People v. Abarca

• Decision Date: 12 August 2016
• Docket Number: E063687
• Citation: 2 Cal.App.5th 475,205 Cal.Rptr.3d 888
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Willie ABARCA, Jr., Defendant and Respondent.

2 Cal.App.5th 475

205 Cal.Rptr.3d 888

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant

v.Willie ABARCA, Jr., Defendant and Respondent.

E063687

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

Filed August 12, 2016

Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney, and Emily R. Hanks, Deputy District Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Thien Huong Tran, Sherman Oaks, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.

OPINION

SLOUGH

, J.

The People appeal from the superior court's order granting defendant Willie Abarca Jr.'s Proposition 47 resentencing petition. (Pen. Code, § 1170.18

.)

Abarca pled guilty to one felony count of second degree burglary (§ 459)¹ based on his attempt to pass a forged check for $300 at a bank. After the electorate passed Proposition 47, Abarca sought to have his felony conviction redesignated as the newly created misdemeanor of shoplifting—entering an open commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny of $950 or less. (§ 459.5, subd. (a).) Abarca's petition says “the value of the check ... does not exceed $950.00.” The People responded by contending Abarca's offense does not constitute shoplifting because banks are not commercial establishments. The superior court concluded banks are commercial establishments, granted Abarca's petition, and resentenced him.

The People advance three grounds for reversing the superior court order granting the petition. First, the People contend the superior court erred in reaching the merits because Abarca did not carry his initial burden by attaching evidence to his petition. Second, the People contend the superior court erred in determining a bank is a commercial establishment. Third, they contend the superior court erred because Abarca's underlying conduct could have been punished as felony burglary even after Proposition 47, because Abarca's act of passing a forged check constituted identity theft. We disagree with each asserted error and therefore affirm.

I

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

According to a declaration supporting an arrest warrant for Abarca, on July 10, 2013, “Willie Abarca walked into the U.S. Bank [at 12612 Limonite Avenue] and attempted to cash a check (# 557) from Newport Coach Works Inc. in the amount of $300.00.” Abarca left the bank without obtaining cash while a bank employee was checking the signature against bank records. The investigating deputy sheriff “contacted the account owner[,] Carter Read,” who reported “he does not know Abarca, never gave Abarca a check ... and did not give permission for any of his employees to give Abarca a check.”

The Riverside County District Attorney charged Abarca with one felony count of burglary (§ 459; count 1) and one felony count of forgery (§ 475, subd. (c); count 2). The information also alleged Abarca had five prison priors within the meaning of 667.5, subdivision (b).

In the burglary count, the prosecution accused Abarca of committing “a violation of Penal Code section 459

, a felony, in that on or about July 10, 2013, in the County of Riverside, State of California, he did wilfully and unlawfully enter a certain building located at 12612 LIMONITE AVE, EASTVALE, CA, with intent to commit theft and a felony.”

In the forgery count, the prosecution accused Abarca of committing “a violation of Penal Code section 475, subdivision (c)

, a felony, in that on or about July 10, 2013, in the County of Riverside, State of California, he did wilfully and unlawfully possess a completed check, money order, traveler's check, warrant, and county order, with the intent to utter and pass and facilitate the utterance and passage of the same, in order to defraud READ C.”

On November 18, 2013, Abarca pled guilty to the commercial burglary count and admitted two prison priors. At the plea hearing, the superior court asked Abarca, “[I]s it true on July 10th, 2013 in Riverside County, you went into a building with the intent to commit a felony?” Abarca replied, “Yes.” The superior court found “a factual basis for the plea and ... accept [ed] the plea.”

On December 9, 2013, in accordance with the plea agreement, the superior court dismissed the forgery count and struck the remaining three prison prior allegations. The superior court sentenced Abarca to an upper term of three years in county jail on the burglary count and consecutive one-year enhancements for each of the two prison priors. The court suspended execution of the final two years of the sentence and ordered two years of mandatory supervision.

On November 4, 2014, the voters of California passed Proposition 47, reducing some felony theft- and forgery-related offenses to misdemeanors when the value of the stolen property does not exceed $950. (E.g., §§ 459.5, subd. (a) [redefining some theft as shoplifting], 490.2, subd. (a) [redefining some grand theft as petty theft], 473, subd. (b) [changing punishment for some forgery and counterfeiting offenses].) The initiative also created a resentencing procedure allowing offenders to petition for resentencing if they are “currently serving a sentence for a conviction” for committing a felony and “would have been guilty of a misdemeanor under” the provisions added by Proposition 47. (§ 1170.18, subd. (a)

.)

On December 10, 2014, Abarca submitted a petition asking the superior court to recall his commercial burglary conviction and resentence him under section 1170.18, subdivision (a)

. The petition declares “the value of the check or property does not exceed $950.”

On March 11, 2015, the prosecution submitted a response stating “[d]efendant is not entitled to the relief requested” because a “[b]ank is not a commercial establishment.” The prosecution did not contest the value of the forged check or contend Abarca was ineligible for resentencing for any other reason. Nor did the prosecution check boxes provided to request a hearing to determine whether defendant poses an unreasonable risk of danger to the public safety or for any other reason.

On April 23, 2015, the superior court entered an order granting Abarca's petition.² The order indicates the superior court did not hold a hearing on his petition. The order overruled the prosecution's “objection that [a] bank is not [a] commercial establishment.” The superior court ordered count one “deemed a misdemeanor ... amend[ed] count 001 to a violation of 459.5 PC

,” and sentenced Abarca to county jail “for the term of 364 days.” Because Abarca had already served 364 days, the superior court ordered him released. The superior court also gave both parties “10 days to file briefs preserving appellate issues.” The appellate record indicates neither party filed a brief raising additional issues.

On May 27, 2015, the People filed a notice of appeal.

II

DISCUSSION

A. Petitioner's Burden

The People contend the superior court erred in granting the petition because Abarca did not “present any evidence whatsoever regarding the underlying facts of his section 459

conviction.” In effect, the People contend the superior court was not permitted to reach the merits of Abarca's petition without first finding the petitioner had made a prima facie case of entitlement to resentencing. We find no error.

In the first place, the People fail to set forth what constitutes a prima facie case or how Abarca's petition was defective. “An appellate court is not required to examine undeveloped claims, nor to make arguments for parties.” (Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 754

.) We decline to do so here.

Even assuming the People's argument is that Abarca failed to show he passed a forged check for an amount that did not exceed $950, we refuse to reverse on that basis. Abarca filed a signed petition declaring, under penalty of perjury, that “the value of the check” he was convicted of passing “does not exceed $950.” The People did not contest the assertion in their responsive pleading in the superior court. Nor did they in any way address the sufficiency of the petition. Even when the superior court granted the petition and gave the People “10 days to file briefs preserving appellate issues,” they chose not to object to the sufficiency of the petition.

Moreover, in this court, the People admit Abarca's offense involved passing a bad $300 check, and also admit “[t]he trial court's order granting the petition was based on a review of the court's record” which contained the arrest warrant showing the value of the bad check. Under these circumstances, we cannot find the superior court abused its discretion by reaching the merits of Abarca's petition.³

B. Commercial Establishment

The People contend the superior court erred by determining Abarca was entitled to resentencing on his conviction for burglarizing U.S. Bank as shoplifting (§ 459.5) on the ground that a bank is not a commercial establishment. Again, we find no error.

Proposition 47 added section 459.5 to the Penal Code

. The new section provides: “Notwithstanding Section 459 [burglary], shoplifting is defined as entering a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny while that establishment is open during regular business hours, where the value of the property that is taken or intended to be taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950). Any other entry into a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny is burglary.” We review de novo the superior court's interpretation of this provision. (People v. Rizo (2000) 22 Cal.4th 681, 685, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 375, 996 P.2d 27.)

Neither Proposition 47 nor the Penal Code defines commercial establishment . We therefore understand it to have the meaning it bears in ordinary usage. (See Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. County of Riverside (1989) 48 Cal.3d 84, 91, 255 Cal.Rptr. 670, 767 P.2d 1148

.) If the language is unambiguous on its face, we interpret it accordingly. If the language is ambiguous, we may consult ballot summaries and other extrinsic materials to aid us in determining the voters' intent. (People v. Superior Court (Pearson ) (2010) 48 Cal.4th 564, 571...