People v. Adair
| Decision Date | 09 May 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. B138462.,B138462. |
| Citation | 88 Cal.App.4th 1297,106 Cal.Rptr.2d 514 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Jeanie Louise ADAIR, Defendant and Respondent. |
Gil Garcetti and Steve Cooley, District Attorneys, George M. Palmer, Fred Klink, and Patrick D. Moran, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
John Steinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.
Jeanie Louise Adair (defendant) was charged with the murder of her husband, Robert Adair (Pen.Code, § 187, subd. (a)). The district attorney of Los Angeles County also alleged special circumstances pursuant to Penal Code sections 190.2, subdivision (a)(1), murder carried out for financial gain, and 190.2, subdivision (a)(15), lying in wait. It was also alleged that pursuant to Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (b)(1), she had used a dangerous or deadly weapon in the commission of the offense.
After approximately a one-month long jury trial, the defendant was acquitted. The People had presented a strong case based upon circumstantial evidence. The defendant presented evidence that not only raised a reasonable doubt with the jury, but now in hindsight, causes the People to concede that the jury had a basis for having a reasonable doubt, based upon the evidence presented.
This matter comes before us after the defendant filed a petition pursuant to Penal Code section 851.8, for a finding of factual innocence, which, after a hearing, was granted by the trial court. The People have appealed the granting of the petition. The granting of such a petition is appealable, pursuant to Penal Code section 851.8, subdivision (p)(1). (See also People v. White (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d Supp. 17 144 Cal.Rptr. 128; People v. Glimps (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 315, 155 Cal.Rptr. 230; People v. Pogre (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 234 Cal.Rptr. 590 and People v. Matthews (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1052, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 348.)
The standard of review in the trial court is not in dispute, as it is set forth in Penal Code section 851.8 and interpreted in subsequent cases.
Penal Code section 851.8 states, in pertinent part, as follows:
(Italics added.)
Although Penal Code section 851.8, subdivision (e) which applies to acquittal after trial, allows the trial judge to grant the petition if "it appears to the judge presiding at the trial wherein such acquittal occurred that the defendant was factually innocent of such charge ...." such seemingly unlimited discretion is in fact limited by subdivision (e)'s reference to the relief standard set forth in subdivision (b).
The term "reasonable cause" means the "arrestee thus must establish that facts exist which would lead no person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or conscientiously entertain any honest and strong suspicion that the person arrested is guilty of the crimes charged." (People v. Matthews, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 1056, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, citing People v. Scott M. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 688, 699, 213 Cal.Rptr. 456.)
(People v. Scott M., supra, 167 Cal.App.3d at pp. 699-700, 213 Cal.Rptr. 456, emphasis added.)
"Establishing factual innocence, within the meaning of Penal Code section 851.8, entails establishing as a prima facie matter not necessarily just that the arrestee had a viable substantive defense to the crime charged, but more fundamentally that there was no reasonable cause to arrest him in the first place." (People v. Matthews, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 1056, 9 Cal.Rptr .2d 348, emphasis added.)
In order to resolve this matter, we must first determine the appropriate standard of appellate review. In discussing the standard of review on appeal, the court of appeal in People v. Scott M., supra, 167 Cal.App.3d at p. 699, 213 Cal.Rptr. 456, a case wherein the trial court denied a section 851.8 petition, determined that (Citing People v. Hampton (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 193, 200, 172 Cal.Rptr. 25.) The Hampton case involved a contention on appeal, after conviction, that there had been insufficient evidence presented at the defendant's preliminary hearing to hold him to answer for trial.
In a part of the opinion that was clearly dicta, the court in Hampton noted that in ruling on a Penal Code section 995 motion, if the reviewing court found some evidence to support a commitment in a criminal case, the reviewing court could not inquire into the sufficiency of that evidence. (People v. Hampton, supra, 116 Cal.App.3d at p. 200, 172 Cal.Rptr. 25.) In any event, the issue in Hampton has no relationship to the review required in Penal Code section 851.8.
In People v. Pogre, supra, the appellate department of the Santa Clara Superior Court noted that Scott M., supra, involved a trial court's denial of a petition under Penal Code section 851.8. Pogre dealt with a finding by the trial court that the defendant was factually innocent, after an acquittal following a jury trial, the same situation presented in this case. The Pogre court stated: "In our case, of course, we determine whether there is any substantial evidence contradicted or uncontradicted which will support the finding by the trial court that defendant was factually innocent." (Pogre, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. Supp. 8, 234 Cal.Rptr. 590, citing People v. Reilly (1970) 3 Cal.3d 421, 425, 90 Cal.Rptr. 417, 475 P.2d 649.) Reilly involved a review of a conviction after a jury trial and has nothing to do with any issue involved in a petition under section 851.8. The court in Pogre, supra, then set forth the reasonable cause standard in subsection (b) of section 851.8, supra, and stated: "It is against this standard that we examine the facts to determine if the trial judge's order is supported by substantial evidence." (Pogre, supra, at p. Supp. 9, 234 Cal.Rptr. 590.)
In People v. Matthews, supra, 7 Cal. App.4th 1052, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, the Court of Appeal did not set forth the standard of review that was applied, but it is clear that the court conducted an independent review of the facts of the case in order to ascertain whether or not the trial court had abused its discretion in granting a petition pursuant to section 851.8, by reference to the standard set forth in subsection (b).
We respectfully decline to follow any language in Scott M. or Pogre, supra, that suggests we are bound by the trial court's findings if any substantial evidence supports them. To do this would allow a trial court to ignore a set of facts that clearly established reasonable cause, as long as there were also facts that supported the possibility of innocence, in clear violation of the language of subdivision (b) of section 851.8, as interpreted in the Matthews case, supra.
After reviewing the cases cited supra, we believe the appropriate standard for our review is to independently review the record to ascertain if any reasonable cause exists to believe defendant committed the offense for which she was arrested and tried and determine if the trial court abused its discretion in granting the petition. With this standard of review in mind, we set forth the facts established at defendant's trial.
Defendant and the decedent Robert Adair (Robert) were married. Defendant was having an affair with her orthopaedic surgeon, Doctor Michael Shapiro.
On November 5, 1996, Robert received two phone calls from defendant while Robert was at work. The receptionist who originally took the calls was familiar with...
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