People v. Altom

Decision Date21 March 2003
Docket NumberNo. 5-02-0016.,5-02-0016.
Citation788 N.E.2d 55,338 Ill. App.3d 355,272 Ill.Dec. 751
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Judy ALTOM, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Daniel M. Kirwan, Deputy Defender, Janet Gandy Fowler, Assistant Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Mt. Vernon, for Appellant.

James Creason, State's Attorney, Salem; Norbert J. Goetten, Director, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Director, Trent M. Marshall, Staff Attorney, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Mt. Vernon, for Appellee.

Presiding Justice HOPKINS delivered the opinion of the court:

Judy Altom (defendant) appeals from the dismissal of her second postconviction petition after counsel had been appointed for her. On May 12, 1986, pursuant to negotiations with the State, defendant pleaded guilty to murder (Ill. Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 9-1(a)(2)), and the State agreed to dismiss two counts of the indictment that charged defendant with cruelty to children (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 23, par. 2368) and murder (Ill.Rev. Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 9-1(a)(3)) and to refrain from seeking the death penalty. After a sentencing hearing, defendant was sentenced to an extended term of 50 years' imprisonment with credit for 462 days served. On this appeal, defendant contends only, relying on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), that her extended-term sentence for murder must be reduced or vacated, where the facts that increased the prescribed range of penalties were not found by the trier of fact to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The United States Supreme Court delivered the following holding in Apprendi as its bottom line:

"Other than a fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury[] and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63, 147 L.Ed.2d at 455.

See People v. Rush, 322 Ill.App.3d 1014, 1020, 258 Ill.Dec. 703, 757 N.E.2d 88, 94 (2001).

At the time of defendant's offense, March 20, 1985, section 5-8-1(a)(1) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) provided:

"Sentence of Imprisonment for Felony. (a) A sentence of imprisonment for a felony shall be a determinate sentence set by the court under this Section, according to the following limitations:
(1) for murder, (a) a term shall be not less than 20 years and not more than 40 years, or (b) if the court finds that the murder was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty or that any of the aggravating factors listed in subsection (b) of Section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 are present, the court may sentence the defendant to a term of natural[-]life imprisonment, or (c) if the defendant has previously been convicted of murder under any state or federal law or is found guilty of murdering more than one victim, the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of natural[-]life imprisonment." Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1(a)(1).

Section 5-5-3.2(b) of the Code provided, in pertinent part:

"(b) the following factors may be considered by the court as reasons to impose an extended[-]term sentence under Section 5-8-2 upon any offender who was at least 17 years old on the date the crime was committed:
* * *
(2) When a defendant is convicted of any felony and the court finds that the offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty; or
(3) When a defendant is convicted of any felony committed against:
(i) a person under 12 years of age at the time of the offense;
(ii) a person 60 years of age or older at the time of the offense; or
(iii) a person physically handicapped at the time of the offense." Ill.Rev. Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 1005-5-3.2(b).

Section 5-8-2(a)(1) of the Code provided that a person convicted of murder could be sentenced to an extended prison term of not less than 40 years and not more than 80 years if the judge finds that the factors in aggravation set forth in paragraph (b) of section 5-5-3.2 were present. Ill.Rev.Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-2(a)(1).

On March 29, 1985, a three-count indictment was filed that charged defendant with one count of cruelty to children and two counts of murder.

On May 12, 1986, defendant entered a plea of guilty to murder (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 9-1(a)(2)) pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). The circuit court read the charge to which defendant was entering her plea and ascertained defendant's understanding of the charge. Defendant was admonished that the ordinary and usual term for murder was a prison sentence of not less than 20 and not more than 40 years and that under certain circumstances defendant could be sentenced to not more than 80 years' imprisonment or to natural-life imprisonment. Defendant stated that she understood the possible penalties. The court informed defendant that she had a right to plead not guilty or guilty and that she had a right to persist in her plea of not guilty. The court further informed defendant that if she pleaded guilty she would be waiving her right to a jury or nonjury trial and that she would be waiving her right to confront and cross-examine witnesses who would appear and attempt to prove the charge against defendant. The court then ascertained that defendant understood that if she pleaded guilty there would be no trial and no confrontation of witnesses. The court inquired of defendant if any promises had been made to her concerning her guilty plea and if any representations had been made to her concerning the sentence she might receive. Defendant responded, "Just the plea bargain the State's Attorney has offered." She also responded that she understood that the death penalty had been waived. After questioning defendant regarding whether any threats had been made to her concerning her guilty plea and receiving defendant's negative reply, the court inquired whether defendant had discussed the case with her attorney and whether he had answered her questions, and defendant responded that she had discussed the case with her attorney and that he had answered her questions. After determining that defendant was pleading guilty of her own free will, defendant was presented with a written guilty plea, which she signed. The court read the written guilty plea, which included a statement of defendant's age, 22. The court asked defendant if the written guilty plea showed her intention to plead guilty to murder and waive a jury trial, to which defendant responded, "Yes."

The court asked the State's Attorney to state the factual basis for the plea, and he responded by stating what various individuals would testify to. Two witnesses would testify that defendant had stated that she had inflicted the cut wounds which were found on the victim. The doctor, Harry Parks, who had performed the autopsy on the victim, Jody Branon, would testify that the cause of death was severe, multiple, blunt trauma to the body and that also contributing to the cause of death were 60 to 80 external lacerations on the trunk and limbs of the victim. The doctor would further testify that during the autopsy, he had observed various internal injuries: edema to the brain, contusions to the baby's lungs, diaphragm, spleen, right kidney, pancreas, and liver, and fractures to some of the rib bones. He also observed that the mesentery, which holds together the small intestine, was ripped apart. The doctor would opine that the internal injuries "were caused by a minimum of between 15 and 20 severe bodily blows to the abdomen and trunk of the body consistent with punches and kicks" and that most of the injuries were inflicted within 24 hours of death.

The State's Attorney further stated that if the case went to trial, the State would call a radiologist, Dr. Appolinar, who would testify that he had x-rayed the victim's body and found three broken ribs which had been broken between one and four weeks prior to the victim's death.

The State's Attorney also stated that at Darrell Branon's trial (No. 85-CF-37), defendant had waived her fifth amendment rights and testified that more than once she had stepped hard on the body of the victim and that later on the night of March 20, 1985, she had inflicted cut marks with a knife on the victim's body. At the State's Attorney's request, the court stated that it would take judicial notice of the trial transcript in People v. Branon, No. 85-CF-37, as an additional factual basis for defendant's plea.

The court then went over the prior admonishments to defendant, including a possible sentence of 80 years' imprisonment if the victim was under 12 years of age at the time of the murder and of natural-life imprisonment if other aggravating factors were shown. After defendant again stated her understanding of the charge, her rights, and the possible penalties, she stated that she wished to plead guilty to the charge. The court ascertained that defendant was satisfied with the representation that had been provided to her by her attorney. The court stated that it found that defendant was guilty of the crime charged, that she entered the plea voluntarily and knowingly, and that defendant was 22 years of age.

On June 24, 1986, the sentencing hearing commenced. Suzzanne Graham, a worker for the Department of Children and Family Services, identified Jody Branon's birth certificate, which stated September 27, 1984, as his date of birth. Dr. Harry Parks testified concerning the extensive injuries to the victim. On June 26, 1986, defendant was sentenced to 50 years' imprisonment, after the court found that defendant was 22 years of age, that the victim was 5½ months old at the time of his death (which is less than 12 years of age), and that the offense was accompanied by exceptionally heinous behavior...

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6 cases
  • People v. Montour, 02SA365.
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • April 23, 2007
    ...his right to jury fact-finding during sentencing, citing Leone v. State, 797 N.E.2d 743 (Ind. 2003); People v. Altom, 338 Ill.App.3d 355, 272 Ill.Dec. 751, 788 N.E.2d 55 (2003); Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807, 59 P.3d 463 (2002); State v. Crisp, 362 S.C. 412, 608 S.E.2d 429 (2005); and Stat......
  • State Ex Rel. Michael Anthony Taylor v. Steele
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • July 19, 2011
    ...cases— Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807, 59 P.3d 463 (2002); Leone v. Indiana, 797 N.E.2d 743 (Ind.2003); Illinois v. Alton, 338 Ill.App.3d 355, 272 Ill.Dec. 751, 788 N.E.2d 55, 61 (2003)—were decided prior to, and are at odds with, Blakely, in which the United States Supreme Court explicitly......
  • State v. Downs
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • October 25, 2004
    ...797 N.E.2d 743, 749-50 (Ind.2003); Colwell v. Nevada, 118 Nev. 807, 59 P.3d 463, 473-74 (2003); Illinois v. Altom, 338 Ill.App.3d 355, 362, 272 Ill.Dec. 751, 788 N.E.2d 55, 61 (5 Dist.), app. denied, 204 Ill.2d 663, 275 Ill.Dec. 77, 792 N.E.2d 308 Appellant was informed that by pleading gui......
  • State v. Wood
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • December 6, 2004
    ...797 N.E.2d 743, 749-50 (Ind.2003); Colwell v. Nevada, 118 Nev. 807, 59 P.3d 463, 473-74 (2003); Illinois v. Altom, 338 Ill.App.3d 355, 272 Ill.Dec. 751, 788 N.E.2d 55, 61 (2003), app. denied, 204 Ill.2d 663, 275 Ill.Dec. 77, 792 N.E.2d 308 (2003). Therefore, appellant's argument is without ......
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