People v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 17 January 1989
• Citation: 146 A.D.2d 638,536 N.Y.S.2d 543
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Robert ANDERSON, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 543

536 N.Y.S.2d 543

146 A.D.2d 638

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Robert ANDERSON, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

Jan. 17, 1989.

Steven R. Bernhard, Mineola, for appellant.

Denis Dillon, Dist. Atty., Mineola (Anthony J. Girese and Bruce E. Whitney, of counsel), for respondent.

Before BROWN, J.P., and LAWRENCE, KOOPER and SPATT, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County (Lipp, J.), rendered April 28, 1986, convicting him of burglary in the first degree, burglary in the second degree, robbery in the second degree (three counts), criminal possession of stolen property in the second degree and grand larceny in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

At approximately 2:30 A.M. on the morning of August 14, 1985, the defendant, accompanied by his girlfriend, Jennifer Woodson, her tenant, Gladys Howard, and Lacy Bostick, drove to the victim's home in Westbury, New York. While Howard occupied the female victim at the front door, the defendant and Bostick entered the apartment from the rear. The defendant and Bostick bound the complainant with tape, menaced and repeatedly beat her with a gun and stole her valuables.

On appeal, the defendant contends that his oral and written confessions should have been suppressed as the products of an improper arrest since he was apprehended without probable cause and without a warrant, as well as because the Miranda warnings he received were inadequate. He further submits that the stolen property and gun recovered by the police should be suppressed as the fruits of an unlawful search, and that his conviction should be reversed because of a Confrontation Clause violation. He finally argues that the sentence imposed was excessive. The defendant's contentions are without merit.

We note in the first instance that the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant. The instant matter is distinguishable from cases such as (People v. Elwell, 50 N.Y.2d 231, 428 N.Y.S.2d 655, 406 N.E.2d 471), where the defendant was linked to a crime by an informant whose basis of knowledge was unknown, and where the only corroborative details witnessed by the police did not suggest any criminal activity. Here, in contrast, the defendant was linked to the crime charged by the victim herself, who was personally acquainted with her attacker, whom she knew as "Rob". The complainant also gave the police a detailed physical description of the defendant, indicated the neighborhood where he resided and stated that he worked as a bus driver. Furthermore, a neighbor supplied the fact that he drove a white or yellow Cadillac, while a local police officer supplied the last name, alias and vehicle registration number; and the complainant's daughter, who also knew the defendant, led the police to the house where the defendant was currently staying, after consulting a number of mutual acquaintances. Therefore, when the police observed the defendant's yellow Cadillac parked outside a house on the street indicated by the complainant's daughter, learned from a resident of the house that "Rob" was inside, saw a man matching the description provided by the complainant lean out of a window and heard him use the known alias, they had probable cause to arrest him for the robbery of which he had been accused.

Nor was the defendant's warrantless arrest improper. The testimony established that, upon being requested to come outside, the defendant either voluntarily exited the building or stood in the front doorway. Although the hearing court did not make a factual determination as to which scenario took place, this failure is inconsequential because either version supports the conclusion that the arrest was legal. It has been held that the rule of (Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639), prohibiting the police from arresting a suspect in his own home without a warrant absent exigent circumstances, is not violated where the police, seeing the defendant at his window, direct him to come outside so long as there is "no indication that defendant was in any way threatened" (People v. Minley, 68 N.Y.2d 952, 953, 510 N.Y.S.2d 87, 502 N.E.2d 1002). There is no suggestion in the instant case that the defendant was threatened, so that he was properly arrested upon his voluntary exit from the building. Moreover, assuming that he merely stood in his doorway, the arrest was equally proper since the doorway to a private house has been held to be a "public place" for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, since the...