People v. Able, 79SA432
| Decision Date | 16 June 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 79SA432,79SA432 |
| Citation | 618 P.2d 1110,200 Colo. 115 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Patrick H. ABLE, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Paul Q. Beacom, Dist. Atty., Marc P. Mishkin, Deputy Dist. Atty., Brighton, for plaintiff-appellant.
Robert W. Caddes, Denver, for defendant-appellee.
The People seek reversal of a decision of the district court dismissing an information charging the appellee with operating a motor vehicle while under revocation as a habitual traffic offender. We reverse and remand with directions to reinstate the information.
The relevant facts of this case are not in dispute. On December 18, 1975, the Department of Revenue held a hearing pursuant to section 42-2-203, C.R.S. 1973, at which time the department's hearing officer found that the appellee had driving convictions sufficient to justify the entry of an order revoking his driver's license for five years. One of the convictions was based on a municipal ordinance prohibiting reckless driving. No appeal of the revocation order was taken pursuant to section 42-2-204, C.R.S. 1973.
On February 20, 1979, the appellee was arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle while under revocation as a habitual traffic offender. Section 42-2-206, C.R.S. 1973.
At a preliminary hearing in the county court, the parties stipulated as to the 1975 order of revocation, the driving by the appellee on February 20, 1979, and the appellee's awareness of the order of revocation. The appellee moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the hearing officer had improperly considered the municipal conviction for reckless driving at the 1975 revocation hearing.
The county court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the municipal reckless driving conviction should not have been considered by the hearing officer and, therefore, the order of revocation was void.
The People then filed an information in the district court charging the same offense. The appellee renewed his motion to dismiss, which was granted on the grounds that the 1975 order of revocation was void. The district court held that the legislature, by not specifically including reckless driving among the traffic offenses enumerated in section 42-2-202(2)(b), C.R.S. 1973, had "excluded a municipal reckless driving conviction from consideration by the Department of Revenue for the purpose of habitual offender revocation."
The People do not dispute, for the purpose of this proceeding, the appellee's contention that the hearing officer should not have considered the appellee's municipal reckless driving conviction. The position of the People is that: (a) the Department of Revenue had the power and jurisdiction to revoke the appellee's driver's license; (b) a mistake as to the nature of an underlying conviction or an incorrect application of the habitual traffic offender statute amounts to no more than an error of law; (c) section 42-2-204, C.R.S. 1973, provides for direct appeal of an order of revocation, and the appellee was aware of his rights under section 42-2-204; (d) public policy and expressed legislative intent preclude collateral attack on a driver's status adjudication during a subsequent criminal proceeding for driving under revocation as a habitual traffic offender.
A revocation proceeding under section 42-2-203, C.R.S. 1973, is not a criminal proceeding. Its purposes are to deny the privilege of operating a motor vehicle to those persons who have demonstrated by their conduct and record an indifference to the safety and welfare...
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People v. Meyers
...C.R.S. 1973. People v. Roybal, Colo., 617 P.2d 800 (1980); People v. Roybal, Colo., 618 P.2d 1121 (1980); see also, People v. Able, Colo., 618 P.2d 1110 (1980); People v. Heinz, 197 Colo. 102, 589 P.2d 931 (1979). We now hold that where the defendant does make a prima facie showing of const......
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People v. Coyle
...the custody of the DDSS after they were adjudicated dependent and neglected. The district court held that our decision in People v. Able, Colo., 618 P.2d 1110 (1980) permitted the defendant to attempt to collaterally attack the custody order, but that the defendant lacked standing to do so ......
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People v. District Court of Seventeenth Judicial Dist., 80SA521
...judgment of dismissal, and we reversed and remanded the case to that court with instructions to reinstate the information. People v. Able, Colo., 618 P.2d 1110 (1980). There we held that, in a trial for violation of section 42-2-206, C.R.S.1973, the defendant could not collaterally attack t......
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People v. Rocha, 83SA5
...to consider defendant's eligibility to retain a license to operate a motor vehicle in Colorado was civil in nature. People v. Able, 200 Colo. 115, 618 P.2d 1110 (1980). We conclude that the right to defend against charges of criminal conduct by collaterally attacking a conviction underlying......