People v. Anderson, 1–08–0500.

CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois
Citation944 N.E.2d 359,348 Ill.Dec. 406,407 Ill.App.3d 662
Docket NumberNo. 1–08–0500.,1–08–0500.
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee,v.John ANDERSON, Defendant–Appellant.
Decision Date14 February 2011

407 Ill.App.3d 662
944 N.E.2d 359
348 Ill.Dec.
406

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
John ANDERSON, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 1–08–0500.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division.

Feb. 14, 2011.


[944 N.E.2d 362]

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Unsinn, Deputy Defender, Byron M. Reina, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, for Appellant.Anita Alvarez, State's Attorney, County of Cook, Alan J. Spellberg, Peter Fischer, Kathleen Warnick, Assistant State's Attorneys, for Appellee.

[407 Ill.App.3d 663] OPINION
Presiding Justice HALL delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[348 Ill.Dec. 409] Following a jury trial, the defendant, John Anderson, was found guilty of residential burglary. The trial court imposed a sentence of 20 years' imprisonment in the Department of Corrections. The defendant appeals.

On appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the denial of his motion to suppress was error; (2) whether it was error to admit evidence

[348 Ill.Dec. 410 , 944 N.E.2d 363]

which permitted the jury to find the defendant guilty of an uncharged residential burglary; (3) whether it was error to allow the jury to view a certified copy of the defendant's previous conviction, which contained prejudicial surplusage; (4) whether the defendant's testimony in support of his defense was inadmissible hearsay; (5) whether the prosecutor's remarks in closing argument deprived the defendant of a fair trial; (6) whether it was error to deny defense counsel's request to question the venire to ascertain any bias based on the defendant's prior conviction; and (7) whether the cumulative effect of the alleged errors denied the defendant a fair trial and due process of law. We affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence.

The defendant was charged with a single count of residential burglary. The indictment charged that, on or about September 17, 2005, the defendant entered the residence of Joann Hess with the intent to commit a theft. See 720 ILCS 5/19–3(a) (West 2004). In response to the defendant's request for a bill of particulars, the State identified the date and time of the offense as on or about September 17, 2005, at approximately 2:39 a.m., and that it occurred at or near 12316 Vincennes, Blue Island, Illinois.

As the defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, only a brief summary of the evidence at trial is necessary. Evidence pertinent to an issue raised on appeal will be set forth in connection with that issue.

SUMMARY OF TRIAL EVIDENCE

Joann and Jeffrey Hess resided at 12316 Vincennes Avenue in Blue Island. On September 16, 2005, the Hesses attended a party. At approximately 2 a.m., on September 17, 2001, Mrs. Hess returned to their residence and discovered evidence of a burglary: the front door was unlocked, and jewelry, cash and gas cards were missing. After being notified of the burglary, Mr. Hess returned to the residence. As the Hesses stood in their kitchen, a man, later identified as the defendant, entered the residence through the front door and began looking around. When Mrs. Hess cried out that the man was back, the defendant fled the house, pursued by Mr. Hess. Mr. Hess managed to [407 Ill.App.3d 664] restrain the defendant. The defendant told Mr. Hess that if he did not call the police, he would get the Hesses' property returned to them. The police arrived, and a search of the defendant revealed a set of car keys, which had been on the kitchen counter of the residence when Mrs. Hess left for the party.

The defendant gave a statement to Blue Island police officers. Initially, the defendant had acted as a lookout while a friend of his, Cat Daddy, entered the Hess residence and removed some items. Cat Daddy shared the proceeds with his girlfriend and then told the defendant to return to the Hess residence and see what else he could take. When the defendant returned to the Hess residence, he was confronted by the homeowner. However, at trial the defendant testified that, prior to going to the Hess residence, he had witnessed Mrs. Hess giving a set of keys to Cat Daddy's brother in exchange for drugs. The keys were then given to the defendant who went to the Hess residence only to exchange the keys for $20.

The jury found the defendant guilty of residential burglary. Following the denial of his motion for a new trial, the defendant was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment. This timely appeal followed.

ANALYSIS
I. Denial of Motion to Suppress Statement

The defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to

[348 Ill.Dec. 411 , 944 N.E.2d 364]

suppress the inculpatory statement he gave to police following his arrest.

A. Pertinent Evidence

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the following testimony was presented by the parties.

Bernadine Rzab 1 testified that, on September 17, 2005, she was a detective with the Blue Island police department. After reporting for work at 3 p.m., Officer Rzab was informed that the defendant, a burglary suspect, had been taken into custody at approximately 2:45 a.m. that morning. At approximately 4:30 p.m., Officer Rzab and Corporal Kevin Sisk interviewed the defendant.

Officer Rzab advised the defendant of his Miranda rights. She had the defendant read aloud each of the rights from the printed form. As he read each right, she asked if he understood each right. He indicated he did and placed his initials by each right. Both officers signed the waiver of rights form after the defendant signed it.

[407 Ill.App.3d 665] After signing the waiver form, the defendant agreed to speak to the officers and agreed that his statement could be summarized in writing. The conversation lasted approximately 40 minutes. The defendant appeared coherent and had no difficulty forming sentences. After the defendant gave his statement, Officer Rzab had him review what she wrote, and the defendant agreed it was accurate. The defendant also acknowledged in the statement that he had been treated well while in custody and that he was not forced to make the statement.

When questioned about the defendant's physical condition, Officer Rzab stated that he appeared fine and that there was no change in his physical condition during the interview. The defendant never stated that he suffered from diabetes or that he was taking insulin. She denied that the defendant told her that he needed to take his insulin or that he told her he did not understand the proceedings because he was ill. She never denied medication to the defendant, and there was no discussion regarding the defendant's need to take medication.

On cross-examination, Officer Rzab testified that she was unaware of whether the defendant had been given any food prior to beginning her interview with him. She did not ask the defendant if he needed food. She acknowledged that she was unfamiliar with the defendant's “normal” demeanor. She again denied that the defendant told her he was a diabetic or that he requested insulin. She did not recall telling the defendant that she would help him get insulin after their discussion. Officer Rzab denied that she escorted the defendant to another room to make a telephone call to obtain insulin.

The defendant testified that he was 45 years of age and had been an insulin-dependent diabetic since 1984. He took insulin twice a day, in the morning and the evening. Following his arrest, he was placed in a holding cell at approximately 2:40 a.m. He had no medication with him, and he was not offered any food or anything to drink. He had last taken his insulin the morning of September 16, 2005, and had last eaten around 8:30 p.m. the evening of the 16th.

When he entered the interview room, he was feeling ill; he had a severe headache, cramps, he was sweating, and feeling nauseated. He told Officer Rzab that he was an insulin-dependent diabetic and need his insulin. He also told her that he had some insulin at his godmother's residence. The

[348 Ill.Dec. 412 , 944 N.E.2d 365]

defendant was not wearing his glasses, which, due to his diabetes, he needed in order to see clearly.

The defendant testified that he repeatedly told Officer Rzab that he was ill and needed his insulin. Officer Rzab responded that once they concluded the interview, she would see about obtaining insulin for the defendant. He did not recall Officer Rzab asking if he wanted [407 Ill.App.3d 666] his statement in writing, but he did recall Officer Rzab reading the statement to him and telling him that if he signed it, he could make a telephone call to get the insulin. The defendant did not read the written statement.

After the defendant signed the statement, Officer Rzab took the defendant into the squad room so he could telephone his godmother, Elizabeth Broadway. He spoke to Ms. Broadway, but she was unable to bring his insulin to the police station. After he concluded the call, Officer Rzab told him she would see about getting him insulin. The defendant was then returned to his cell. When he was taken to bond court the next morning, he passed out and woke up in the hospital.

On cross-examination, the defendant testified that, while in custody, he had three meals, each consisting of a cheeseburger and a soft drink. The first time he ate was after he signed the statement. The defendant maintained that he signed the statement because he was feeling ill. He acknowledged that, despite not having his glasses, he was able to place his initials on the lines of the form. The defendant pointed out that three of the letters of his signature on the waiver of rights form were not exactly on the line. However, he acknowledged that he signed on the lines, including a slanted line, in three places on his statement.

On redirect examination, the defendant testified that much of the food he consumed while in custody was not good for him. He passed out because he had not taken his insulin since the morning of...

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