People of City of Adrian v. Poucher

• Decision Date: 21 December 1976
• Docket Number: No. 58074,58074
• Citation: 247 N.W.2d 798,398 Mich. 316
• Parties: PEOPLE OF the CITY OF ADRIAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Glenn Willit POUCHER, Defendant-Appellant. 398 Mich. 316, 247 N.W.2d 798
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 798

247 N.W.2d 798

PEOPLE OF the CITY OF ADRIAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Glenn Willit POUCHER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 58074.

398 Mich. 316, 247 N.W.2d 798

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 21, 1976.

James E. Sheridan, Asst. City Atty., Adrian, for plaintiff-appellee.

J. C. Beardsley, Tecumseh, for defendant-appellant.

PER CURIAM.

In American Motorcycle Association v. Department of State Police, 11 Mich.App 351, 158 N.W.2d 72 (1968), the Court of Appeals held unconstitutional a statute requiring a motorcyclist to wear a crash helmet. ¹ In this case, at 67 Mich.App. 133, 240 N.W.2d 298 (1976), the Court of Appeals declined to follow American Motorcycle Association, supra, and upheld ordinance language identical to the statute voided by the American Motorcycle Association decision. Defendant has applied for leave to appeal. In lieu of leave to appeal, pursuant to GCR 1963, 853.2(4), we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Defendant argues that the ordinance is not a valid exercise of the police power, but rather an unlawful invasion of individual rights.

'(A) large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests (citations omitted). To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear--First, that the interests of the public, generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose * * *.' Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136, 137, 14 S.Ct. 499, 501, 38 L.Ed. 385 (1894).

Defendant's challenge is to the first point: whether the interests of the public generally require interference with his right to drive a motorcycle without a helmet.

The Legislature has the power to control and regulate the use of the highways. Smith v. Wayne County Sheriff, 278 Mich. 91, 96, 270 N.W. 227 (1936). Moreover, 'if the relation between the statute and the public welfare is debatable, the legislative judgment must be accepted', because of the presumption of constitutionality afforded a statute. Grocers Dairy Co. v. Dept. of Agriculture, 377 Mich. 71, 76, 138 N.W.2d 767, 770 (1966).

'For the State itself to legislate in a manner that affects the individual right of its citizens, the State must show that it has a sufficient interest in protecting or implementing the common good, via its police powers, that such private interests must give way to this higher interest.' Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 157, 215 N.W.2d 179, 186 (1974).

New York pioneered in the area of motorcycle helmet regulation. A memorandum from the Department of Motor Vehicles to the New York Legislature evinces a concern for personal injuries and deaths attributable to motorcycle accidents:

'The number of accidents involving motorcycles is increasing rapidly. In fact, motorcycle accidents increased by 105% In 1965 as compared to 1964, while the total registration of these vehicles increased by 83%. Fatalities increased by 63.6 63.6% And personal injury accidents by statistics indicates that 89.2% Of the motorcycle accidents result in injury or death and almost all fatalities occurring as a result of such accidents involve head injuries. Most of these fatalities could have been avoided, or the severity lessened by the use of a proper helmet.' McKinney's 1966 Session Laws of New York, pp. 2961--2962.

Michigan and Massachusetts quickly followed the New York lead. By 1967, the helmet requirement was a federal minimum standard to which all states were required to conform. ²

There is some evidence that the requirement is effective. During 1967, states with a helmet requirement recorded a decrease in motorcycle deaths by as much as 50%, while a major population state without a helmet requirement had a 9% Increase. ³ The growth in motorcycle registrations continues unabated, ⁴ and the problem motivating the state legislatures in the late 1960's remains a substantial concern. ⁵

We believe there is a distinction between regulations which Solely protect the individual from himself, and those which Primarily protect the individual and Secondarily protect society as a whole. ⁶ More is involved than the unfettered freedom of the cyclist. For example, the ordinance benefits the driver of a vehicle which may accidentally collide with a motorcyclist. Since the helmet is designed to reduce injury to the cyclist, it also has a concomitant effect on the status of the automobile driver. If the helmet succeeds in mitigating what would otherwise be a fatal injury, then not only has the cyclist survived, but the automobile driver has not killed anyone.

Government agencies have gathered impressive statistics on the increased hazard associated with these vehicles, as compared to enclosed transportation. The helmet ordinance is therefore a creative, relatively nonintrusive response of government to protect the public from detrimental technological change. Wearing a helmet is a minor burden, the effects of which benefit not only both parties involved in an accident, but society as a whole. Enforcement of the provision is open and public. Because the cost of the safety device is not only low, but technologically simple to achieve, it does not unduly burden the use of motorcycles.

In furthering highway safety, the Legislature is not limited to measures intended to prevent accidents; it may also design a highway safety program to reduce the consequences of accidents. The changes in transportation, including the accelerated growth of motorcycles, have expanded the concept of permissible legislative infringement on individual liberties in this area. Bisenius v. Karns, 42 Wis.2d 42, 165 N.W.2d 377, 381--384 (1969).

Affirmed.

LINDEMER, COLEMAN, WILLIAMS, FITZGERALD and RYAN, JJ., concur.

LEVIN, Justice (concurring).

There is substantial evidence, as set forth in the opinion of the Court, that the wearing of helmets by motorcyclists tends to reduce loss of life and the severity of injury in traffic accidents.

The ordinance, therefore, benefits not only cyclists but also drivers of other vehicles who collide with them and who may be required to respond civilly or criminally for resultant death or injury.

The government may regulate competing uses of the highways, and to this end may reasonably require that helmets be worn with a view to mitigating potential civil and criminal liability of drivers who collide with motorcycles, although the regulation may also reflect a paternalistic concern for cyclists who prefer to assume the risk of not wearing them.

Since this legislation is a reasonable regulation of conflict arising from competing interests of societal groups, there is no need to advert to the question of regulation of a minority in a situation where the character of the legislation is not defined by the societal conflict which it regulates.

T. G. KAVANAGH, Chief Justice (dissenting).

The Adrian city ordinance involved here, identical to the statute condemned...