ were too indefinite, because they did not disclose whether the money was levied to buy grounds and buildings, to improve buildings or to maintain them. The present levy must receive a reasonable construction and is not objectionable under the line of cases cited, as its purpose is sufficiently designated to comply with the law. People v. Jackson, 272 Ill. 494, 112 N. E. 344;People v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co., 266 Ill. 196, 107 N. E. 222.

[7] The objection to item (b) is also that it is too indefinite, and, further, because it levies a tax for both the assessment and collection of taxes, without specifying the amount required for each purpose. The purpose of the levy is sufficientlystated, under the rules above announced, not to be void for indefiniteness. The objection to the item because of its failure to specify separate amounts for the assessment and collection of revenue was properly overruled by the trial court. Only one general purpose is embraced within...