People v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 12 June 2014
• Citation: 2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 04270,118 A.D.3d 1138,987 N.Y.S.2d 681
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Christopher L. ANDERSON, Appellant.

118 A.D.3d 1138
987 N.Y.S.2d 681
2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 04270

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,
v.
Christopher L. ANDERSON, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

June 12, 2014.

[987 N.Y.S.2d 682]

David E. Woodin, Catskill, for appellant.

Paul Czajka, District Attorney, Hudson (H. Neal Conolly of counsel), for respondent.

[987 N.Y.S.2d 683]

Before: STEIN, J.P., McCARTHY, ROSE and EGAN JR., JJ.

STEIN, J.P.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Columbia County (Nichols, J.), rendered August 15, 2012, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of robbery in the first degree, burglary in the first degree (four counts), burglary in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (two counts) and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree.

Over the course of three days in January 2012, there were three separate home invasions in Columbia County, the last of which occurred during the early morning hours of January 12 when David Chrapowitzky and Barbara Chrapowitzky woke up in their home and saw intruders. After the intruders left, the Chrapowitzkys called 911, described them as two males, one of whom was wearing a mask and the other a bandana across his face, and both wearing black hooded sweatshirts. Both of the men were armed and, after they exited the house, the Chrapowitzkys heard a vehicle leaving. Donald Krapf, a sergeant with the Columbia County Sheriff's Department, responded to the 911 call and, while traveling to the residence, observed a suspicious vehicle. Krapf kept the vehicle in his view for a few minutes and was eventually able to see that defendant—who was driving—was wearing a black hooded sweatshirt. Krapf also observed the vehicle turn without a directional signal being employed and effectuated a traffic stop of the vehicle, which was occupied by defendant and four others, including Jeremy Bost and Joshua Spencer. Bost was asked to exit the vehicle and a pat down revealed two guns in the waistband of his pants. Physical evidence linking defendant to the three burglaries was found in the vehicle and, later, in defendant's residence.

Defendant, Bost and Spencer were arrested and were each charged in an indictment with burglary in the first degree (four counts), criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (two counts), criminal possession of weapon in the third degree, robbery in the first degree and burglary in the second degree. Following a suppression hearing, County Court determined that Krapf had probable cause to stop defendant's vehicle and refused to suppress the evidence seized as a result thereof. County Court subsequently severed defendant's trial from his codefendants' trial and defendant was convicted by a jury as charged. Defendant was sentenced, as a second violent felony offender, to an aggregate prison term of 80 years, to be followed by five years of postrelease supervision. Defendant now appeals, and we affirm.

Initially, we reject defendant's claim that County Court failed to acquire personal jurisdiction over him because he was not arraigned in accordance with the statutory requirements ( seeCPL 210.15[1] ). Defendant was present at the arraignment, during which his counsel waived a formal reading of the charges, acknowledged receipt of the indictment and entered a plea of not guilty on each and every count therein. Thus, the statutory requirements were satisfied ( seeCPL 210.15; People v. Oakley, 112 A.D.3d 1064, 1064, 976 N.Y.S.2d 619 [2013],lv. denied22 N.Y.3d 1140, 983 N.Y.S.2d 499, 6 N.E.3d 618 [2014];People v. Buckner, 274 A.D.2d 832, 833, 711 N.Y.S.2d 861 [2000],lv. denied95 N.Y.2d 904, 716 N.Y.S.2d 645, 739 N.E.2d 1150 [2000] ).

We also find no merit to defendant's contention that County Court should have suppressed the evidence derived from the traffic stop. Probable cause to believe that a person has violated a provision of the Vehicle and Traffic Law

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provides an “ ‘objectively reasonable basis' ” for the stop of a vehicle ( People v. Brock, 107 A.D.3d 1025, 1026, 968 N.Y.S.2d 624 [2013],lv. denied21 N.Y.3d 1072, 974 N.Y.S.2d 321, 997 N.E.2d 146 [2013], quoting People v. Pealer, 20 N.Y.3d 447, 457 n. 2, 962 N.Y.S.2d 592, 985 N.E.2d 903 [2013],cert. denied––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 105, 187 L.Ed.2d 77 [2013];see People v. Thompson, 106 A.D.3d 1134, 1135, 963 N.Y.S.2d 780 [2013];People v. McLean, 99 A.D.3d 1111, 1111–1112, 952 N.Y.S.2d 672 [2012],lv. denied20 N.Y.3d 1013, 960 N.Y.S.2d 356, 984 N.E.2d 331 [2013];People v. Viele, 90 A.D.3d 1238, 1239, 935 N.Y.S.2d 171 [2011],lv. denied19 N.Y.3d 868, 947 N.Y.S.2d 417, 970 N.E.2d 440 [2012];People v. Green, 80 A.D.3d 1004, 1004–1005, 915 N.Y.S.2d 371 [2011] ). Here, Krapf testified at the probable cause hearing that, as he was responding to the 911 call, he observed defendant's vehicle fail to signal when it made a left-hand turn ( seeVehicle and Traffic Law § 1163[d] ).¹ County Court assessed that testimony as credible, and the objective reasonableness of the stop was not negated by any subjective intention that Krapf might have had in connection with his desire to investigate the possibility that the occupants of the vehicle were involved in that evening's burglary ( see People v. McLean, 99 A.D.3d at 1112, 952 N.Y.S.2d 672;People v. Viele, 90 A.D.3d at 1239, 935 N.Y.S.2d 171). Krapf also observed the vehicle—which was the only one on the road—in close geographical and temporal proximity to the scene of the reported crime, as well as the fact that defendant was wearing clothing that matched the description of the perpetrators and that another occupant in the car was moving suspiciously. Based on this testimony, and according deference to County Court's credibility assessments, we discern no basis to disturb that court's finding that there was probable cause to stop defendant's vehicle.

We turn next to defendant's argument that the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence because the People failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt his identity as a perpetrator in the home invasions. Shortly after the burglary at the Chrapowitzky home, defendant was seen driving a vehicle in a nearby location wearing clothing that matched the description of the perpetrator. Certain items linked to the three burglaries were found in the vehicle and Bost had two guns in his waistband. Also, the Chrapowitzkys and Edrick King, one of the victims of the first burglary, identified those guns as the weapons that were used by the perpetrators, and Lucas Samascott, the victim of the second burglary, identified items found in the vehicle and at defendant's residence as items that had been taken from his home.² Additionally, the Chrapowitzkys were able to make an in-court identification of defendant as one of the two perpetrators, and David Chrapowitzky identified the mask found in defendant's vehicle as the mask worn by one of the intruders. Finally, King identified a black jacket that was later found in defendant's jail locker as the jacket that was worn by the shorter of the two intruders at his home.

Catrina Lewis, who was in the vehicle with defendant, Bost and Spencer on all three occasions, testified that, each time, the vehicle stopped at a house, the three

[987 N.Y.S.2d 685]

men got out of the vehicle and returned a short time later. Lewis also testified that during the first incident, the three men returned carrying a bag, which they later threw out of the window. That bag was recovered and the other victim of the first burglary identified it as a bag belonging to him that had been taken from his home. Shaeancye Anthony–Lewis, who was also in the car after the last home invasion, testified that she saw defendant hand a weapon to Bost. In addition, the People proffered evidence that both of the weapons recovered on Bost were operable, and that defendant had previously been convicted of a felony.

Although defendant challenges the credibility of Lewis and Anthony–Lewis, as well as the victims' descriptions of the perpetrators, the identification of the...