People v. Adkins

• Decision Date: 19 December 1989
• Docket Number: 82333,Docket Nos. 82294
• Citation: 449 N.W.2d 400,433 Mich. 732
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Kenneth ADKINS, Defendant-Appellee. 433 Mich. 732, 449 N.W.2d 400
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 400

449 N.W.2d 400

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Kenneth ADKINS, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket Nos. 82294, 82333.

433 Mich. 732, 449 N.W.2d 400

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued June 6, 1989.

Decided Dec. 19, 1989.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., John D. O'Hair, Pros. Atty., County of Wayne, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of the Criminal Div., Research, Training and Appeals, Larry L. Roberts, Asst. Pros. Atty., Detroit, for the People.

Arthur Lee Morman, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

BOYLE, Justice.

The question before the Court is whether Michigan's sentence credit statute, M.C.L. Sec. 769.11b; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1083(2), requires that a defendant receive credit for time spent incarcerated in other jurisdictions, for offenses committed while he was free on bond for the offense for which he seeks such credit, from the time that a detainer or hold either was or could have been entered against him by authorities in the jurisdiction where the defendant is to be sentenced. We hold that the statute does not require sentence credit under such circumstances.

I

Defendant Adkins was arrested on February 10, 1983, and charged with armed robbery, M.C.L. Sec. 750.529; M.S.A. Sec. 28.797, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, M.C.L. Sec. 750.227b; M.S.A. Sec. 28.424(2). He posted bond on February 14, 1983, and was released from custody pending trial, which was scheduled for September 6, 1983. When the defendant failed to appear for trial, his bond was revoked and a capias ad respondendum issued.

Soon thereafter, in October, 1983, the defendant was arrested in Ohio for an unrelated offense and charged with receiving stolen property. He was incarcerated in an Ohio county jail for that offense from October 28, 1983, until July 26, 1984, when he was released into federal custody to begin serving a sentence for the separate conviction in federal court, during his custody in Ohio, of interstate transportation of stolen property. The defendant was initially placed in the federal penitentiary in Milan, Michigan, but was later transferred, in October, 1984, to the federal facility in Terra Haute, Indiana.

He was returned to Michigan on November 26, 1984, to stand trial on the armed robbery and felony-firearm charges. He was convicted of both offenses on July 11, 1985, and sentenced on July 26, 1985, to thirteen to twenty-five years for the armed robbery conviction, plus the mandatory two-year term for the felony-firearm offense.

The question in this case concerns the extent to which the defendant is entitled under our sentence credit statute, M.C.L. Sec. 769.11b; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1083(2), to sentence credit for his Michigan convictions for time spent incarcerated in the Ohio and federal jails as a result of the unrelated stolen property offenses. The trial judge gave the defendant credit only for the time actually spent in Michigan jails, that is, for the three days between his arrest and release on bond and for the time between November 26, 1984, when the defendant was returned to this state by the federal authorities, and July 26, 1985, when he was sentenced.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had miscalculated the amount of credit to which the defendant was entitled under Sec. 11b. The Court held that even though the defendant had been incarcerated outside of Michigan for unrelated offenses, he was entitled to credit from the time at which Michigan authorities placed, or could have placed, pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), M.C.L. Sec. 780.601 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 4.147(1) et seq., a detainer, or "hold," on him while he was incarcerated in those facilities. ¹

We granted leave ² to determine whether the fact that the prosecution could have placed a detainer or hold on the defendant, or brought him back to stand trial in this state earlier than it in fact did, entitles him to sentence credit under Sec. 11b from the time such action could have been taken.

II

Michigan's sentence credit statute, M.C.L. Sec. 769.11b; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1083(2), provides:

"Whenever any person is hereafter convicted of any crime within this state and has served any time in jail prior to sentencing because of being denied or unable to furnish bond for the offense of which he is convicted, the trial court in imposing sentence shall specifically grant credit against the sentence for such time served in jail prior to sentencing."

Recently, in People v. Prieskorn, 424 Mich. 327, 381 N.W.2d 646 (1985), this Court undertook to provide a rather lengthy explanation of the history, purpose, and application of this statute in the context of a defendant's incarceration for multiple unrelated offenses. We decided, on the basis of clear language of the statute, that "[t]he Legislature sought, in enacting the statute, to give a criminal defendant a right to credit for any presentence time served 'for the offense of which he is convicted,' and not upon any other conviction." Id., p. 341, 381 N.W.2d 646. We remain convinced of the correctness of that conclusion.

A

In Prieskorn, the defendant was free on bond awaiting trial on two drug-related charges when he was arrested and subsequently convicted for driving with a revoked license. He was sentenced to ninety days in jail for this traffic violation. After serving fifty-one days of that sentence, the defendant was charged with a third drug offense. Eighteen days later he pled guilty to the first drug charge in exchange for dismissal of the other two. The defendant then sought credit for the sixty-nine days he had spent incarcerated prior to his plea. The Court of Appeals granted the defendant credit only for the eighteen days after his "arrest" while in jail on the third charge.

In affirming the Court of Appeals decision, we noted initially the conflicting lower court interpretations of Sec. 11b, many of which appeared to turn on various policy considerations, or some notion of judicial fairness. We cautioned that such policy decisions were generally the province of the Legislature, which had made its decision regarding sentence credit by adopting Sec. 11b, and that our function was merely to apply the language of that statute in order to effectuate the Legislature's intentions. Prieskorn, p. 339, 381 N.W.2d 646.

Ultimately, we concluded that the language of the sentence credit statute

"neither requires nor permits sentence credit in cases, such as the one before us, where a defendant is released on bond following entry of charges arising from one offense and, pending disposition of those charges, is subsequently incarcerated as a result of charges arising out of an unrelated offense or circumstance and then seeks credit in the former case for that latter period of confinement." Id., p. 340, 381 N.W.2d 646.

We based this conclusion on the language in Sec. 11b referring to time served prior to sentencing "because of being denied or unable to furnish bond for the offense of which he is convicted...." We reasoned:

"Had the Legislature intended that convicted defendants be given sentence credit for all time served prior to sentencing day, regardless of the purpose for which the presentence confinement was served, it would not have conditioned and limited entitlement to credit to time served 'for the offense of which [the defendant] is convicted.' " Prieskorn, p. 341, 381 N.W.2d 646. ³

Relying on this interpretation of Sec. 11b, we affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals not to grant the defendant credit for the fifty-one days served prior to his being charged with the third drug offense. We concluded that the defendant "did not serve that time because of his inability to post bond for the [drug offense] of which he now stands convicted." Id., p. 343, 381 N.W.2d 646. ⁴

In our view, Prieskorn is clearly implicated in this case. The defendant here was charged initially with armed robbery and then released on bond pending trial. Prior to his trial and conviction of this charge, the defendant was arrested and convicted, and began serving sentences in two other jurisdictions, for two unrelated stolen property offenses. The defendant now seeks credit for part of that time served, even though it was clearly served under the unrelated stolen property conviction sentences and not because of his inability to post bond for the armed robbery charge of which he was eventually convicted.

Under these facts, it would seem to be a relatively straightforward application of Prieskorn to say that the defendant here is entitled to no credit for the time served in the Ohio and federal facilities for these unrelated offenses. The Court of Appeals, however, declined to follow Prieskorn in this case. Relying on its recent decision in People v. Ranson, 153 Mich.App. 157, 395 N.W.2d 271 (1986), the Court concluded that Prieskorn does not apply where a "hold" was placed on the defendant by authorities in the jurisdiction where he is being sentenced while he was imprisoned elsewhere for an unrelated offense. Slip op, p 8. It reasoned that once such a hold is placed, the defendant can no longer be said to be incarcerated solely because of the unrelated offense.

In this case, the Court of Appeals found that a hold, or detainer, was entered against the defendant under the IAD when the prosecution was informed by federal officials that its request for temporary custody was granted, on October 24, 1984. ⁵ Thus, it concluded, sentencing credit under Sec. 11b should have run at least from that date, some thirty days prior to defendant's actual transfer into the custody of the Michigan authorities, on November 24, 1984.

The Court of Appeals in this case took the reasoning in People v. Ranson, supra, one step further, however, concluding that the defendant should be given credit not only from the time at which the hold was actually placed, but from the time it could have been placed. Presumably, this...