People in Interest of Lynch, 88SC198

• Citation: 783 P.2d 848
• Decision Date: 27 November 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88SC198,88SC198
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, In the Interest of William LYNCH, Respondent.
• Court: Supreme Court of Colorado

Page 848

783 P.2d 848

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner,

In the Interest of William LYNCH, Respondent.

No. 88SC198.

Supreme Court of Colorado,

En Banc.

Nov. 27, 1989.

Thomas O. David, Weld County Atty., Jan Rundus, Asst. County Atty., Greeley, for petitioner.

Joseph H. Hellewell, Greeley, for respondent.

Justice LOHR delivered the Opinion of the Court.

In People in Interest of Lynch, 757 P.2d 145 (Colo.App.1988), the Colorado Court of Appeals held that the failure to convene a hearing within ten days after the respondent, William Lynch, requested review of his certification for involuntary short-term mental health treatment pursuant to section 27-10-107, 11B C.R.S. (1989), deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. We granted the People's petition for certiorari, and we now reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

I.

On June 23, 1986, William Lynch was detained by officers of the Platteville police department for seventy-two hours of mental health treatment and evaluation at North Colorado Medical Center, located nearby in Greeley, pursuant to section 27-10-105, 11B C.R.S. (1989). At the request of persons treating Lynch, he was moved under authority of court order on June 24, 1986, to the Colorado State Hospital in Pueblo. See § 27-10-107(8), 11B C.R.S. (1989). The next day, Lynch was certified for short-term involuntary mental health treatment pursuant to section 27-10-107. The certification was filed in the Weld County District Court on June 27, 1986, as required by subsection 27-10-107(2). The district court appointed counsel to represent Lynch on June 30, 1986. See § 27-10-107(5).

Lynch, through counsel, requested a certification hearing to review his involuntary commitment on July 17, 1986, and also moved that the proceeding be transferred from Weld County to Pueblo County. See § 27-10-111(4), 11B C.R.S. (1989). Under subsection 27-10-107(6), the certification hearing was required to be held within ten days after the request. Lynch's motion for transfer, however, included a waiver by counsel to allow an additional five days to be added to that ten-day period. The district court granted the motion and transferred the proceeding to Pueblo County District Court on July 17, 1986. On July 22, 1986, the People filed a motion in Pueblo County District Court to transfer venue back to Weld County District Court, citing the presence of witnesses in Weld County and the expense and inconvenience involved in transporting them to Pueblo County for the hearing. On July 23, 1986, the district court granted the request. Later the same day, the Weld County District Court appointed local co-counsel to represent Lynch.

The certification hearing was held on July 30, 1986. After the jury was impaneled, but prior to the examination of witnesses, Lynch moved that he be discharged, ¹ citing the trial court's failure to hold the hearing within ten days of receiving Lynch's written request as required by subsection 27-10-107(6). The trial court denied Lynch's motion and proceeded with the hearing. Following brief deliberations, the six-person jury returned answers to interrogatories set forth on a special verdict form. Based on those answers, the court discharged Lynch from certification. Lynch was taken back into custody a short time later, however, after the district court granted the People's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and upheld Lynch's certification for short-term treatment. ²

Lynch appealed the district court's order confirming his certification for short-term treatment. In People in Interest of Lynch, 757 P.2d 145 (Colo.App.1988), the court of appeals vacated the district court's order. Based on its decision in People in Interest of Clinton, 742 P.2d 946 (Colo.App.1987), rev'd, 762 P.2d 1381 (Colo.1988), then pending certiorari review by this court, the court of appeals concluded that failure to convene a mental health certification hearing within ten days after such a hearing is requested pursuant to subsection 27-10-107(6) deprives the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. Lynch, 757 P.2d at 146. The court of appeals further held that the district court's subject matter jurisdiction could not be extended beyond the ten-day period by Lynch's purported five-day waiver, id., and therefore, although the hearing was held within fifteen days, the district court's order certifying Lynch for short-term treatment was void. Id.

Judge Van Cise dissented in part because he considered the legal foundation of Clinton questionable and we had already granted certiorari in Clinton to review the reasoning in that case relied on by the majority. Id. Furthermore, the dissent distinguished Clinton based on the fact that the respondent in that case, unlike Lynch, did not waive the ten-day hearing requirement or consent to any delay in the proceedings. ³ Id. The dissent also pointed out that the district court's subject matter jurisdiction over certification hearings is based on section 27-10-111, under which "subject matter jurisdiction is invoked by the filing of a petition or a notice of certification with the court. Once invoked, it continues like any other civil proceeding." Id. Finally, the dissent reasoned that the right to a certification hearing within ten days after a request is made is primarily for the committed person's protection, and thus "there is no valid reason why he cannot waive this right or, as here, consent to a delay." Id.

II.

Procedures for involuntary civil commitment of the mentally ill are prescribed by statute. See §§ 27-10-101 to -129, 11B C.R.S. (1989); People in Interest of Dveirin, 755 P.2d 1207, 1208-09 (Colo.1988). As we recently noted in People in Interest of Clinton, 762 P.2d 1381 (Colo.1988), cases in which we have reversed mental health commitments for failure to comply strictly with statutory requirements fall into two broad categories. Id. at 1384.

The first category of cases involves some failure to comply with essential statutory requirements in mental health certification proceedings. Id. at 1384-85. On several occasions, this court has held that such failure constitutes reversible error, requiring dismissal of the certification proceedings and invalidation of orders entered pursuant to those proceedings. See, e.g., Hultquist v. People, 77 Colo. 310, 236 P. 995 (1925) (failures to deliver copy of complaint to respondent in lunacy proceeding, to give guardian ad litem requisite notice of lunacy commission hearing and to allow respondent the statutorily mandated five-day period for requesting a jury trial); Okerberg v. People, 119 Colo. 529, 205 P.2d 224 (1949) (failure to give five-day notice of lunacy commission proceeding); Watkins v. People, 140 Colo. 228, 344 P.2d 682 (1959) (failure to observe statutory five-day waiting period before executing commitment order); Ford v. District Court, 179 Colo. 64, 498 P.2d 1125 (1972) (reliance on out-of-state incompetency adjudication rather than statutory procedures).

The other category of cases involves defects in notice or process, or attempts by courts to exercise power over persons residing outside the statutorily prescribed territorial limits of the courts' jurisdiction in mental health cases. Clinton, 762 P.2d at 1384-85. Unlike the first category of cases, where these latter forms of noncompliance with statutory provisions were found we held that a jurisdictional defect was created, preventing the district court from acquiring the power to act. See, e.g., Iwerks v. People, 130 Colo. 86, 273 P.2d 133 (1954) (faulty service of process); Kendall v. People, 126 Colo. 573, 252 P.2d 91 (1952) (attempted exercise of jurisdiction over nonresident of county).

In the present case, the court of appeals, relying on its decision in People in Interest of Clinton, 742 P.2d 946 (Colo.App.1987), held that the district court's failure to hold a certification review hearing within ten days after Lynch requested one created a jurisdictional defect, depriving the court of any further power to act on the request. Lynch, 757 P.2d at 146. The court of appeals added that Lynch's purported waiver to allow five days to be added to the ten-day period for hearing in order to gain a change of venue could not extend the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 146. Consequently, the district court's order confirming Lynch's certification for short-term treatment was void. Id.

The court of appeals did not have the benefit of our subsequent decision in Clinton when it reached this conclusion. In Clinton, after delineating the two broad categories of cases involving failure to comply strictly with statutory certification procedures, we rejected as dictum our statement in Barber v. People, 127 Colo. 90, 254 P.2d 431 (1953), that in a lunacy proceeding, governed entirely by statute, failure to comply strictly with the statute's provisions resulted in the court having "no jurisdiction to act." Clinton, 762 P.2d at 1384-85, quoting Barber, 127 Colo. at 95, 254 P.2d at 434.

Under Clinton, the proper analysis of cases involving deviations from the statutory requirements governing mental health certification proceedings involves two sets of inquiries: (1) whether the defect involves "notice or process, or failure to satisfy the statutory [residence] requirements limiting the court's jurisdiction," resulting in a jurisdictional defect, id. at 1385; or, if a non-jurisdictional deviation is involved, whether the defect concerns a failure to comply with essential statutory provisions grave enough to "undermine confidence in the fairness and outcome of the certification proceedings." Id. at 1389.

III.

We begin by reviewing for jurisdictional concerns the district court's failure to hold a hearing within ten days after Lynch's written request. "A court's jurisdiction consists of two elements: jurisdiction over the parties (personal jurisdiction) and jurisdiction over the subject matter of the issue to be...