People v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 23 September 1994
• Docket Number: No. 1-89-1199,1-89-1199
• Citation: 204 Ill.Dec. 367,266 Ill.App.3d 947,641 N.E.2d 591
• Parties: , 204 Ill.Dec. 367 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Clifford ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 591

641 N.E.2d 591

266 Ill.App.3d 947, 204 Ill.Dec. 367

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Clifford ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 1-89-1199.

Appellate Court of Illinois First District, Fifth Division.

Sept. 23, 1994.

Frederick F. Cohn, Chicago, for appellant.

Cecil A. Partee, State's Atty., Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Judy L. DeAngelis, of counsel), for appellee.

Justice GORDON delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Clifford Anderson, was charged by indictment with various counts of murder and armed violence. ¹ At the conclusion of a jury trial, the Defendant was found guilty of two counts of murder and two counts of armed violence for the murders of Robert Williams and Mack Sutton and was sentenced to natural life.

On appeal the Defendant raises several issues. They are: (1) whether he was denied due process because several jury instructions were denied, improperly given over his objection, or not given sua sponte by the trial court; (2) whether he was denied due process and effective assistance of counsel when his defense counsel refused to abide by Defendant's decision not to present an insanity defense; (3) whether the prosecution erroneously presented a previously undisclosed admission of the Defendant; (4) whether the Defendant was denied the right of confrontation; 5) whether the trial court erroneously denied Defendant a fitness hearing; (6) whether the Defendant was improperly prevented from presenting relevant testimony; (7) whether the jury selection was improper; (8) whether improper and prejudicial prosecutorial acts occurred at trial; and (9) whether during closing argument defense counsel improperly was prevented from disclosing the consequences of a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity. ²

OPINION

I.

The Defendant's first argument on appeal is that he was denied due process because several jury instructions were denied, improperly given over Defendant's objection or not given sua sponte by the trial court. Initially, the Defendant contends that the trial court committed error with respect to his conviction of the murder of Sutton when it refused to give a voluntary manslaughter instruction and to amend the murder instruction accordingly.

The Defendant argues that a voluntary manslaughter instruction should have been given with respect to Sutton's death because the evidence presented at trial could support a jury finding that he either acted in the unreasonable belief of justification or acted under a sudden and intense passion caused by adequate provocation (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 9-2; cf. 720 ILCS 5/9-2 (West 1992) (voluntary manslaughter replaced by second degree murder)). The evidence, solely based upon his own testimony, was that he was attacked by Sutton, that Sutton pulled a gun on him and that a struggle ensued during which the gun discharged killing Sutton.

In support of his argument, the Defendant relies on People v. Lockett (1980), 82 Ill.2d 546, 45 Ill.Dec. 900, 413 N.E.2d 378, for the proposition that, whenever a self-defense instruction is given in a murder case, a voluntary manslaughter instruction also is required. We do not believe that Lockett is so encompassing. Rather, Lockett held that self-defense and voluntary manslaughter instructions should be given when any evidence is presented showing the defendant's subjective belief that deadly use of force was necessary. A question must exist, however, as to whether that subjective belief is reasonable, resulting in a verdict of not guilty, or unreasonable, resulting in a verdict of voluntary manslaughter.

We believe the holding in Lockett is inapplicable to the facts in the instant case. In Lockett, the defendant's subjective belief clearly was in question; and the jury had to decide whether the defendant could reasonably believe that the concealed object the victim picked up before the defendant shot him was a gun, when it was actually an empty whiskey bottle. The court held that the evidence presented the possibility that the defendant had a subjective belief he was acting in self-defense and that it was for the jury to decide whether that subjective belief was reasonable or unreasonable. In the instant case, the reasonableness of the Defendant's subjective belief was not in question. As the trial court stated, there was no evidence of an unreasonable subjective belief; rather, the evidence elicited from the Defendant's testimony, was that Sutton pointed a gun at the Defendant, that a struggle ensued, and that the gun went off fatally injuring Sutton. The question for the jury to decide was whether the factual scenario alleged by the Defendant occurred. If the jury believed it did, and that Sutton instigated the altercation and threatened the Defendant by pointing the gun at him, then the jury could conclude that the Defendant could reasonably believe that the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 7-1 now codified at 720 ILCS 5/7-1 (West 1992)). If the jury disbelieved the Defendant's testimony and believed the testimony of the other witnesses, then there was no physical altercation between Sutton and the Defendant and, instead, the Defendant was the aggressor; had possession of the gun; walked over to Sutton; and shot him. Under this latter factual scenario, the Defendant would be guilty of murder. In either case, there can be no question of an unreasonable belief by the Defendant; and, therefore, the Defendant was not entitled to a voluntary manslaughter instruction under section 9-2(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961 nor was the Defendant entitled to a murder instruction placing upon the State the burden of disproving beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of an unreasonable belief of justification (see People v. Reddick (1988), 123 Ill.2d 184, 122 Ill.Dec. 1, 526 N.E.2d 141).

Even assuming arguendo that an error occurred in instructing the jury on mitigating mental conditions, this error would not warrant a new trial since the result of the trial would not have been different had the arguably correct instructions been given. (People v. Fierer (1988), 124 Ill.2d 176, 124 Ill.Dec. 855, 529 N.E.2d 972.) In People v. Moleterno (1990), 199 Ill.App.3d 15, 145 Ill.Dec. 85, 556 N.E.2d 703, the defendant's murder conviction was affirmed despite the fact that the jury received the identical murder and voluntary manslaughter instructions found to be erroneous in People v. Reddick (1988), 123 Ill.2d 184, 122 Ill.Dec. 1, 526 N.E.2d 141. In Moleterno, the defendant and victim had been involved in an altercation while driving their automobiles. The defendant's testimony was the only evidence pertaining to his perceptions or subjective belief in the need to use deadly force. The court held that his testimony was contradicted and impeached by other direct and circumstantial evidence; that his lack of belief in the need to use deadly force was so clear and convincing; that the trial result would not have been different had the arguably correct instructions been given; and that, therefore, the error, if any, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See also People v. Beauford (1991), 249 Ill.App.3d 943, 190 Ill.Dec. 132, 621 N.E.2d 1.) We believe that the same conclusions can be reached here and that, therefore, the error, if any, is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

For similar reasons we affirm the trial court's denial of a voluntary manslaughter instruction pursuant to section 9-2(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 and the corresponding murder instruction required by People v. Reddick. There was no evidence in the record from which the jury could find the Defendant was acting under a sudden, intense passion resulting from provocation when Sutton was shot. As the trial judge stated, the acts related by the Defendant leading up to the shooting of Sutton were not sufficient acts of provocation which would engender passion or a killing in the heat of passion. The Defendant's testimony supported a theory of self-defense and a desire to protect himself. See People v. Handley (1972), 51 Ill.2d 229, 282 N.E.2d 131; People v. De Rosa (1941), 378 Ill. 557, 39 N.E.2d 1 (self-defense instruction given, voluntary manslaughter instruction refused).

The Defendant next contends that the trial court committed error when it refused to amend the armed violence instruction to include language that the State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was not justified in using the force he used against Sutton. At trial, the jury was presented with the issues instruction for armed violence, I.P.I. Criminal No. 11.20. Unlike the tendered murder instruction, this instruction did not contain language placing the burden on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the additional element that the Defendant was not justified in using the force he used. The jury also was given a definitional instruction covering the justifiable use of force in self-defense (IPI Crim. No. 24-25.06 (2d 1981) formerly IPI Crim. No. 24.06 (1968)) along with an instruction informing the jury that the burden of proof remained with the State (IPI Crim. No. 24-25.06 (2d ed. 1981)).

In People v. Wells (1982), 110 Ill.App.3d 700, 66 Ill.Dec. 428, 442 N.E.2d 1341, a case cited by the Defendant, the identical jury instructions for murder, aggravated battery and self-defense were given. An additional instruction for involuntary manslaughter was given. The court found that the conspicuous absence of the self-defense language from the aggravated battery and involuntary instructions, while present in the murder instruction, could lead a diligent jury to conclude that, although absence of justification was required to prove murder, it was not required to prove armed violence or involuntary manslaughter. The court concluded that the defendant may well have been convicted of involuntary manslaughter and aggravated...