People of Village of Cahokia v. Wright

• Decision Date: 20 March 1974
• Docket Number: No. 45940,45940
• Citation: 57 Ill.2d 166,311 N.E.2d 153
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the VILLAGE OF CAHOKIA, Appellee, v. Carl WRIGHT et al., Appellants.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 153

311 N.E.2d 153

57 Ill.2d 166

The PEOPLE of the VILLAGE OF CAHOKIA, Appellee, v. Carl WRIGHT et al., Appellants.

No. 45940.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 20, 1974.

Rehearing Denied May 31, 1974.

David H. Goldenhersh, Goldenhersh & Goldenhersh, East St. Louis, for appellants.

Sprague, Sprague & Ysursa, Belleville, for appellee.

RYAN, Justice:

The defendants in these consolidated cases, Carl Wright and Joan Morris, were charged with violating a recent amendment to the zoning ordinance of the Village of Cahokia. The circuit court of St. Clair County dismissed the charges, ruling that the amendment was unconstitutional. The appellate court reversed (11 Ill.App.3d 124, 296 N.E.2d 30), and this court allowed the defendants' petition for leave to appeal.

The challenged amendment to the zoning ordinance reads as follows:

'5. Except as provided in the following, no person shall be permitted to park or occupy any trailer on any premises in any district outside of an approved trailer park. The parking of an occupied trailer in an accessory private garage or in a rear yard in any district shall be allowed provided no living quarters are maintained or any business conducted in such trailer while so parked or store (sic). Emergency or temporary stopping of a trailer shall be allowed on any street, alley or highway for not longer than two hours subject to any other further prohibitions, regulations or limitations imposed by the traffic regulations or laws for such street, alley or highway. In any trailer park, the wheels of any trailer shall not be permitted to be removed except for repairs, nor shall any trailer be permitted to be otherwise permanently fixed to the ground in a manner than (sic) would prevent its removal.'

The defendants have stipulated that their lots are located in an R--1 single-family residential zone and that the zoning ordinance prohibits the placement of trailers within an R--1 district. They further stipulated that they own trailers and that they placed them on the lots which they own in an R--1 district after the adoption of the amendment in question.

The defendants have argued that the ordinance as applied to them is unconstitutional in that the Village of Cahokia does not have the authority to prohibit the location of mobile homes in the Village except in approved trailer parks. Reliance is placed on the case of City of Sparta v. Brenning (1970), 45 Ill.2d 359, 259 N.E.2d 30, where this court ruled that the City of Sparta did not have the statutory authority to pass a similar ordinance prohibiting trailers except in licensed trailer-coach parks. However, it was carefully pointed out in the City of Sparta case that the ordinance was not enacted pursuant to the city's zoning power because the city had no comprehensive zoning ordinance. In our case, however, the amendment was an amendment to the Village of Cahokia's comprehensive zoning ordinance and the question is thus presented in a different context; that is, may the Village of Cahokia validly prohibit trailers except in approved trailer courts pursuant to its power to zone?

The Village's authority to zone and to classify areas into various districts is contained in section 11--13--1 et seq. of the Illinois Municipal Code. The Village is granted the specific power 'to prohibit uses, buildings, or structures incompatible with the character of such districts' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 24, par. 11--13--1(7)). Unless a zoning provision is clearly arbitrary or unreasonable on its face (City of Champaign v. Roseman (1958), 15 Ill.2d 363, 155 N.E.2d 34), it is presumed valid (Honeck v. County of Cook (1957), 12 Ill.2d 257, 146 N.E.2d 35), 'and the one assailing its validity has the burden of proof that the ordinance is invalid or arbitrary or unreasonable as to his property. (Citations.) The same principle applies to amendatory ordinances. (Citations.) Where there is room for a fair difference of opinion concerning the reasonableness of the classification, the legislative judgment of the city council must be conclusive. (Citations.)' (La Salle National Bank v. City of Chicago (1954), 4 Ill.2d 253, 256, 122 N.E.2d 519, 521.) Furthermore, 'To overcome the presumption of validity, it is encumbent upon the property owner to prove by clear and affirmative evidence that the restriction is arbitrary * * *.' Reitman v. Village of River Forest (1956), 9 Ill.2d 448, 452, 453, 137...