People's Sav. Bank v. James
| Decision Date | 12 March 1901 |
| Citation | 178 Mass. 322,59 N.E. 807 |
| Parties | PEOPLE'S SAV. BANK OF WOONSOCKET v. JAMES. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Phipps & Curtin, for appellant.
S. H Dudley and H. Dudley, for appellee.
This is a bill to redeem from a tax sale. There is an answer and also a cross bill by the defendant, and a demurrer to the cross bill by the plaintiff. The demurrer was sustained, the cross bill was dismissed, and a decree was entered for the plaintiff upon its bill. The defendant appeals. The question before us concerns only the dismissal of the cross bill. The case intended to be made by the cross bill is this. The plaintiff derives its title from one Melina Kelley through one Rice, and holds it subject to the equities, if any, of Kelley against Rice. The defendant (the plaintiff in the cross bill) derives his title through a subsequent conveyance from Kelley, and has succeeded to her equities. We express no opinion whether in fact he has succeeded to them. Foster v. Wightman, 123 Mass. 100; Fairfield v. McArthur, 15 Gray, 526. Her equities arise out of the following facts. She was under contract to Rice and wished to pay off this and other liabilities, and to that end was intending to sell or mortgage her land, as she told Rice. Following but slightly abridging the language of the bill, Rice, wishing to get the land without giving an equivalent, fraudulently represented to her that he was a man of large means and credit, that he had superior facilities for raising money, and could raise it on easier terms than she could, and that if he had the title to her land, he could at once get $12,000 upon a mortgage of it from a bank in Providence, Rhode Island, and he promised if she would convey the land to him he would raise that amount, pay Kelley's liabilities, give the balance to her, and return to her the land subject to the mortgage. She believed him and conveyed to him the land. It is alleged that Rice knew that his representations as to existing and contingent facts were false, he being at that time insolvent and that no effort was made by him to obtain any money on his own credit. It is also alleged that his promises were made without any reasonable expectation on his part that he would be able to perform them. He did not perform them, and afterwards went into insolvency and was discharged. The land in question was attached and was sold on execution to the plaintiff. It should be added that the land conveyed to Rice is alleged to have been worth about $17,000, but that a part of it not embraced in this bill was subject to a mortgage of $7,300, so that the security available for the proposed mortgage was less than $10,000 on the defendant's own valuation, which presumably is put as high as it will bear.
We assume that upon a general demurrer we are to consider the case evidently intended to be made, without too close a criticism of the words used. But the demurrer in this case called attention to the insufficiency of the allegations of fraud, and in view of the fact that no amendment was made it is fair to suppose that the pleader has stated the case as strongly as he could. We are of opinion that although the case comes very near the line the cross bill does not make out a title to relief.
The cross bill does not allege that Rice intended not to give the stipulated consideration for the land, or not to return it when required to do so by the terms of his bargain. The words 'desiring to obtain possession of said real estate without rendering any equivalent therefor' just falls short of alleging an intent not to make an attempt to carry out the terms of the understanding. They are a discrediting summary of a general state of mind, but do not allege the necessary specificintent. We may add here that it is not alleged that the sale on execution under which the plaintiff claims was in any way the intended result of Rice's acts.
The only representations alleged to have been made are that Rice the speaker, was a man of large means and credit and had superior facilities for raising money, that he could raise it on easier terms than Kelley could, and that if he had her land he could at once get $12,000 upon a mortgage of it. These we must assume were made with knowledge of their falsity, and with fraudulent intent. But none of them in our opinion reaches the point at which equity interferes. Rice's interest was manifestly adverse to Kelley's, and the parties were at arm's length. They stood like the parties to a sale, or at least were not in confidential relations. The statement concerning the mortgage by its very terms and nature depended on the value of the security, a point on which Kelley presumably was at least as well qualified to judge as Rice, and according to the defendant's valuation it was absured...
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