People Of The State Of Mich. v. Davis
Decision Date | 17 March 2011 |
Docket Number | No. 290131,No. 08-030280-FC,290131,08-030280-FC |
Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEONTAE TRAVOHN DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
ON REMAND
Before: Fort Hood, P.J., and Borrello and Stephens, JJ.
This Court previously issued an unpublished opinion in this case, affirming defendant's convictions and sentences for one count of conspiracy to commit first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.157a; MCL 750.316, seven counts of attempted murder, MCL 750.91, one count of placing offensive or injurious substances in or near real or personal property, MCL 750.209(1)(b), one count of conspiracy to commit arson of a dwelling house, MCL 750.157a; MCL 750.72, and one count of arson of a dwelling house, MCL 750.72. People v Davis, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued June 22, 2010 (Docket No. 290131). Defendant sought leave to appeal with our Supreme Court, and our Supreme Court remanded to this Court "for consideration of an issue raised by the defendant but not addressed in that court's opinion: whether the circuit court erroneously allowed the statement of the defendant's co-defendant, Caprice Mack, to be introduced into evidence through the preliminary examination testimony of Travis Crowley." People v Davis, _____ Mich _____; 790 NW2d 401 (2010). For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.
The facts of this case were articulated in this Court's previous opinion:
The issue on remand concerns Mack's statement to Crowley during their telephone conversation, and the admission of Mack's statement through Crowley's testimony. Crowley testified that he was talking on the phone to his girlfriend, April Johnson, about the burning of her mother's car. Mack got on the phone and told Crowley that "they" were planning to retaliate with bombs. Crowley testified at the preliminary examination:
Q. Who got on the phone?
A. Sean.
Q. And who is that, what's his full name?
A. Caprice.
Q. Okay. Caprice Mack?
A. Yes, sir.
* * *
Q. Did he tell you anything about what had happened or what they were going do [sic]?
A. Yes, sir, he told me that some boys in that neighborhood had come and blew up Tonya's car, so—
* * *
Q. Go ahead, Judge says you can answer. What did Mr.—what did Sean say?
A. Some boys had blew up Tonya car, so they was gonna, ah, they said that they was gonna take care of it, and they—
* * *
Q. What did he say?
A. When he got on the phone, he said, "Man, Bro, some niggers done blew up mom's car, but yeah, we got these bombs, they gonna get 'em back, we gonna take care of it."
Pursuant to the directive of our Supreme Court, we address whether the circuit court erroneously allowed the statement of Mack to be introduced into evidence through the preliminary examination testimony of Crowley.
Defendant raises two bases of alleged error in the admission of Mack's out-of-court statement through Crowley's testimony. He claims that the admission of the statement violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, and that the statement was inadmissible hearsay.
Because defendant did not preserve this issue for appellate review by raising it in the trial court, this Court's review is for plain error affecting defendant's substantial rights. People v Pipes, 475 Mich 267, 274-279; 715 NW2d 290 (2006), citing People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Under the plain error rule, defendant must establish that (1) error occurred, (2) the error was plain, that is, clear or obvious, and (3) the plain error affected a substantial right of the defendant. Pipes, 475 Mich at 279, citing Carines, 460 Mich at 763-764. Reversal is warranted only when plain error results in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings, independent of defendant's guilt or innocence.Id.
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to confront witnesses who testify against them. US Const, Am VI. Michigan's constitution guarantees the same right. Const 1963, art 1, § 20. The right of confrontation has been interpreted to prohibit the admission of out-of-court testimonial statements unless the accused has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, and the declarant is unavailable. Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36, 53-54, 59, 68; 124 S Ct 1354; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004); People v Shepherd, 472 Mich 343, 347; 697 NW2d 144 (2005).
Only out-of-court statements that are testimonial implicate the Confrontation Clause. Crawford, 541 US at 50-52, 61, 68; People v Taylor, 482 Mich 368, 374; 759 NW2d 361 (2008). A testimonial statement is "a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact." Crawford, 541 US at 51. A statement is testimonial if its "primary purpose" or the questioning that elicits it "is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." Davis v Washington, 547 US 813, 814; 126 S Ct 2266; 165 L Ed 2d 224 (2006). Stated differently, statements are testimonial if they are made under circumstances that would lead an objective declarant reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use in a later trial or criminal prosecution. Id. at 821-822; Taylor, 482 Mich at 377-378. The rationale for limiting the Confrontation Clause's application to testimonial statements is that only testimonial statements cause the declarant to be a "witness" within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. Davis, 547 US at 821. "It is the testimonial character of a statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause." Id.
The Supreme Court in Crawford did not attempt "to spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial[,]'" but the Court recognized that "a casual remark to an acquaintance" is not a testimonial statement in the same way that an accuser making a formal statement to a government officer is. Crawford, 541 US at 51, 68. This Court similarly held inPeople v Bauder, 269 Mich App 174, 180-182; 712 NW2d 506 (2005), that a victim's statements to friends, coworkers, and the defendant's relatives shortly before her death were not testimonial.
In Taylor, our Supreme Court applied Crawford and concluded that inculpatory statements of a codefendant to an acquaintance were nontestimonial and admissible through the acquaintance's testimony. Taylor, 482 Mich at 378, 380. In that case, the three defendants— Marlon Scarber, Eric Taylor, and Robert King—were tried together on charges arising from a kidnapping and murder. One of the prosecution's main witnesses was Troy Ervin, an...
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