People v. Aaron J. (In re Aaron J.)
| Decision Date | 01 May 2018 |
| Docket Number | A145253,A145890 |
| Citation | 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 229,22 Cal.App.5th 1038 |
| Parties | IN RE AARON J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Aaron J., Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Counsel for Appellant: Amanda K. Roze, First District Appellate Project
Counsel for Respondent: Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of California, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Donna M. Provenzano, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Aileen Bunney, Deputy Attorney General, Christina Vom Saal, Deputy Attorney General, Victoria Ratnikova, Deputy Attorney General
In this juvenile appeal, we consider the appropriate procedure for determining—in accordance with section 241.1 of the Welfare and Institutions Code1 —whether a juvenile who appears to come within the description of both section 300 and section 602 should be treated as a dependent or a ward. After Aaron J. (appellant) was declared a ward of the juvenile court pursuant to section 602, he appealed claiming a host of errors primarily focused on the juvenile court's decision to make him a ward rather than retain his status as a dependent minor. Specifically, appellant asserts that the county protocol under which his juvenile court status was assessed violates state law; that the juvenile court's status determination was prejudicially flawed in numerous respects; and that the juvenile court's later refusal to modify its dispositional order to reinstate dependency was error. Appellant also claims that the juvenile court's underlying jurisdictional finding that he committed second degree robbery is not supported by substantial evidence and that various restitution fines and administrative fees should be stricken.2 The Attorney General concedes that a $200 restitution fine was imposed in error in this case, and we therefore strike it. However, finding any further potential errors harmless under the specific circumstances of this case, we otherwise affirm.
After what can only be described as an extremely abusive and traumatic childhood,3 appellant initially came to the attention of the delinquency court in April 2010 at the age of 12, when the San Francisco County District Attorney (DA) filed an original juvenile wardship petition pursuant to section 602 alleging that appellant had committed robbery ( Pen. Code, § 211 ) and assault with a deadly weapon ( Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1) ). The petition was suspended, appellant was placed on home supervision in accordance with section 654, and the petition was ultimately dismissed in November 2010. Thereafter, in April 2012, the San Francisco Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a juvenile dependency petition with respect to appellant pursuant to section 300, alleging that his legal guardian could not safely maintain him in the family home due to his physically and verbally assaultive behaviors. The juvenile court sustained the dependency petition in May 2012 and placed appellant in foster care. He was returned to the home of his guardian in January 2013 under a family maintenance plan.
However, less than three months later, in April 2013, a second wardship petition was filed by the DA alleging that appellant had committed grand theft ( Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (c) ) and had received stolen property ( Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a) ). He admitted to misdemeanor possession of stolen property ( Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a) ). In June 2013, a third wardship petition alleged that appellant committed robbery of a transit passenger ( Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (a) ). He admitted to felony grand theft ( Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (c) ). That same month, a fourth wardship petition was filed, alleging that appellant committed grand theft ( Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (c) ), robbery ( Pen. Code, § 211 ), and receiving stolen property ( Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a) ). Appellant again admitted to felony grand theft ( Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (c) ).
While appellant was pending disposition on all three of these petitions, the San Francisco Juvenile Probation Department (Probation) filed a report pursuant to section 241.1 (CASE report) recommending that appellant—a current juvenile court dependent—be made a juvenile court ward pursuant to section 602. In addition to appellant's history of delinquency, the CASE report described appellant's extensive history of behavioral referrals in the school setting, including issues with extortion, fighting, class disruptions, absenteeism, and truancy. Appellant—whose most recent report card reflected a grade point average of 0.33—was described by his Dean of Students as "out of control" and a "safety issue." At the dispositional hearing in August 2013, appellant was placed on juvenile probation under section 725, subdivision (a). Thereafter, appellant made significant progress while on probation, allowing his case to be dismissed in November 2014, earlier than expected.
Unfortunately, only four months later, on March 16, 2015, a fifth wardship petition was filed by the DA alleging that appellant, now 17 years old, had committed second degree robbery ( Pen. Code, § 211.) Appellant was detained in juvenile hall. Although appellant's court appointed special advocate (CASA) and the Detention Diversion Advocacy Program both filed reports recommending that appellant be released on home supervision, this was not done. Rather, on March 25, 2015, a sixth wardship petition was filed alleging that appellant had committed robbery of a transit passenger ( Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (a) ) and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury ( Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4) ).
A contested jurisdictional hearing with respect to the fifth petition was held on April 14 and 15, 2015, at the conclusion of which the juvenile court sustained the allegation of second degree robbery. Thereafter, the court amended the sixth petition to include an allegation of attempted first-degree robbery ( Pen. Code, §§ 211, 664 ), and appellant admitted that allegation in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts. On April 22, 2015, Probation filed a CASE report recommending that appellant be declared a juvenile court ward. The related dispositional report recommended wardship and out of home placement. An April 27 CASA report, in contrast, recommended that appellant remain a juvenile court dependent.
A contested dispositional hearing was held on May 26, 2015, focused on the issue of whether appellant should remain a dependent or be declared a ward of the juvenile court pursuant to section 241.1. At the conclusion of that hearing, the juvenile court declared wardship and ordered out of home placement with various terms and conditions of probation. That same day, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings and dispositional order.
Due to the juvenile court's decision to treat appellant as a ward pursuant to section 241.1, appellant's dependency jurisdiction was terminated on June 2, 2015, one month shy of his eighteenth birthday. However, on July 8, 2015, appellant filed a motion under sections 388 and 778 asking the juvenile court to modify its previous dispositional order to set aside its wardship determination; reinstate him as a dependent pursuant to section 300; and grant his request for non-wardship probation pursuant to section 725. Appellant argued that Probation had been unable to place him in out of home care before he turned 18 and that the Agency could provide services that were unavailable through Probation. The DA filed an opposition, and, after hearing on July 27, 2015, the juvenile court denied the modification petition with prejudice. Several days later, on July 30, a different juvenile court judge implemented the prior court's commitment order, sending appellant to Log Cabin Ranch (Log Cabin) until age 19.
Appellant filed an additional notice of appeal with respect to the juvenile court's denial of his modification petition. By order dated September 2, 2015, we consolidated appellant's two appeals for briefing, argument, and decision, and the combined matter is now before us for resolution.
The bulk of appellant's complaints stem from his disagreement with the juvenile court's decision to treat him as a juvenile court ward rather than retaining his status as a dependent minor. As we recently had occasion to summarize: ( In re M.V. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1505-1506, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 519, fn. omitted ( M.V. ).)
Pursuant to section 241.1 : ( § 241.1, subd. (a) ; but see § 241.1, subd...
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