People v. Williams

Decision Date14 July 1992
Docket NumberNo. 1-89-2605,1-89-2605
Citation599 N.E.2d 1033,233 Ill.App.3d 1005,175 Ill.Dec. 19
Parties, 175 Ill.Dec. 19 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ivan Glenn WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Burch & Delgado, Chicago, for defendant-appellant.

State's Atty. of Cook County, Chicago (Jack O'Malley, Renee G. Goldfarb and Guy L. Miller, IV, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.

Justice McCORMICK delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Ivan Glenn Williams, in a jury trial, was found guilty of first-degree murder (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 9-1(a)(1)), and sentenced to a term of 35 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, defendant contends that (1) his statements and certain physical evidence should be suppressed as the product of an illegal arrest; (2) that his statements and certain physical evidence should have been suppressed because the statements were not given voluntarily; (3) inadmissible hearsay was admitted at trial, denying him the right to confrontation; (4) a mistrial should have been declared after a State's witness asked a juror for a date during the trial; and after the jury was advised, outside of defendant's presence, that the vandalization of cars in the court's parking lot was not limited to the juror's cars, but included cars of other persons not connected with defendant's case; and (5) that his conviction should be reduced to second-degree murder because the evidence did not prove him guilty of first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The decision of the trial court is affirmed because we find that defendants arrest was legal and the trial court's finding that defendant's statements were voluntarily is supported by the facts and circumstances of the case. Further, there is no basis for a mistrial in the record and defendant was proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

On Wednesday, December 9, 1987, at about 2:15 p.m., the body of the deceased was found in her apartment on east 14th Street in Chicago Heights. The deceased had been stabbed twice in the left chest and four times in the upper back. The apartment was in a state of disarray and looked ransacked. The walls were splattered with blood and a video cassette recorder was missing.

Detectives David Wierzbicki and Robert Pinnow of the Chicago Heights police department interviewed family members and friends of the deceased at the police station. Detective Wierzbicki learned from Marilyn Nichols, the deceased's mother that at about 12:30 p.m., she had telephoned the deceased who said that defendant was in the apartment to use the telephone. She told the deceased that defendant had to leave after he made the telephone call.

Defendant initially appeared at the police station on his own volition with friends and relatives of the deceased. He told the police that at about 12:30 p.m. that day he received a ride from Holbart Buckner to the Nichols' apartment. He wanted to see his brother, Roger, who lived at the apartment with Marilyn Nichols. Roger was not there and he asked the deceased to let him use the telephone. He acknowledged that Marilyn Nichols called while he was in the apartment. He stated that the deceased was alive when he left the apartment; also he said that Buckner, who had waited outside of the apartment, drove him to another location.

Buckner was located by the detecives. Buckner said that at around 12:30 p.m. that day he and James Jett drove defendant to 1416 Green Street. This location is about a block away from the Nichols' apartment. Buckner stated that they waited about 10 to 15 minutes and then left without defendant. The detectives interviewed Jett who corroborated Buckner's account.

The detectives went to defendant's father's house at about 12:10 a.m. By that time they knew about an active traffic warrant for defendant's arrest. The arrest warrant was for driving on a suspended license. Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-303.

Defendant was advised that the detectives "needed to speak with him" about the investigation of the Nichols homicide. Defendant went with them to the police station. At the police station, defendant was told that he was under arrest for the traffic violation and investigation of murder.

The following afternoon, defendant was questioned and eventually made three statements.

I.

Defendant states that his arrest was illegal and the confessions and the resulting physical evidence must be suppressed. Three reasons are advanced by defendant to sustain his position: (1) the traffic warrant was invalid because it had been recalled; (2) the traffic warrant was used as a pretext to allow the detectives to take him into custody to interrogate defendant about the murder; and (3) there was no probable cause to arrest him.

The State argues that defendant has waived any challenge to the legality of his arrest because he failed to include it in his motions to suppress or in his motion for new trial. People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill.2d 176, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124.

Defendant acknowledges that he failed to raise the illegal arrest claim but requests that we review it under the plain error rule contained in Supreme Court Rule 615(a). (134 Ill.2d.R. 615(a).) In People v. Alexander (1991), 212 Ill.App.3d 1091, 157 Ill.Dec. 56, 571 N.E.2d 1075, we observed that even constitutional errors could be waived under Enoch where a post-trial motion fails to preserve the issue "[u]nless the error reasonably could have affected the verdict or if it would have resulted in a failure to afford the defendant due process of law." (Alexander, 212 Ill.App.3d at 1102, 157 Ill.Dec. 56, 571 N.E.2d 1075.) We said that "[l]imiting our review to issues which could reasonably have affected the verdict still adequately ensures that serious injustices are corrected and that the integrity and reputation of the judicial process is preserved." Alexander, 212 Ill.App.3d at 1103, 157 Ill.Dec. 56, 571 N.E.2d 1075; see also, People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill.2d 1, 131 Ill.Dec. 86, 538 N.E.2d 461.

Although we conclude that the claim of an illegal arrest has been waived, we will review it in the interest of judicial economy, as it involves a constitutionally based issue.

(1)

Defendant does not argue that the arrest warrant was invalidly issued. He argues that it was recalled as a matter of law. Defendant relies on the following general orders of the circuit court "Effective immediately, a moratorium is hereby declared on the service and execution of all warrants covering state, county and municipal ordinance violations punishable by fine only until further order of Court." (May 17, 1984. General Order No. 84-4(M).)

"Effective immediately, all warrants covering state, county and municipal ordinance violations punishable by fine only are hereby recalled and quashed." (June 6, 1984. General Order No. 84-6(M).)

Neither of the foregoing orders apply to the traffic warrant at issue.

The common law record states that defendant's traffic warrant was for a violation of section 6-303 of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-303), which punishes driving on a suspended license as a Class A misdemeanor. Under the Uniform Code of Corrections, section 5-8-3(a) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-3(a)), a Class A misdemeanor is punishable by a determinate prison sentence of less than one year. Therefore, the general orders affecting ordinance violations punishable only by a fine do not apply to defendant's traffic warrant. Therefore, for purposes of the fourth amendment, we conclude that defendant's December 10, 1987, arrest for driving on a suspended license was lawful and that the ensuing custody was reasonably related to that arrest.

(2)

Defendant contends that the arrest warrant was merely a pretext to allow the detectives to take him into custody to accomplish their real purpose, which was to interrogate him about the murder. Defendant argues that, therefore, his custody was illegal and his confessions and the resulting physical evidence must be suppressed.

While it is true that a suspect cannot be detained for custodial questioning on less than probable cause (Dunaway v. New York (1979), 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824; People v. Holveck (1990), 141 Ill.2d 84, 95, 152 Ill.Dec. 237, 565 N.E.2d 919), generally, an arrest supported by a duly authorized warrant is a valid arrest (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 107-2(a); People v. Spence (1976), 43 Ill.App.3d 1044, 2 Ill.Dec. 802, 357 N.E.2d 1245; see also United States v. Watson, (1976), 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598). Moreover, it is permissible for police officers to arrest a suspect on a minor offense and conduct questioning on a more serious offense and the arrest will not be deemed pretextual as long as the arrest on the minor offense is valid. (People v. Perry (1990), 204 Ill.App.3d 782, 150 Ill.Dec. 88, 562 N.E.2d 618 (arrest for driving without a license, which arose out of stop for failure to display rear registration plate, was not pretext for subsequent search of purse revealing cocaine).) Similarly, in People v. Hattery (1989), 183 Ill.App.3d 785, 813-19, 132 Ill.Dec. 58, 539 N.E.2d 368, the court affirmed, as not manifestly erroneous, a trial court's ruling that an arrest warrant for aggravated battery was not executed as a pretext to allow questioning on an unrelated murder case. The court relied on the rule of objective reasonableness and concluded that, while the police may have been motivated to execute the warrant for reasons unrelated to the murder, the confession to the murder obtained following the arrest under the battery warrant was admissible. Hattery, 183 Ill.App.3d at 818-19, 132 Ill.Dec. 58, 539 N.E.2d 368.

The Hattery court cited, among other cases, the decision in People v. Anderson (1988), 169 Ill.App.3d 289, 120 Ill.Dec. 123, 523 N.E.2d 1034, which involved a warrantless arrest for driving on a suspended...

To continue reading

Request your trial
8 cases
  • Miranda v. Leibach
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • January 20, 2005
    ...court's presumption that defendant had not preserved them via post-trial motion); People v. Williams, 233 Ill.App.3d 1005, 175 Ill.Dec. 19, 599 N.E.2d 1033, 1035 (1st Dist.1992) ("Although we conclude that the claim of an illegal arrest has been waived, we will review it in the interest of ......
  • People v. Munoz
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • February 11, 2010
    ...People v. Simms, 143 Ill.2d 154, 174, 157 Ill.Dec. 483, 572 N.E.2d 947, 954-55 (1991); see also People v. Williams, 233 Ill.App.3d 1005, 1016-17, 175 Ill.Dec. 19, 599 N.E.2d 1033, 1040-41 (1992). We note, however, that contrary to the State's assertion, the record below firmly establishes t......
  • People v. Armstead
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • April 24, 2001
    ...for a limited purpose and that the jury is not to accept the statement for the truth of its contents. People v. Williams, 233 Ill.App.3d 1005, 1017, 175 Ill.Dec. 19, 599 N.E.2d 1033 (1992). Admission of hearsay identification testimony constitutes plain error only where it serves as a subst......
  • People v. Prather
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • October 29, 2012
    ...result for the truth of the matter asserted–that B.R. was pregnant at the time of the battery. See People v. Williams, 233 Ill.App.3d 1005, 1017, 175 Ill.Dec. 19, 599 N.E.2d 1033 (1992). We therefore need not discuss the issue of hearsay further. We examine in turn each of the other possibl......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT