People v. Alfonso
| Decision Date | 24 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 2–13–0568.,2–13–0568. |
| Citation | 402 Ill.Dec. 535,52 N.E.3d 456 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Michael ALFONSO, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Michael J. Pelletier, Thomas A. Lilien, and Fletcher P. Hamill, all of State Appellate Defender's Office, Elgin, for appellant.
Robert B. Berlin, State's Attorney, Wheaton (Lisa A. Hoffman and Kristin M. Schwind, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
¶ 1 Defendant, Michael Alfonso, appeals the trial court's orders striking petitions that he filed pursuant to the Post–Conviction Hearing Act (Postconviction Act) (725 ILCS 5/122–1 et seq. (West 2012)) and section 2–1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2–1401 (West 2012) ), and the trial court's order denying his motion to reconsider. The trial court struck the petitions on the basis that they violated defendant's promise, as part of his plea agreement, not to collaterally attack his convictions. Defendant argues that the trial court's actions were procedurally impermissible; that he was not properly admonished that he was waiving his right to file collateral petitions; and that, if he did violate the plea agreement, the State had to either seek to vacate the plea agreement or allow his petitions to proceed. We reverse and remand.
¶ 3 On July 3, 2001, defendant was charged with the first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9–1(a) (West 2000)) and aggravated stalking (725 ILCS 5/12–7.4(a)(1) (West 2000)) of Geneva Velasquez. Defendant was not apprehended and brought back to Illinois until 2005, after which the State charged him by superseding indictment with multiple counts of first-degree murder and with aggravated stalking.
¶ 4 On August 23, 2005, defendant's attorneys filed a motion for the appointment of a clinical psychologist to examine his fitness to stand trial. They alleged that due to defendant's mental state they were unable to communicate effectively with him. On November 4, 2005, following a fitness hearing, the trial court found defendant fit to stand trial.
¶ 5 The same day, the State filed a notice of its intent to seek the imposition of the death penalty. Among other aggravating factors, the State alleged that defendant had also killed Sumnear Yang on September 1, 1992.
¶ 6 On June 29, 2007, the State and the defense indicated that they were close to a plea deal. As part of the agreement, defendant was placed under oath and was examined in open court by the State's Attorney. Defendant admitted to killing Yang and Velasquez. He admitted that the only reason that he would agree to natural life imprisonment was to avoid the possibility of the death penalty. He also admitted faking a mental illness in 1994 and again in this case. He agreed that, for purposes of entering a guilty plea, he would waive any right to appeal and to raise any issue in postconviction litigation in either state or federal court. He agreed that he would “waive any and all issues that [he] could ever have brought up throughout the rest of [his] life” and that, if he ever tried to escape and “broke the agreement,” the State could seek the death penalty against him.
¶ 7 The parties formally entered into the plea agreement on July 11, 2007. As to Velasquez, defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and aggravated stalking, in return for natural life imprisonment for the former charge and a consecutive sentence of five years' imprisonment for the latter charge. As to Yang, defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree murder, intentional homicide of an unborn child, concealment of a homicidal death, and kidnapping. In return, he was to receive two natural life sentences concurrent with the natural life sentence relating to Velasquez's case, and also five- and seven-year consecutive sentences that would be concurrent with each other.
¶ 8 The trial court asked defense counsel if he had: the opportunity to go through all of the discovery; discussed with defendant a defense strategy, potential witnesses, and other evidence that could be presented at trial and at the sentencing phase; and explained all of the options to defendant, including the procedures and the burden of proof for a death penalty case. Defense counsel responded in the affirmative. He stated that he was not initially able to communicate with defendant effectively but had been able to do so for the previous 1 ½ years. In response to further questioning by the trial court, defense counsel stated that he did not have any doubts regarding defendant's current mental state and believed that defendant fully understood the nature of the plea agreement. When defendant was asked if he agreed with all of defense counsel's answers to the aforementioned questions, defendant responded in the affirmative.
¶ 9 The State's Attorney stated that, as part of the plea agreement, defendant was waiving any appeals and all collateral attacks in state and federal court. The State's Attorney stated that defendant also agreed that, if he attempted to escape and that fact were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the plea agreement would be vacated and defendant would again face the death penalty. Finally, a portion of defendant's retirement funds would go to Yang's family for her burial costs, and the remainder would be turned over to the County of Du Page for reimbursement.
¶ 10 The trial court then proceeded to admonish defendant. Defendant agreed that the State's Attorney's recitation of the plea agreement was also his understanding of the agreement. The trial court inquired into defendant's medication, mental state, and satisfaction with counsel. He stated that he was able to understand the proceedings, fully discussed the case with his counsel, and was satisfied with the representation that he had received. The trial court admonished defendant of the charges, the sentencing ranges, and his right to a jury trial. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial and pleaded guilty to the charges.
¶ 11 The State presented a factual basis, to which defendant stipulated. The trial court again admonished defendant as to the agreed-upon sentences. The following exchange then occurred:
¶ 12 The trial court found that defendant's pleas were voluntary; that he understood the nature of the charges and the possible penalties that could be imposed; that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial; and that there was a sufficient factual basis for the pleas. It further found that defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to appeal and to collaterally attack the judgments.
¶ 13 Over five years later, on March 7, 2013, defendant filed a petition for relief from judgment under section 2–1401 and a postconviction petition. In his section 2–1401 petition, defendant argued that his natural life sentence for Velasquez's death was void because it was beyond the statutory maximum of 60 years' imprisonment and because the State did not follow statutory procedures to obtain an extended - term sentence. He also argued that his conviction of aggravated stalking was improper because his crime did not satisfy the statutory prerequisites and his conviction violated one-act, one-crime principles.
¶ 14 In his postconviction petition, defendant argued that his counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a defense of mental illness, given that defendant had been diagnosed as mentally ill prior to the crimes, and for coercing defendant to plead guilty by assisting the State's Attorney in threatening him with the death penalty, even though there was a death penalty moratorium at that time.
¶ 15 On March 20, 2013, the...
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People v. Williams
...final matter, we find it pertinent to address a recent case decided by the Second District, People v. Alfonso , 2016 IL App (2d) 130568, 402 Ill.Dec. 535, 52 N.E.3d 456. Although that case was decided after Castleberry , the court reversed the trial court's dismissal of a defendant's postco......