People's Home Telephone Co. v. Cockrum

• Decision Date: 17 April 1913
• Citation: 62 So. 86,182 Ala. 547
• Parties: PEOPLE'S HOME TELEPHONE CO. v. COCKRUM.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

62 So. 86

182 Ala. 547

PEOPLE'S HOME TELEPHONE CO. v. COCKRUM.

Supreme Court of Alabama

April 17, 1913

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; E.C. Crowe, Judge.

Action by Charles C. Cockrum against the People's Home Telephone Company for damages for injuries to his wife. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Cockrum's wife, while passing along Nineteenth street in Birmingham came in contract with a wire hanging down from one of appellant's telephone poles, and was greatly shocked thereby. The questions raised on the pleading are those discussed in the opinion. The court charged: "It was the duty of the defendant company to use a guard wire or other reasonable means necessary to protect its wire from the trolley wire of the Birmingham Railway, Light & Power Company, to protect and avoid just such accidents as is claimed in this complaint, if you believe that it crossed such wire." The court also charged that, in effect plaintiff was entitled to recover punitive damages, in the character of action here brought by the husband, for damages on account of the injury to the wife.

Tillman Bradley & Morrow, John S. Stone, and Frank M. Dominick, all of Birmingham, for appellant.

Denson & Denson, of Birmingham, for appellee.

ANDERSON J.

Mr Sutherland, in discussing the right to recover exemplary damages for personal injuries, in section 1253, vol. 3, of his work on Damages, says: "Where the action is brought by one who suffered the injury in his own person, exemplary damages may be allowed, where the doctrine of such damages prevails, if the wrong was done with malice, or with reckless indifference to consequences." Prior to the present married woman's law, which was enacted in 1887, the wife could not sue alone for personal injuries, but had to sue jointly with her husband and for his sole benefit, and it may be that, as she could not then sue alone, and would be a party to the action with her husband, exemplary damages could have been recovered. Barker v. Anniston R.R. Co., 92 Ala. 314, 8 So. 466. This would doubtless be so upon the theory that the wife could not bring a separate suit; but as she, the injured party, was a party to the cause exemplary damages could be recovered. When, however, the present married woman's law, by section 4493 of the Code of 1907, requires her to sue alone for injuries to her person or reputation, and section 4489 makes the damages which she is entitled to recover her separate estate, she is the only party who is entitled to recover exemplary or punitive damages, as the husband is, by the statute, shorn of all right in the matter, except to recover compensatory damages, as hereinafter enumerated.

While the present statute requires the wife to sue alone for torts against her person or reputation, this court has held that this statute does not emancipate her from her household duties or deprive the husband of the right to her domestic service and society, or relieve him of the duty of providing for her "in sickness and in health." Birmingham So. R.R. Co. v. Linter, 141 Ala. 420, 38 So. 363, 109 Am.St.Rep. 40, 3 Ann.Cas. 461. As was said by Dowdell, J., in speaking for the court in the case of Southern R.R. Co v. Crowder, 135 Ala. 417, 33 So. 335: "Our statute on this subject (Code,§ 2521) reads as follows: 'The earnings of the wife are her separate property; but she is not entitled to compensation for services rendered to or for her husband, or to or for the family.' It will be observed that our statute is not as unrestricted as the statutes of New York and Nebraska are in giving to the wife her 'earnings,' but, on the contrary, contains an express limitation that she shall not be entitled to any compensation for services rendered to or for her husband, or to or for the family; or in other words, for any services performed by her in discharge of any duty or obligation growing out of the marriage relation. That it was not the intention of the Legislature, in conferring, by section 2521, upon the wife the right to her earnings, to absolve the wife from the duties and obligations imposed by the marriage vow in her marital and domestic relations is placed beyond cavil by the limitation contained in the second clause of the statute. Section 2527 provides that for all injuries to the person the wife must sue alone. This in no wise takes from the husband his right of action for the loss and damage he has sustained as a proximate result of the injury done to the wife. He may not sue for the injury itself, and this the appellee concedes. Our conclusion is that the statute does not affect the reciprocal duties of husband and wife growing out of the marriage state, within their domestic relations, and that the husband has a marital right to the wife's services to himself and to the family, and for the loss of which, when caused by the wrongful act of another, he has his right of action in damages as against such wrongdoer. So, likewise, for the loss to him of the companionship of his wife, resulting from the wrong and injury to her. His relation as husband imposes upon him the duty of providing and taking care of his wife, and any and all expenses paid or incurred by him on account of injuries received by her are recoverable as an...