People v. Allen
| Decision Date | 21 May 1979 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 77-25 |
| Citation | 90 Mich.App. 128,282 N.W.2d 255 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Edward G. ALLEN, Defendant-Appellant. 90 Mich.App. 128, 282 N.W.2d 255 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., L. Brooks Patterson, Pros. Atty., Thomas S. Richards, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before V. J. BRENNAN, P. J., and ALLEN and O'CONNELL, * JJ.
Defendant, age 15, was charged with and convicted of the crimes of assault with intent to rob being armed contrary to M.C.L. § 750.89; M.S.A. § 28.284, and assault with intent to commit murder contrary to M.C.L. § 750.83; M.S.A. § 28.278. At the time these offenses occurred, defendant had a history of mental treatment and was a ward of the state. The prosecutor sought to have the probate court waive juvenile jurisdiction over defendant so that he could be tried as an adult in Oakland County Circuit Court. Following hearings held on August 12, September 2, and September 8, [90 MICHAPP 132] 1975, the Probate Court Judge waived jurisdiction and ordered defendant to be tried as an adult.
In circuit court, defendant challenged the waiver of jurisdiction of the probate court. He argued that there had been insufficient evidence produced at the waiver hearing to determine the best interest of defendant or of society, that no repetitive pattern of offenses was shown, and that defendant was denied due process of law. The court concluded, however, that because of the seriousness of the charge and the testimony given before the probate court, the probate judge did not abuse his discretion in waiving defendant to the jurisdiction of the circuit court.
Defendant's primary trial defense was one of insanity; and he called an expert psychiatric witness. This doctor testified that defendant was suffering from "chronic paranoid schizophrenia" and stated that, although defendant knew the difference between right and wrong, he committed the crime as a result of an irresistible impulse. On cross-examination, however, the prosecutor brought out the fact that the doctor's opinion was based primarily on his interview with defendant and a psychological test. The doctor denied that he was "conned" by defendant and opined that defendant was not manipulative or faking his condition.
Defendant also called his stepbrother, who had been with him on the day of the crime. During the cross-examination of this witness, the following exchange occurred:
[90 MICHAPP 133] "Q (By Mr. Bunting) Who got it?
To rebut the defendant's expert psychiatric testimony that defendant was not manipulative, the prosecutor called two witnesses, Mr. Kim, a Program Manager at the Boy's Training School who supervised the staff, and Mr. McKie, a caseworker at the school, both of whom had substantial contact with defendant during his one and one-half year stay there. Defense counsel objected to their testimony on the basis that an inadequate foundation had been laid to allow lay witnesses to give an opinion as to defendant's sanity. Defense counsel also objected to introducing the foundation of facts before the jury on the grounds that the fact of his juvenile incarceration would prejudice the defendant. A separate record of their testimony was made, and the court overruled defendant's objection and permitted them to testify before the jury. Neither witness offered an opinion on defendant's sanity, but both testified that defendant was a manipulative person. Mr. Kim testified: "I'm employed with the State of Michigan Department of Social Services as Program Manager at the Boy's [90 MICHAPP 134] Training School", and made a single reference to defendant's "truancy", but Mr. McKie, in response to defense counsel's question, indicated only that defendant was "in a placement of some type".
Following closing arguments and the denial of a defense motion for a directed verdict, the court gave the jury the final charge. During the instructions, the court said:
"If you find the defendant not guilty of the offense in the degree charged in the information, you may find him guilty of any other degree of the offense inferior to that charge or guilty of an attempt to commit such an offense."
The court then went on to instruct on the charged offense of assault with intent to commit murder, and its two lesser offenses of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder and felonious assault. The court then instructed the jury on the charged offense of assault with intent to rob and steal while armed, and the lesser offense of attempted armed robbery. In the course of defining those two offenses, the trial court also defined the crime of armed robbery.
Furthermore, the court instructed the jury on the disposition of defendant if he was found not guilty by reason of insanity:
The court then reviewed the possible verdicts [90 MICHAPP 135] and gave the jury a written form listing those verdicts, saying:
At the end of the instructions, defense counsel stated that defendant was generally satisfied with the instructions (with only one exception not relevant here). Following deliberations, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on both of the charged offenses, and defendant was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment on the assault with intent to rob count and to a term of 40 to 60 years imprisonment on the assault with intent to commit murder count. It is from that order of conviction and sentence that defendant brings this appeal.
Defendant's first claim of error is that the trial court erred in upholding the Probate Court's waiver of jurisdiction over the defendant.
M.C.L. § 712A.4(4); M.S.A. § 27.3178(598.4)(4) sets the guidelines for waiver.
Here, the probate court's findings were as detailed, succinct and cogent as one could reasonably expect. The statutory criteria were rigidly adhered [90 MICHAPP 136] to, and there is no question that the probate court's findings were more than adequate to support the waiver. People v. Schumacher, 75 Mich.App. 505, 511-512, 256 N.W.2d 39 (1977).
The defendant asserts that the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as an element of due process has been held applicable to juvenile proceedings and cites the Federal case of United States v. Costanzo, 395 F.2d 441 (C.A. 4, 1968), Cert. den., 393 U.S. 883, 89 S.Ct. 189, 21 L.Ed.2d 157 (1968), as authority for the proposition that proof by a mere preponderance of the evidence was discarded for a determination of delinquency. He further asserts that the juvenile waiver standards created in the aftermath of People v. Fields, 388 Mich. 66, 199 N.W.2d 217 (1972), and approved in People v. Jackson, 46 Mich.App. 764, 208 N.W.2d 526 (1973), reflect an intent on behalf of the Legislature and the Court that certain points be proven in any waiver of jurisdiction. We find the defendant's contention without merit.
The "probable cause" determination of phase I of a waiver hearing is similar to a preliminary examination. Phase II is designed to determine the best interests of the minor and the public. Unlike the determination of delinquency hearings, guilt or innocence is not determined at a waiver hearing. JCR 1969, 11, meets the now settled requirements of procedural due process. People v. Williams, 50 Mich.App. 270, 273-274, 213 N.W.2d 307 (1973).
In addition, a waiver hearing does not subject the child to loss of liberty because it is not a [90 MICHAPP 137] determination of guilt or innocence, but rather it is a determination of whether the juvenile or adult criminal justice system will better serve the needs of the public and the defendant. Consequently, the Federal authority relied upon by the defendant does not control here, and the waiver to circuit court was proper.
The defendant next asserts that the prosecutor, while questioning defendant's brother, deliberately attempted to elicit statements of defendant's prior illegal acts. He contends that the testimony was of a separate and distinct crime which had not been charged against the defendant and that the testimony was also inadmissible because it concerned a juvenile offense.
Although it is clear that testimony concerning juvenile proceedings are inadmissible against the defendant in a subsequent...
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People v. Mays
...deliberations. The instruction should be viewed as introductory rather than directory, as was the instruction in People v. Allen, 90 Mich.App. 128, 282 N.W.2d 255 (1979). The language claimed to be error was but a small portion of a lengthy instruction. A fundamental rule when reviewing ins......
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...regarding Norfolk's sanity and, hence, does not fall within the ambit of the principle enunciated in Myers. See People v. Allen, 90 Mich.App. 128, 282 N.W.2d 255 (1979) (rule governing admission of lay testimony as to sanity does not apply to a witness who simply describes defendant's manip......
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Allen v. Redman
...intent to commit murder, Mich.Comp.Laws Sec. 750.83. The convictions were upheld by the Michigan Court of Appeals, People v. Allen, 90 Mich.App. 128, 282 N.W.2d 255 (1979), and, on April 10, 1984, after unsuccessful motions for relief in the trial court, delayed application for leave to app......
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People v. Williams, Docket No. 53667
...Court has analogized the "probable cause" determination in Phase 1 of a waiver hearing to a preliminary examination. People v. Allen, 90 Mich.App. 128, 282 N.W.2d 255 (1979). The recognized rules of evidence apply at Phase 1 of a waiver hearing and at a preliminary examination. JCR 11.1(a),......