People v. Pipes
| Decision Date | 14 June 2006 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 129152.,Docket No. 129154. |
| Citation | 475 Mich. 267,715 N.W.2d 290 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Cedric PIPES, Defendant-Appellee. People of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Julian Dale Key, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Kym L. Worthy, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, and Jeffrey Caminsky, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Detroit, for the people.
Daniel J. Rust, Detroit, for Cedric Pipes.
Jonathan B.D. Simon, Detroit, for Julian D. Key.
Defendants were convicted of first-degree premeditated murder following a joint trial before one jury. The Court of Appeals reversed defendants' convictions on the bases that the admission of each codefendant's statements to the police against the other was a violation of Bruton v. United States,1 and that the error was not harmless. In Bruton, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights when a nontestifying codefendant's confession that inculpates the defendant is introduced at a joint trial.2
We agree with the Court of Appeals that defendants' Sixth Amendment confrontation rights were violated. However, we disagree with the Court of Appeals that the error warranted reversal of defendants' convictions. Unpreserved, constitutional errors are reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. Because defendants have failed to show reversible prejudice, actual innocence, or that the confrontation error "seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation" 3 of the trial, reversal of their convictions was improper. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals judgment and reinstate defendants' first-degree murder convictions.
On March 23, 2002, three-year-old Destiney Thomas sustained a fatal gunshot wound as the result of a drive-by shooting. The prosecution charged defendants Cedric Pipes and Julian Key with first-degree premeditated murder,4 assault with intent to commit murder,5 and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony6 in connection with the shooting.7
Pursuant to MCR 6.121(C),8 defendants moved for separate trials or separate juries, arguing that their defenses were "mutually exclusive."9 In support of the motion, defendant Key made an offer of proof that he would testify that he was not present and had no involvement in the shooting. Meanwhile, defendant Pipes made an offer of proof that he would testify that he was present when defendant Key shot at the house, but that Pipes had no involvement in the shooting. Neither defendant argued for severance based on the possibility of a Bruton error.10
The trial court denied defendants' motion, determining that defendants could not make the requisite showing of prejudice necessary to sustain the motion. The trial court concluded that although defendants' proposed defenses involved blame shifting, they were not "mutually exclusive." Furthermore, the trial court specifically noted that, given defendants' offer of proof, no Bruton problem was present in this case. If the codefendant testifies at trial, then his statements to the police are admissible because the maker of the statements is subject to cross-examination. The trial court relied on the offers of proof presented by both defendants where each unequivocally stated his intention to testify at trial. The trial court noted multiple times its determination that no Bruton problem was present because both defendants planned to testify.11
The prosecution's theory at trial was that the victim died in a drive-by shooting that resulted from a territorial dispute between defendants and rival drug dealers. According to the prosecution, rival drug dealers shot defendant Key's girlfriend's automobile, a green Jeep Cherokee, in response to an argument with defendants. Defendant Key frequently used the green Jeep and had it in his possession when it was shot. The drive-by shooting that killed the victim was an act of retaliation for the damage done to the automobile.
The trial court admitted into evidence multiple statements given by both defendants to the police.12 Both defendants' admissions recounted the argument with the rival drug dealers and discussions regarding retaliation for the shooting of the Jeep. Initially, each defendant shifted all blame for the shooting to his codefendant. Subsequently, each codefendant made statements that inculpated himself as well as his codefendant. Defendant Key conceded that both he and defendant Pipes committed the drive-by shooting. Key admitted that he and Pipes obtained a car from a drug customer, which they used in the drive-by shooting, while others followed in the Jeep as backup. Likewise, Pipes admitted that he rented a car for Key to use in the shooting and admitted following behind Key in the Jeep in order to "watch his [codefendant's] back" during the shooting.
After the prosecution presented its case-in-chief, the trial court inquired of defendants regarding how they planned to proceed. At that point, counsel for each defendant equivocated regarding whether his client would testify. The trial court acknowledged that defendants were free to not testify, but reiterated that its denial of their motion for separate trials and juries was specifically premised on the unequivocal offers of proof that defendants would testify at trial.
Ultimately, however, defendants exercised their Fifth Amendment right and did not testify at trial.13 However, defendants never sought a mistrial when the Bruton error became apparent. The jury convicted both defendants of first-degree premeditated murder, but acquitted defendants on all other charges. Defendants were sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
The Court of Appeals reversed defendants' convictions and remanded for new trials.14 The Court of Appeals majority concluded that the trial court denied defendants a fair trial by denying their motion for separate trials or separate juries, thus causing a Bruton error when defendants chose not to testify. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals majority concluded that the admission of these statements in violation of defendants' confrontation rights was not harmless. The Court of Appeals majority, however, failed to determine whether defendants properly preserved the Bruton error for appeal, as required by People v. Carines.15 Furthermore, the Court of Appeals majority did not cite or apply the proper standard of review delineated in Carines for unpreserved, constitutional error. In applying a harmless error analysis, the majority gave little weight to the highly self-incriminating nature of defendants' statements.
The dissent, however, would have affirmed defendants' convictions on the basis that the offers of proof submitted by the defendants, unequivocally representing that they would testify, waived any claim of error with regard to separate trials or separate juries.
The prosecution sought leave to appeal in this Court. After directing the parties to address whether the offers of proof by defendants waived any right to claim a confrontation error, we heard oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other peremptory action permitted by MCR 7.302(G)(1).16
Constitutional questions, such as those concerning the right to confront witnesses at trial, are reviewed de novo.17 The effect of an unpreserved claim of constitutional error is reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights.18 To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, a defendant must show actual prejudice.19 Under the plain error rule, reversal is only warranted if the defendant is actually innocent or the error seriously undermined the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the trial.20
In Bruton, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him when his nontestifying codefendant's statements implicating the defendant are introduced at their joint trial.21 There is no error, however, if the codefendant testifies.22 The Court held that giving limiting instructions to the jury that the statements can only be used against the declarant is not sufficiently curative because "the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored."23
In Cruz v. New York,24 a codefendant's statements were admitted against the defendant along with the defendant's own confession. The Cruz Court revisited the plurality opinion in Parker v. Randolph.25 In Parker, which involved the same factual predicate as Cruz, four justices determined that Bruton was inapplicable and that there was no Sixth Amendment violation in cases where the defendant's own statement is admitted alongside the defendant's nontestifying codefendant's incriminating statement. Concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Blackmun stated that the admission of the codefendant's statement was a Sixth Amendment violation under Bruton, but any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.26 In Cruz, the Court adopted Justice Blackmun's approach, holding that a Confrontation Clause violation is not ameliorated when the defendant's confession is introduced at trial alongside a nontestifying codefendant's statement that inculpates the defendant.27 Thus, "where a nontestifying codefendant's confession incriminating the defendant is not directly admissible against the defendant . . . the Confrontation Clause bars its admission at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed not to consider it against the defendant, and even if the defendant's own...
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