People's United States Bank v. Goodwin

• Decision Date: 23 June 1908
• Docket Number: 5,593.
• Citation: 162 F. 937
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
• Parties: PEOPLE'S UNITED STATES BANK v. GOODWIN et al.

162 F. 937

PEOPLE'S UNITED STATES BANK v. GOODWIN et al.

No. 5,593.

United States Circuit Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division.

June 23, 1908

This action was instituted in the circuit court for the city of St. Louis, state of Missouri, to recover damages for an alleged libel charged to have been wrongfully and maliciously written, composed, and published by the defendants. It was sought to remove the cause from the state court to this court upon the ground that there was a federal question involved but a motion to remand it to the state court was sustained upon the ground that the complaint did not show that there was such a question in the case. 160 F. 727. It is now sought to remove it to this court by certiorari under section 643 Rev. St. (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 521). The petition for certiorari alleges: That the defendant Goodwin was the Assistant Attorney General for the Post Office Department of the United States, and the defendant Fulton, inspector in charge of the post office inspectors of the United States at the time and for some time prior to the acts complained of in the declaration; that all of said acts were committed by them solely in their capacity as officers of the United States in the Post Office Department thereof, in the discharge of their official duties, and not otherwise; that the action was commenced by plaintiff on account of acts done by defendants under authority of the revenue laws of the United States, and under and by virtue of their offices aforesaid, which said offices were occupied by them all the time mentioned in the declaration, and they therefore pray for a removal of the cause from the state to this court, and that a writ of certiorari issue for that purpose in pursuance of section 643, Rev. St. (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 521).

The petition is duly verified by defendants, and also has certificate of counsel, as prescribed by that statute. The granting of the writ was resisted by counsel for plaintiff who appeared specially for that purpose; but the court, owing to the importance of the issues involved, granted an order for the writ with leave to plaintiff to file a motion to set aside this order and quash the writ. By consent of parties the issuance of the writ was waived, and a transcript of the pleadings in the state court filed as a return in the same manner as if a writ of certiorari had been issued. In pursuance of the leave granted, plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the order for the writ and quash it. There are several grounds assigned in the motion, but the substantial one alleged for the quashing of the writ is that 'the petition does not allege or show that the petitioners are or were officers under any revenue law of the United States or otherwise within the terms of section 643, Rev. St. (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 521). ' The motion may therefore be properly treated as a demurrer to the sufficiency of the petition and the jurisdiction of this court to grant the writ upon the allegations of the petition. Virginia v. Felts (C.C.) 133 F. 85.

Barclay & Fauntleroy, for plaintiffs.

H. W. Blodgett, U.S. Atty., and T. P. Young, Asst. U.S. Atty., for defendants.

TRIEBER District Judge (after stating the facts as above).

The importance of the questions of law involved, and the ability with which the case has been argued by counsel, and the fact that the precise question involved in this proceeding has never been determined by the Supreme Court or the Circuit Court of Appeals for this circuit require a more full review of the statute in question and the principles of law which will aid in a construction thereof than would ordinarily be necessary. The section under which the proceeding is instituted is lengthy and was digested by the compilers of the Revised Statutes from a number of acts, some of which have been repealed since the enactment of the Revised Statutes; but, as the petition is based solely upon the claim that the defendants committed the acts complained of by the plaintiff under and by virtue of the revenue laws of the United States, it is unnecessary to refer to any other part of that section than the one relating to 'any officer appointed under, or acting by, authority of any revenue law of the United States, now or hereafter enacted, or against any person acting under, or by, authority of any such officer, on account of any act done under color of his office, or of any such law, or on account of any right, title or authority claimed by such officer or other person under any such law.'

The constitutionality of the act is not questioned; that having been fully determined in Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 25 L.Ed. 648, and Davis v. South Carolina, 107 U.S. 591, 2 Sup.Ct. 636, 27 L.Ed. 574. Although under section 5596, Rev. St., all acts of Congress passed prior to the 1st day of December, 1873, any portion of which is embraced in any section of the Revised Statutes, are repealed (United States v. Bowen, 100 U.S. 508, 25 L.Ed. 631), still, when there is a doubt as to the construction of a section of the Revised Statutes, it is proper to refer to the original acts from which the section was taken for the purpose of ascertaining the true intent of Congress, and this is especially so where the act authorizing the revision directs marginal references, as is the case in the act authorizing the Revised Statutes. United States v. Lacher, 134 U.S. 624, 10 Sup.Ct. 625, 33 L.Ed. 1080; The Conqueror, 166 U.S. 110, 17 Sup.Ct. 510, 41 L.Ed. 937; Barrett v. United States, 169 U.S. 218, 18 Sup.Ct. 327, 42 L.Ed. 723.

The first act passed by Congress on that subject (excepting Act Feb. 4, 1815, c. 31, 3 Stat. 198, which was intended to be of short duration only, during the then existing war between the United States and Great Britain, extended by Act March 15, 1815, c. 94, Sec. 6, 3 Stat.

233, and re-enacted by Act March 3, 1817, c. 109, 3 Stat. 396, for the term of four years), was Act March 2, 1833, c. 57, 4 Stat. 633, entitled 'An act to provide for the collection of duties on imports.'

Section 3 of that act, in so far as it is necessary to quote it for the determination of the issue involved in this case, is as follows:

'That in any case where suit or prosecution shall be commenced in a court of any state against any officer of the United States, or other person, for or on account of any act done under the revenue laws of the United States, or under color thereof, or for, or on account of, any right, authority or title set up or claimed by such officer or other person under any such law of the United States, it shall be lawful for the defendant in such suit or prosecution at any time before trial, upon a petition to the Circuit Court of the United States, in and for the district in which the defendant shall have been served with process * * * which petition, affidavit and certificate shall be presented to the said Circuit Court if in session, and if not, to the clerk thereof at his office, and shall be filed in said office and the cause shall thereupon be entered on the docket of said court and shall thereafter be proceeded in as a cause originally commenced in that court; and it shall be the duty of the clerk of said court, if the suit were commenced in the court below by summons, to issue a writ of certiorari to the state court requiring said court to send to the said Circuit Court the record and proceedings in said cause.'

The cause which led to the enactment of this act was the attempted nullification of the tariff laws by one of the states of the Union and was upon the recommendation of President Jackson in a special message to Congress. 2 Richardson's Messages and Papers of the Presidents, p. 610. A history of the causes which led to the enactment of the act may be found in the opinion of Mr. Justice Strong in Tennessee v. Davis, supra.

In view of the title of the act, it had been held that it applied only to duties on imports, and not to cases arising under the internal revenue laws. Stevens v. Mack, 5 Blatch. 514, Fed. Cas. No. 13,404, where Judge Benedict held that it did not even apply to cases arising under the internal revenue laws. In Philadelphia v. Diehl, 5 Wall. 720, 728, 18 L.Ed. 614, Mr. Justice Clifford, delivering the opinion of the court upon the same matter, said:

'Undoubtedly the original act was passed for the protection of officers of the revenue and persons acting under them, charged by law with the collection of import duties.'

The first act of Congress intending to extend the provisions of the act to the internal revenue laws was Act June 13, 1864, c. 173, 13 Stat. 223, 241, entitled 'An act to provide internal revenue to support the government, to pay interest on the public debt and for other purposes. ' Section 50 of that act is as follows:

'That the provisions of the act entitled 'An act to provide for the collection of duties on imports,' approved March 2, 1833, now in force, shall be taken and deemed as extended to and embracing all cases arising under the laws for the collection of internal duties, stamp duties, licenses or taxes which have been, or may be hereafter enacted; and all persons duly authorized to assess, receive or collect such duties or tax under such laws are hereby declared to be, and to have been revenue officers within the true intent and meaning of said act and entitled to all the exemptions, immunities, rights, benefits and privileges therein enumerated or conferred.'

By Act July 13, 1866, c. 184, 14 Stat. 98, 171, entitled 'An act to reduce internal taxes and to amend an act entitled 'An act to provide internal revenue to support the government, to pay interest on the public debt and for other purposes,' approved June 30, 1864, and acts amendatory thereof,' the section of the act of 1864...