People v. Adams

• Decision Date: 11 October 1990
• Docket Number: No. E007063,E007063
• Citation: 224 Cal.App.3d 705,274 Cal.Rptr. 94
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Martin ADAMS, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 94

274 Cal.Rptr. 94

224 Cal.App.3d 705

PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Martin ADAMS, Defendant and Appellant.

No. E007063.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

Oct. 11, 1990.

Review Denied Jan. 3, 1991.

[224 Cal.App.3d 707] Dennis L. Cava, Beverly Hills, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Richard B. Iglehart, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Harley D. Mayfield, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Tim Nader, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

OPINION

HOLLENHORST, Acting Presiding Justice.

Defendant challenges certain conditions imposed pursuant to a grant of probation after he pled guilty to one count of arson. Specifically, he contends (1) the condition requiring him to register with the chief of police where he resides pursuant to Penal Code section 457.1 is improper because the court failed to state on the record its reasons for finding the arson was the result of compulsive behavior and further that there is no evidence of compulsive behavior; and (2) the condition that defendant submit to warrantless searches is invalid. He also challenges the order requiring him to reimburse the probation costs as being invalid because defendant was not afforded his right to a separate hearing on his ability to pay. We affirm the order granting probation but reverse the order for reimbursement of probation costs.

FACTS ¹

On December 8, 1988, the Hesperia Fire Department was called to investigate five separate vegetation fires in Hesperia. Witnesses provided the officers with the license plate of a suspect vehicle which the officers began to pursue. The vehicle sped from the scene but the officers were eventually able to effectuate a felony stop and defendant was arrested.

After he was read his rights, defendant told the officers he just wanted to take his frustrations out on something so he lit each fire by wadding up a piece of paper, lighting it with his Zippo lighter and tossing it out the window. He had been drinking but claimed he was not drunk.

After defendant agreed to plead guilty to one count of arson, the remaining four counts of arson and one count of evading an officer were dismissed. In his statement to the probation officer, defendant claimed he was wasted on alcohol at the time of the incident, that he did not start the fires and got scared when the police started chasing him. In a report prepared pursuant to Evidence Code sections 1017 and 952, Craig C. Rath, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist, stated that defendant had a predisposition toward agitation and hyperactivity and was rebellious and hostile toward authority figures. There is also an indication that the fires were near the home of a John C. Austerman who had been encountering problems with defendant because of defendant's belief that Mr. Austerman had stolen defendant's girlfriend away from him.

REGISTRATION UNDER PENAL CODE SECTION 457.1

Defendant contends the registration requirement imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 457.1 ² was improper. Section 457.1, subdivision (b), gives the trial court the discretion to require a convicted arsonist to register with the appropriate law enforcement officer for the area in which the defendant resides.

The court may require registration not only as a reasonable condition to a grant of probation, as in this case, but in addition to any sentence or other penalty prescribed by law which the court might impose. ³

The only limitation on the court's discretion to require registration is that the court is obligated to first find that in committing Defendant contends that although the trial court expressly found that he had exhibited compulsive behavior in committing the arson, the registration requirement is invalid because the trial court did not state its reasons for this finding on the record. He also contends there is no basis for finding compulsive behavior.

the offense, the defendant exhibited compulsive behavior. Section 457.1 further requires the court to state its reasons for the finding of compulsive behavior.

Admittedly the trial court did not give its reasons for its finding of compulsive behavior. The question is what is the effect of this omission. Defendant contends that the registration requirement should be stricken and that a remand would be futile because there is nothing in the record to support a finding of compulsive behavior. We disagree.

First, we dispel any notion that this failure to state reasons automatically requires the requirement to be stricken. At best, defendant would be entitled to a remand for further consideration by the trial court and to afford the trial court the opportunity to state its reasons on the record.

Nor do we believe that a remand is automatically required. In the analogous situation where the trial court fails to state reasons for its sentencing choice, the matter need not be remanded to the trial court when the omission is harmless error, i.e., when there is no reasonable probability that defendant would obtain a more favorable result. (People v. Porter (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 34, 39, 239 Cal.Rptr. 269; People v. Blessing (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 835, 838-839, 155 Cal.Rptr. 780.) To remand for an express statement of reasons when the finding is amply supported by the record "would result in an exaltation of form over substance." (People v. Bravot (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 93, 98, 227 Cal.Rptr. 810.) Accordingly, if the trial court's finding that defendant exhibited compulsive behavior in committing the offense is supported by the record and there is nothing to suggest the offense was not the result of compulsive behavior, remand is not necessary.

Defendant contends that his statement that he " 'just wanted to take [his] frustrations out on something, so [he] lit the fires' " is insufficient to establish that he was compelled to set the fires. Plaintiff contends that defendant's behavior fits the criterion outlined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed. rev. 1987) at page 321. This manual which defines compulsive behavior as a disorder of impulse control with its salient features involving (1) a failure to resist an impulse, drive or temptation to perform some act harmful to others; (2) an increasing sense of tension before committing the act; and (3) an experience of pleasure, gratification or release at the time of committing the act.

While the statute contains no definition of "compulsive behavior," the purpose of the registration requirement itself sheds light on its meaning. Registration requirements generally are based on the assumption that persons convicted of certain offenses are more likely to repeat the crimes and that law enforcement's ability to prevent certain crimes and its ability to apprehend certain types of criminals will be improved if these repeat offenders' whereabouts are known. (3 Witkin & Epstein, Cal.Criminal Law (2d ed. 1989) § 1416, p. 1678.) Accordingly, the Legislature has determined that sex offenders (Pen.Code, § 290), narcotics offenders (Health & Saf.Code, § 11590) and arsonists (Pen.Code, § 457.1) are likely to repeat their offenses and therefore are subject to registration requirements.

Unlike sex offenders and narcotics offenders, where the registration requirement is automatically imposed, in the case of arsonists, the registration requirement is only imposed if the trial court finds that the defendant exhibited compulsive behavior. We presume the Legislature chose not to make the registration requirement automatic out of recognition that not all arsonists are likely to repeat the offense. For example, a defendant who sets fire to his own building for purposes of collecting insurance In making its determination, we do not believe the court is required to conduct an evidentiary hearing or enlist the aid of psychiatric experts to determine whether the defendant meets all of the criteria set forth in the Diagnostic Manual. While reference to the manual may be helpful, the fact that a particular defendant would not be diagnosed by experts as having exhibited compulsive behavior as defined by that manual does not mean the trial court cannot require registration if the circumstances warrant a conclusion that the defendant is likely to repeat the offense.

proceeds is not necessarily likely to repeat the offense. On the other hand, a person who commits arson for no apparent reason or simply because he or she receives gratification or pleasure in setting fires is more likely to repeat the offense. Accordingly, in determining whether a defendant exhibited compulsive behavior, the trial court in essence is required to determine whether the circumstances of the offense and the offender make it likely the defendant will repeat the offense such that the purpose of registration is served by imposing the requirement.

Here we believe the record amply supports the trial court's finding of compulsive behavior within the meaning and the purpose of Penal Code section 457.1. By defendant's own admission, he set the fires to release his sense of frustration. By his own admission, he clearly meets two of the criterion set forth in the Diagnostic Manual in that he failed to resist an impulse, drive or temptation to perform an act harmful to others and apparently experienced a release or some sense of gratification in committing the arsons. That defendant is likely to experience a sense of frustration again cannot be doubted, particularly in light of his predisposition towards agitation and hyperactivity and his rebellious and hostile attitude towards authority figures. This in turn makes it probable that he will again turn to arson as a means to relieve his frustration.

The trial court recognized that these fires were the result of defendant's inability to control himself and ordered defendant to obtain psychological counseling to gain insight into his arson problem. In light of...