People v. Andrade

• Decision Date: 29 March 1996
• Docket Number: No. 1-94-1282,1-94-1282
• Citation: 279 Ill.App.3d 292,664 N.E.2d 256
• Parties: , 215 Ill.Dec. 859 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sergio ANDRADE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 256

664 N.E.2d 256

279 Ill.App.3d 292, 215 Ill.Dec. 859

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sergio ANDRADE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-94-1282.

Appellate Court of Illinois First District, Sixth Division.

March 29, 1996.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; Honorable Bertina Lampkin, Judge Presiding.

Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, Yasemin Eken, Asst. Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Jack O'Malley, State's Attorney of Cook County, Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, James Fitzgerald and John L. McNamara, of counsel), for appellee.

Justice RAKOWSKI delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial in February 1994, defendant was convicted of unlawful delivery of more than 15 grams but less than 100 grams of a controlled substance and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment. This is defendant's second appeal. Defendant was first tried in May 1991, which resulted in a mistrial. He appealed and we affirmed. Defendant now appeals his conviction and sentence following his second trial arguing: (1) he is entitled to discharge under section 103-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (the Speedy Trial Act) (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 1994)); (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of other crimes; and (3) his sentence of nine years is excessive. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for discharge pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 1994)). The Act provides in part that "[e]very person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant." 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 1994).

Defendant was arrested on July 23, 1990. He was charged with two counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance for two separate transactions, which occurred on March 23, 1989, and on May 17, 1989. The case was continued until September 26 on the State's motion. This constituted 65 days. ¹ Defendant was arraigned on September 26 and sought a continuance until October 2. By agreement, the case was continued until January 30, 1991, at which time defendant demanded trial. The case was again continued at the State's request until March 26. This constituted 55 days. Thus, we agree with the trial court that March 26, 1991, was the 120th day. On March 26, defendant's counsel did not appear in court and the case was continued until April 19, with the time attributable to defendant. On April 19, now the 120th day, both parties appeared and defendant again demanded trial. The case was continued to May 16. The parties dispute which side should be charged with this time.

On May 16, defendant filed a motion for discharge pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act. The court granted the State a one-day continuance to respond to the motion. The State nol-prossed the count relative to the sale on March 23, 1989. On May 17, the court heard the defendant's motion to discharge and denied it, finding that the delay from April 19 to May 16 was attributable to defendant because he agreed to a continuance. The court then granted the State a continuance to May 21 pursuant to section 103-5(f) because defendant caused a delay within 21 days of the end of the term. On May 21, the State filed a motion to use proof of other crimes. The court continued the case to May 22. On May 22, the court conducted a hearing on the State's motion and granted it. It then continued the case to May 23. On May 23, the court continued the case to May 28 by agreement. Jury selection and defendant's first trial began on May 28.

Defendant presents three separate allegations of error in arguing entitlement to discharge pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act.

A. APRIL 19, 1991, TO MAY 16, 1991, CONTINUANCE

Defendant first argues that the continuance from April 19 to May 16, 1991, was not attributable to him but instead to the court because of its crowded docket.

At the hearing on April 19 the following occurred:

"MR. DIAMOND-FALK [Defense counsel]: Thank you. Your Honor, we are ready to have this case set for trial. * * *

THE COURT: All right, counsel. I know you were demanding trial on the last Court date, what is your position today?

MR. DIAMOND-FALK: We would also continue the demand.

THE COURT: We'll set this for May 3.

MR. DIAMOND-FALK: Would it be possible to have the 1s[t] or 2nd--

THE COURT: No, I won't be here and not the 9th because it is motion state. It would have to be by agreement, if you want it other than days I am selecting I have 2 or 3 juries every week, every day.

MR. DIAMOND-FALK: If we could have--

I would be agreeable to May 9 to the 17th, any date those 2 weeks and I am sure the State will endeavor to bring this case to trial.

THE COURT: It is not that, we have 2 or 3 juries every week.

MR. DIAMOND-FALK: May 3rd is the first date.

* * * * * *

MR. DIAMOND-FALK: We'll demand then May 3 * * *.

MR. DIAMOND-FALK: I have a motion set that morning in front of Judge Berman in chancery.

THE COURT: Counsel you can't do it at that time?

MR. DIAMOND-FALK: When is the next available date[?].

THE COURT: We could try May 16. * * *

MR. DIAMOND-FALK: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Wait a second, by agreement, May 16, I have indicated motion State to May 3rd[ ] but it is by agreement any other date.

MR. DIAMOND-FALK: Sure.

THE COURT: By agreement to May 16 with for trial." (Emphasis added.)

The half sheet also indicates the continuance was by agreement.

The parties dispute whether the above dialogue constitutes an agreement by defense counsel to a continuance. "[A]n express agreement to a continuance on the record is an affirmative act attributable to the defendant." People v. Williams, 272 Ill.App.3d 868, 877, 209 Ill.Dec. 354, 651 N.E.2d 532 (1995). The decision as to accountability for delay is within the discretion of the trial court and should not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Williams, 272 Ill.App.3d at 877, 209 Ill.Dec. 354, 651 N.E.2d 532. "In reviewing speedy trial claims, this court is duty-bound to examine both the transcript of proceedings and the common-law record so as to do complete justice to both the State and defendant[, including the half sheets]." (Emphasis in original.) People v. Sojak, 273 Ill.App.3d 579, 582-83, 210 Ill.Dec. 85, 652 N.E.2d 1061 (1995).

Defendant argues that the above discussion was a mere agreement to a date ordered by the court due to its crowded docket, not an agreement by the defendant to a delay of trial. Defendant cites to People v. Beyah, 67 Ill.2d 423, 10 Ill.Dec. 568, 367 N.E.2d 1334 (1977), to support this contention.

In Beyah, the supreme court found that delay was not attributable to defendant because he merely agreed to a date ordered by the court. In that case, while the State was introducing defendant's criminal record during defendant's motion to reduce bond, the trial court interrupted and the following colloquy occurred:

" 'THE COURT: I will give you an early date.

MR. GOLDBERG [Assistant State's Attorney]:--served time in the House of Correction--

THE COURT: Motion for bond reduction denied. Go ahead, pick a date.

MR. GOLDBERG: I have got others.

THE COURT: I haven't got time. Pick a date. We'll give him a trial. I can't talk about bond. If you're innocent, you walk out. If you're guilty, you go to jail.

MR. WALTERS [Public Defender]: Set it down for three weeks from today.

THE COURT: How about October 18?

THE DEFENDANT: Can I get one earlier than that?

THE COURT: I can't give you one earlier than that. Motion Defendant, with subpoenas, October 18.' " Beyah, 67 Ill.2d at 426, 10 Ill.Dec. 568, 367 N.E.2d 1334.

In ruling the delay was not attributable to defendant, the court stated that defendant was seeking only a reduction in bail not a continuance. In addition, defendant's counsel, the State, and the court were all engaged in other trials and, therefore, not able to proceed immediately. Because of this, the court ordered defense counsel to "pick a date." The supreme court emphasized that this was not a case where only defense counsel was engaged in another trial and therefore could not proceed. Finally, it was the court, " 'and the court alone,' " which interjected the issue of continuing the case. Beyah, 67 Ill.2d at 428, 10 Ill.Dec. 568, 367 N.E.2d 1334, quoting People v. Wyatt, 24 Ill.2d 151, 154, 180 N.E.2d 478 (1962).

Beyah is distinguishable. In the case before us, there is no evidence that the State or the court was not ready to proceed to trial immediately. Nor is there evidence that defense was ready to proceed. As is evidenced by the aforementioned colloquy, defense counsel's position on April 19 was at best ambiguous. His first statement to the court was "we are ready to have this case set for trial." This alone is not determinative, but coupled with the remaining colloquy, it is. Although counsel stated he was continuing in his demand for trial, he did not state he was ready to proceed immediately nor did he demand trial for that day. Rather, he stated that he was ready to have the case set for trial. When the court began discussing alternative dates, counsel fully participated in the discussion and offered dates. He stated he would be agreeable to any date between May 9 and May 17. When the court set the case for May 3 after defense counsel agreed, he stated he would not be available. Most damaging though is counsel's last statement. When the court finally set the date for May 16, it stated that the continuance was by agreement. Defense counsel responded, "Sure." This statement is much more than merely agreeing to a date ordered by a court that had indicated it had no time for the case that day. Finally, there is no evidence, as in Beyah, that the court in the instant case was the one to...