People v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 19 February 2020
• Docket Number: Ind. No. 2299/14,2016–05593
• Citation: 180 A.D.3d 923,120 N.Y.S.3d 63
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Kathon ANDERSON, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

180 A.D.3d 923

120 N.Y.S.3d 63

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent,

v.Kathon ANDERSON, Appellant.

2016–05593

Ind. No. 2299/14

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued—November 15, 2019

February 19, 2020

Paul Skip Laisure, New York, N.Y. (Cynthia Colt of counsel), for appellant.

Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Solomon Neubort of counsel), for respondent.

WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, JOSEPH J. MALTESE, VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Dineen Ann Riviezzo, J.), rendered May 3, 2016, convicting him of murder in the second degree and attempted murder in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree and attempted murder in the second degree related to a shooting on a B15 bus in Brooklyn. The defendant, who was 14 years old at the time of the incident, was seated at the back of the bus when rival gang members boarded the bus and moved toward the back. As the rival gang members reached the middle of the bus, the defendant took out a gun and shot at them, hitting and killing an innocent passenger. The defendant then ran off the bus after the fleeing gang members and continued shooting. The defendant appeals.

"[A] defendant is justified in using ‘deadly physical force’ upon another only if that defendant ‘reasonably believes that such other person is using or about to use deadly physical force’ " ( People v. Brown, 33 N.Y.3d 316, 320, 102 N.Y.S.3d 143, 125 N.E.3d 808, quoting Penal Law § 35.15[2][a] ). A justification defense is negated where the defendant was the initial aggressor (see Penal Law § 35.15[1][b] ), or where the physical force used by a defendant was "the product of a combat by agreement not specifically authorized by law" ( Penal Law § 35.15[1][c] ).

We agree with the defendant that the Supreme Court should not have charged the jury with respect to the combat by agreement exception to the justification defense. The court granted the People's request for the instruction based upon generalized evidence that the defendant was a member of a gang which had a rivalry with other local gangs, including the gang with which the persons who approached the defendant were affiliated. However, any evidence of an alleged agreement in this case was tacit, open-ended as to time and place, and applicable to all members of the gangs of the parties involved as well as to all members of their affiliate gangs. The combat by agreement exception to justification is generally limited to agreements to combat between specific individuals or small groups on discrete occasions (see e.g. People v. Rollins, 51 A.D.3d 1279, 1280–1281, 858 N.Y.S.2d 474 ; People v. Young, 33 A.D.3d 1120, 1124, 825 N.Y.S.2d 147 ; People v. Rosario, 292 A.D.2d 324, 325, 740 N.Y.S.2d 23 ; Matter of Kim H., 112 A.D.2d 160, 161, 491 N.Y.S.2d 64 ; see also People v. Russell, 91 N.Y.2d 280, 670 N.Y.S.2d 166, 693 N.E.2d 193 ). As there was no evidence of a combat agreement between the defendant and the specific persons who approached him on the bus, or among rival gang members during a discrete period of time or at a specific location, there was no reasonable view of the evidence that the combat by agreement exception applied to negate a justification defense in this case (see generally People v. Watts, 57 N.Y.2d 299, 301, 456 N.Y.S.2d 677, 442 N.E.2d 1188 ).

However, under the circumstances of this case, the error in the charge was harmless. The evidence that the defendant was the initial aggressor employing deadly physical force, which negated the justification defense, was overwhelming, and there was no reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been different had the charge been correctly given (see People v. Brown, 33 N.Y.3d 316, 321, 102 N.Y.S.3d 143, 125 N.E.3d 808 ; People v. Petty, 7 N.Y.3d 277, 286, 819 N.Y.S.2d 684, 852 N.E.2d 1155 ; People v. Jones, 3 N.Y.3d 491, 497, 788 N.Y.S.2d 651, 821 N.E.2d 955 ).

Contrary to the defendant's contention, certain Facebook messages of the defendant were properly admitted into evidence since they were "relevant to the issue of the defendant's motive and to his claim of justification, and explained the relationship between the parties" ( People v. Bruno, 127 A.D.3d 986, 986, 7 N.Y.S.3d 408 ; see People v. Bailey, 32 N.Y.3d 70, 83, 85 N.Y.S.3d 377, 110 N.E.3d 489 ). The Facebook messages were not "merely cumulative" of other evidence ( People v. Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350, 361, 438 N.Y.S.2d 261, 420 N.E.2d 59 ). The court providently exercised its discretion in determining that the probative value of the messages outweighed the risk of prejudice to the...