People v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 27 April 1988
• Docket Number: No. 3-87-0366,3-87-0366
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois
• Parties: , 120 Ill.Dec. 123 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Christopher ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellee.

Page 1034

523 N.E.2d 1034

169 Ill.App.3d 289, 120 Ill.Dec. 123

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Christopher ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 3-87-0366.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Third District.

April 27, 1988.

Rehearing Denied June 13, 1988.

Gary F. Gnidovec (argued), States' Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Ottawa, Edward F. Masters, State's Atty., Joliet, for People.

Mark D. Fisher, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Ottawa, for Christopher Anderson.

Justice HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the Court:

Christopher Anderson was indicted on a charge of murder following the shooting death of Vicki Scarabello. Anderson filed motions to quash his arrest and to suppress certain evidence and after a hearing, the trial court granted the motions. The State brings this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1). (87 Ill.2d R. 604(a)(1).) We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The State's recitation of facts, which was not controverted by the defendant, established the following. On the afternoon of November 20, 1986, Vicki Scarabello was killed by a gunshot to the head in a Park Forest, Illinois apartment rental office where she was employed as a manager. Information obtained by Park Forest Detectives Carl Kuester and Patrick Fitzgerald indicated that a man fitting Anderson's description was the last potential apartment lessee to speak with the victim before she was murdered. The detectives also discovered that Anderson, who lived near the apartment complex where Scarabello was murdered, had a prior record for violent crimes and that his Illinois driver's license had been suspended.

The evidence adduced at the suppression hearing regarding the events surrounding Anderson's arrest and interrogation is set out below. Detective Kuester testified that on November 22, 1986, he and his partner, Detective Fitzgerald, proceeded in an unmarked car to the Bob Evans restaurant in the adjacent community of Matteson, Illinois where Anderson was employed. They located a vehicle registered to Anderson in the parking lot and placed it under surveillance. Kuester admitted that at this time, he wished to speak to Anderson about the homicide.

A short time later, Anderson entered his car and drove a short distance to a shopping center's parking lot. The detectives followed Anderson and parked behind his car. They approached Anderson as he exited the car and Kuester identified himself as a Park Forest police officer. He asked Anderson to produce his driver's license, but Anderson stated that his license was suspended. Anderson was then advised that he was under arrest for driving with a suspended license. Fitzgerald asked Anderson for permission to look in his vehicle, and when Anderson consented to the search, Fitzgerald opened the car door and looked inside.

Fitzgerald notified the Matteson police department of the traffic stop and asked that a marked car from Matteson be dispatched to the scene. The Matteson police department allowed the detectives to take Anderson to the Park Forest police department for questioning. Neither detective had a ticket book with him, and Anderson was not issued a citation for the offense at the scene or when he was taken to the Park Forest police station.

Upon his arrival at the Park Forest police department, Anderson was taken to the detective division office. Kuester orally advised him of his Miranda rights and Anderson indicated that he understood those rights. He was informed that a bond was required for the offense of driving while license suspended; Anderson did not ask to place a telephone call to obtain bond money.

Anderson was again asked for permission to search his car and he consented verbally and by signing a form. Anderson's car was at that time in a municipal building adjacent to the police department, having been towed there at Kuester's request. After receiving Anderson's permission, Kuester and two officers conducted a thorough search of the car, looking for evidence of the Scarabello homicide. Several items were taken from the car including a variety of live rounds of ammunition, a small gun case, and proposal forms from the apartment complex where Scarabello had been employed.

After completing the vehicle search, Kuester again advised Anderson of his constitutional rights, and on a written form, Anderson indicated that he understood each of his rights and was willing to answer questions without first speaking to an attorney. Kuester then informed Anderson that Park Forest police were investigating a serious crime and requested that he provide any information he had about the crime. Anderson was interrogated periodically over the next several hours; breaks for food, drink, and rest were taken.

During the course of the interrogation, Anderson stated that he previously possessed a small .22 caliber derringer but that he had recently thrown it into a creek. At some point in the evening after Anderson made this statement, he left the police station with Kuester and Fitzgerald and directed them to the location where he allegedly disposed of the gun. A search of that portion of the creek was conducted later, but the gun was not recovered.

During the interrogation, Anderson made statements admitting his involvement in the murder and he gave a voluntary written statement describing the circumstances surrounding Scarabello's shooting. He was placed under arrest on the murder charge and was incarcerated at the Park Forest police department.

On the morning of November 23, Anderson asked the police to call attorney Dave McDermott. McDermott was telephoned and he conferred privately with Anderson later that day. Anderson also was allowed a brief visit with his girlfriend. After this visit, as he passed by Detective Kuester, Anderson told Kuester that he wanted to apologize for lying about the location of the gun and tell him where he actually threw the gun. Kuester interrupted Anderson to explain that since he had consulted with an attorney, he could not be questioned without his attorney present. Anderson stated that he understood that he did not have to answer any questions, but insisted on taking Kuester to the place where he had disposed of the gun. Kuester recited the Miranda rights to Anderson, who again stated he understood them, but wanted to take the detective to the gun. Anderson, Kuester, Fitzgerald, and a police officer then left the police station. Anderson directed them to a small creek a short distance from the station. He pointed out where the gun hit the water and later, a .22 caliber derringer was recovered from the creek.

The defendant filed a motion to quash the arrest and suppress his confession and another motion to suppress the gun on grounds that the traffic arrest was an invalid pretextual arrest. The trial court found that the detectives made a valid arrest for driving on a suspended license, but that the suspended license arrest was a pretext used to place the defendant in a disadvantageous position where he could be questioned concerning the murder. The court then analyzed the detectives' subsequent actions under the objective standard applied by the United States Supreme Court in Scott v. United States (1978), 436 U.S. 128, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 and determined that the officers substantially deviated from their normal, customary procedures, and therefore violated Anderson's constitutional rights. The defendant's motions were granted and the evidence was suppressed. The State filed a certificate of inability to proceed with trial and then filed the instant appeal.

On appeal to this court, the State's primary argument is that the officers' subjective intentions at the time of a valid arrest cannot transform that valid arrest into an unlawful, pretextual arrest. The State contends that recent cases from the United States Supreme Court instruct that in evaluating alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment, courts are to conduct an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances then known to him. (E.g., Scott v. United States (1978), 436 U.S. 128, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168.) Under this analysis, the State argues that because the defendant was lawfully arrested for driving without a valid license, the officers' motives at the time of the arrest are irrelevant and do not retroactively invalidate this otherwise valid arrest. The defendant asserts that the Scott decision did not replace the pretextual arrest doctrine and that even under a Scott analysis, the officers' post-arrest conduct was not objectively reasonable and therefore it violated the Fourth Amendment. We disagree with the defendant and find that the evidence was erroneously suppressed.

According to the pretextual arrest doctrine, an arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence, and evidence seized by means of a pretextual arrest is inadmissible. The tainted evidence is excluded under this theory in order to deter deliberate police misconduct and prevent law enforcement officers from being rewarded for their subterfuge. In United States v. Lefkowitz (1932), 285 U.S. 452, 52 S.Ct. 420, 76 L.Ed. 877, the Supreme Court first stated that an arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence of a crime. However, in Lefkowitz, officers who had obtained a valid warrant to arrest the defendants for conspiracy to deliver liquor searched desks and wastebaskets and seized papers therein for use as evidence of the crime of which the defendants were accused, rather than some unrelated offense. Later, in Abel v. United States (1960), 362 U.S. 217, 80 S.Ct. 683, 4 L.Ed.2d 668, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.) suspected Abel was a Russian spy, but did not have sufficient evidence to arrest him, so it notified the Immigration and Naturalization Service (I.N.S.) that Abel might be an illegal alien. Acting pursuant to an administrative warrant, I.N.S. officers...