People v. Alex

• Decision Date: 03 July 1934
• Citation: 265 N.Y. 192,192 N.E. 289
• Parties: PEOPLE v. ALEX.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

265 N.Y. 192

192 N.E. 289

PEOPLE

v.ALEX.

Court of Appeals of New York.

July 3, 1934.

Michael Alex was convicted of murder in the first degree on the verdict of a jury, and he appeals.

Reversed and new trial ordered.

Appeal from Queens County Court.

Richard J. Barry, of Long Island City, David M. Wolff, of Jamaica, L. I., and Joseph Lonardo, of Long Island City, for appellant.

Charles S. Colden, Dist. Atty., of Whitestone, L. I. (Mordecai Konowitz, of New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

LEHMAN, Judge.

The defendant was arrested late at night on June 15, 1931. He was arraigned on the morning of June 17th, and then charged with murder in the first degree. During the period of about thirty-six hours when he was held by the police, he confessed his guilty participation in a murder. Aside from the defendant's oral and written confessions made before his arraignment and before he had opportunity to consult counsel, there is little, if any, competent evidence to connect the defendant with the crime. If these confessions were not made under the influence of fear produced by threats (Code Crim. Proc. § 395) and were given voluntarily, no room for reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt remains.

Upon defendant's trial the defendant made claim that his confessions were the result of brutal beating by the police while in their custody before his arraignment. The police officers who held the defendant denied that they had beaten him. A question of fact thus arose which the trial judge was bound to submit to the jury under proper instructions.

Upon a previous appeal this court was constrained to reverse a judgment convicting the defendant of the crime of murder in the first degree, because the trial judge refused to admit testimony which tended to sustain the defendant's contention that the confessions were not voluntarily made. People v. Alex, 260 N. Y. 425, 183 N. E. 906, 85 A. L. R. 939. Upon the second trial this evidence was received. Otherwise the testimony presented at the trial now under review is substantially the same as at the first trial. No useful purpose would be served by detailing again that evidence. The questions of fact which should have been presented to the jury for determination remained the same.

In our earlier opinion we pointed out that the confessions were obtained while the defendant ‘had neither been arraigned nor given the privilege of consulting counsel’ (page 426 of 260 N. Y.,183 N. E. 906). The Code of Criminal Procedure provides that ‘the defendant must in all cases be taken before the magistrate without unnecessary delay.’ (Section 165.) Here there was delay of almost thirty-six hours. Even where the police, for thirty-six hours, illegally delay arraignment after arrest, for the purpose of obtaining a confession, the confession is admissible, unless ‘made under the influence of fear produced by threats, or unless made upon a stipulation of the district attorney, that he [the defendant] shall not be prosecuted therefor.’ (Code Crim. Proc. § 395.) Nevertheless, in determining whether a confession has been obtained as a result of a beating, or is voluntary, the circumstance that it was obtained while arraignment was illegally delayed for no apparent reason except that the police needed a confession in order to have competent proof of the commission of a crime, should be considered by the jury. People v. Trybus, 219 N. Y. 18, 113 N. E. 538. In every case where there is a substantial question of the voluntary nature of a confession obtained while a defendant is in the custody of the police, and arraignment is delayed, it is the duty of the trial judge, at least upon request of counsel, to charge that any ‘unnecessary delay’ in arraignment is forbidden by law and should be considered by them.

Here the trial judge refused to so charge, though counsel...