People v. De Los Angeles
| Decision Date | 30 March 2000 |
| Citation | 270 A.D.2d 196,707 N.Y.S.2d 16 |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent,<BR>v.<BR>WILFREDO DE LOS ANGELES, Appellant.<BR>THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent,<BR>v.<BR>VICTOR MERCEDES, Appellant.<BR>THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent,<BR>v.<BR>RAFAEL PEREZ, Appellant.<BR>THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent,<BR>v.<BR>LINWOOD COLLINS, Appellant.<BR>THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent,<BR>v.<BR>DANIEL GONZALEZ, Appellant.<BR>THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent,<BR>v.<BR>RUSSELL HARRIS, Appellant.<BR>THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent,<BR>v.<BR>JOSE LLACA, Appellant.<BR>THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent,<BR>v.<BR>STANLEY TUKES, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence. We see no reason to disturb the jury's determinations concerning credibility. Contrary to defendant Perez's contention, the evidence of his actions and statements before, during, and after the murder of which he was convicted provided overwhelming proof that he acted in concert with the shooter to murder the victim (see, People v Rossey, 89 NY2d 970). Furthermore, there was no reasonable view of the evidence that he acted with intent to cause serious physical injury rather than death, and thus his request for the submission of manslaughter in the first degree was properly denied. There was ample evidence from which the jury could conclude that there was a single conspiracy that encompassed several drug-selling operations, rather than several conspiracies (see, People v Leisner, 73 NY2d 140, 149-151).
Defendant Tukes's suppression motion was properly denied. The record supports the hearing court's determination that his spontaneously volunteered statements to the police were not the result of any conduct by the police (see, People v Gonzales, 75 NY2d 938, cert denied 498 US 833).
The court properly exercised its discretion in denying defendants' motions for severance since most of the People's evidence was introduced to establish the joint enterprise, which evidence applied to all defendants (see, People v Mahboubian, 74 NY2d 174). The trial lasted eight months, with the People presenting some 70 witnesses, and to have conducted multiple trials would have violated the strong public policy favoring joinder and would have turned an already extended trial into several such trials, with security problems associated with disclosure of the identity of witnesses through repetitive appearances (People v Mobley, 162 AD2d 305, lv denied 76 NY2d 895). Furthermore, the record reveals that there was no irreconcilable conflict between the defenses presented nor was there a significant danger that any alleged conflict led the jury to infer any defendant's guilt. Incidents during the trial wherein some defendants elicited evidence that other defendants found objectionable did not require a severance, since no defendant took an aggressive adversarial stance against another, and since the evidence so elicited was cumulative to evidence elicited by the People or was nonprejudicial (see, People v Cardwell, 78 NY2d 996).
Defendants' applications pursuant to Batson v Kentucky (476 US 79) were properly denied. Defendants failed to preserve for appellate review their current contentions that the court did not follow the proper three-step procedure and that the prosecutor's explanations for his peremptory challenges of certain prospective jurors were pretextual, and we decline to review them in the interest of justice. Were we to review these claims, we would find that the record, read as a whole, establishes that the court followed the proper protocols and made a distinct finding that the reasons proffered by the prosecutor were not pretextual, and we would further find that this factual determination, which largely turned on the credibility of the prosecutor, was supported by the record (see, People v Allen, 86 NY2d 101; People v Wint, 237 AD2d 195, lv denied 89 NY2d 1103; People v Mancini, 219 AD2d 456, lv denied 86 NY2d 844).
Defendants' various contentions regarding the conduct of the trial court are unpreserved because defendants did not register an appropriate objection to the court's overall conduct during trial or request any corrective action (People v Charleston, 56 NY2d 886) and we decline to review them in the interest of justice. Were we to review these claims, we would find that the court took necessary steps, in this complex, multiple-defendant case, to clarify confusing testimony and to facilitate the orderly and expeditious progress of the trial (People v Jamison, 47 NY2d 882). Although at times, confrontations erupted between defense counsel and the court, the court's prompt curative instructions served to dispel any possible prejudice (see, People v Gonzalez, 38 NY2d 208, 210). The jurors are presumed to have followed these instructions (People v Davis, 58 NY2d 1102), and the court's conduct could not have deprived any of the defendants of a fair trial in light of the overwhelming evidence of each defendant's guilt.
Defendants' various challenges to the admissibility of coconspirators' statements are unpreserved and we decline to review them in the interest of justice. Were we to review these claims, we would find that the statements were properly admitted (see, People v Castillo, 223 AD2d 481).
The court properly exercised its discretion in permitting the People to reopen their case during defendant Mercedes's summation, in order to introduce testimony about a pretrial photo identification of Mercedes, because his summation created an unfair impression about a witness's identification of him and the photo identification was thus rendered admissible for the first time in the trial. The prejudice to the People caused by this misimpression was of sufficient magnitude to warrant reopening the case during summation (see, People v Olsen, 34 NY2d 349; People v Roseman, 78 AD2d 878, lv denied 53 NY2d 711), and defense counsel was then allowed to cross-examine the witness and to resume his summation in order to comment upon the new testimony.
The challenged portions of the People's summation were largely responsive to defendants' summations (see, People v Overlee, 236 AD2d 133, lv denied 91 NY2d 976), and there was no pattern of inflammatory, prejudicial remarks warranting reversal (see, People v D'Alessandro, 184 AD2d 114, 118-119, lv denied 81 NY2d 884).
Viewed as a whole, the court's charge and supplemental instructions with respect to conspiracy in the first degree and multiple conspiracies conveyed the appropriate legal principles (see, People v Fields, 87 NY2d 821). Considering the form of the questions posed by the deliberating jurors, including their request for instruction on "deliberations," the balanced and noncoercive supplemental instructions provided by the court were meaningful (see, People v Almodovar, 62 NY2d 126; People v Malloy, 55 NY2d 296, cert denied 459 US 847). The court's response cautioning the jury against arbitrarily disbelieving a witness was proper, in context, since the court defined arbitrariness in terms of lack of reason.
Finally, defendant Collins argues that he was deprived of his right to a fair trial because of a prejudicial "stipulation" read to the jury. Collins contends that he did not "open the door" to the stipulation, which informed the jury that he was incarcerated from February 1992 up until and including the time of trial, and that he never agreed to the "stipulation."
Although People v Mullin (41 NY2d 475, 480), relied upon by the dissent, speaks of prejudice to the defendant resulting from "the defendant's criminal past [being] forcefully and unrelentingly thrust upon the jury, admittedly without any conceivable justification," nothing similar occurred here. The jury never heard of any criminal history and the only mention of defendant's incarceration was one passing reference during a six month trial. In fact, the jurors proved fully capable of distinguishing defendant's lesser involvement by their inability to unanimously agree with respect to two of the three counts against him.
While Collins correctly notes that his trial lawyer did not enter into the stipulation, since counsel rejected the court's offer to inform the jury that he did not agree to the stipulation, this issue has not been preserved for appellate review (see, People v Medina, 53 NY2d 951). Thus, the sole issue is whether the trial court was correct in concluding that defense counsel had "opened the door" regarding defendant's incarceration.
After the direct testimony of each of two detectives which failed to place defendant at two key drug locations, the detectives were cross-examined by defense counsel. They were repeatedly asked whether they had seen defendant at the two crucial locations towards the end of the first detective's surveillance and during the entirety of the second detective's surveillance. Defense counsel was keenly aware that the detectives could not have seen defendant at the locations specified because the defendant resided elsewhere, at the New York City Correctional facility on Rikers Island. Since counsel's questions focused on the detectives' failure to observe defendant, these questions tended to mislead the jury. Furthermore, while the court initially urged the parties to agree upon a stipulation which would not mention defendant's jail status, the prosecutor was correct in urging that anything short of informing the jury that defendant was incarcerated would leave the impression that defendant had voluntarily withdrawn from the conspiracy.
Because of obvious prejudice, it is true that the prosecution is normally precluded from offering evidence about a defendant's criminal record in its direct case (People v Mullin, supra). Nevertheless, evidence otherwise inadmissible may become the proper subject of inquiry when the opposing party seeks to raise a subject on...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Dragani
...445, 452, 449 N.Y.S.2d 946, 434 N.E.2d 1324 ; People v. McClinton, 187 A.D.3d 1056, 1057, 131 N.Y.S.3d 249 ; People v. De Los Angeles, 270 A.D.2d 196, 201, 707 N.Y.S.2d 16, affd sub nom. People v. Collins, 96 N.Y.2d 837, 729 N.Y.S.2d 433, 754 N.E.2d 192 ). Contrary to the People's contentio......
-
People v. Philips
...151, affd.22 N.Y.3d 687, 985 N.Y.S.2d 428, 8 N.E.3d 803; People v. Loney, 43 A.D.3d 726, 841 N.Y.S.2d 444; People v. De Los Angeles, 270 A.D.2d 196, 199, 707 N.Y.S.2d 16, affd. sub nom. People v. Collins, 96 N.Y.2d 837, 729 N.Y.S.2d 433, 754 N.E.2d 192; see also People v. Massie, 2 N.Y.3d 1......
-
People v. Jones
...by this misimpression [would be] of sufficient magnitude to warrant reopening the case during summation" (People v. De Los Angeles, 270 A.D.2d 196, 199, 707 N.Y.S.2d 16, lv. denied 95 N.Y.2d 889, 715 N.Y.S.2d 381, 738 N.E.2d 785 ; see People v. Loney, 43 A.D.3d 726, 727, 841 N.Y.S.2d 444, l......
-
People v. Dragani
...People v Rojas, 97 N.Y.2d 32, 39; People v Melendez, 55 N.Y.2d 445, 452; People v McClinton, 187 A.D.3d 1056, 1057; People v De Los Angeles, 270 A.D.2d 196, 201, affd sub nom. People v Collins, 96 N.Y.2d Contrary to the People's contention, the defendant preserved for appellate review his c......