People v. Anthony

• Decision Date: 06 January 1983
• Docket Number: Docket No. 52874
• Citation: 327 N.W.2d 441,120 Mich.App. 207
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jessie ANTHONY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 441

327 N.W.2d 441

120 Mich.App. 207

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jessie ANTHONY, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 52874.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted March 10, 1982.

Decided Oct. 6, 1982.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 2, 1982.

Released for Publication Jan. 6, 1983.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Edward Reilly Wilson, Deputy Chief, Appellate Asst. Pros. Atty., and Frank J. Bernacki, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the people.

Paul C. Louisell, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

Before RILEY, P.J., and R.B. BURNS and EVERETT, ^* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant was charged with the armed robbery, M.C.L. Sec. 750.529; M.S.A. Sec. 28.797, of a clothing store. A jury found him guilty as charged and he was ultimately sentenced to a term of from 15 to 30 years in prison.

While the police were investigating at the scene of the crime, they were told by one Sylvester Fields that he knew where the people who had robbed the store lived. Fields had seen three men, allegedly including defendant, running through the alley carrying clothing shortly after the robbery had occurred. The police were led by Fields to the defendant's home. The police had no information that anyone had recently entered the house. Three patrolmen and one sergeant were at the house when the decision to announce their presence was made. When the police knocked on the door and identified themselves, they heard some running and men talking inside. The officers, receiving no response, forced open the door. Somewhere between 15 to 30 minutes had elapsed from the time of the robbery until the police forcibly entered defendant's house. Defendant was found hiding in the basement under a pile of clothes. Donald Kline and Robert Owens were also found hiding in the house along with stolen items from the clothing store. Defendant had $284 in cash and a woman's diamond ring, which had been stolen from a salesperson in the store, on his person. Robert Owens had $322 and an Omega watch on his person.

Kline pled guilty to the charge of armed robbery and testified that defendant was not involved in the crime. People v. Kline, 113 Mich.App. 733, 318 N.W.2d 510 (1982). Defendant testified that he was home in his basement repairing a broken water pipe at the time of the robbery.

Defendant raises a number of issues, one of which requires reversal. Defendant argues that the police lacked probable cause to conduct a warrantless search and seizure at defendant's residence and, therefore, the resulting evidence should have been suppressed.

The lower court's decision denying the motion to suppress, according to the briefs filed in this appeal, was grounded on the position that the police were in "hot pursuit" and, therefore, were justified in entering the house. Once the officers were in the house, the evidence seized apparently was in "plain view". Both of these terms relate to exceptions to the warrant requirements of U.S. Const., Am. IV, and Const.1963, art. 1, Sec. 11. All too often, terms such as these are used in an arcane manner without solid legal analysis.

A warrantless search is unreasonable per se unless there exists both probable cause and circumstances establishing one of the delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. People v. Mullaney, 104 Mich.App. 787, 792, 306 N.W.2d 347 (1981). Probable cause has been defined as a state of mind which stems from some fact, circumstance or information which would create an honest belief in the mind of a reasonably prudent person, People v. Gwinn, 47 Mich.App. 134, 140, 209 N.W.2d 297 (1973). Exigent circumstances are present where immediate action is necessary to (1) protect the police officers or other persons, (2) prevent the loss or destruction of evidence, or (3) prevent the escape of the suspect. People v. Dugan, 102 Mich.App. 497, 503, 302 N.W.2d 209 (1980).

In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), the Court held that absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a house to make a routine felony arrest is prohibited. People v. Woodard, 111 Mich.App. 528, 314 N.W.2d 680 (1981). In Woodard, a panel of this Court found the forcible entry into the home and the subsequent arrests of the defendants therein to be illegal due to the lack of exigent circumstances. The police were led to the Woodward house by one of the apprehended participants in the underlying robbery shortly after the crime. After announcing themselves as police, the team of officers heard running inside the house which prompted the police to force open the door. On the basis of Payton, the warrantless arrests were found to be illegal due to the lack of exigent circumstances.

In People v. Van Auker, 111 Mich.App. 478, 314 N.W.2d 657 (1981), the people argued that a warrantless, nonconsensual entry was necessary to prevent defendant's escape and prevent destruction of evidence. The Court stated:

"There was testimony that at least five police officers were present at the time of defendant's arrest and that there was only one entrance to the apartment in which he was hiding. Under these circumstances we believe that the officers could have kept watch over the building and prevented any attempted escape while waiting for an arrest warrant to be issued." 111 Mich.App. at 482, 314 N.W.2d 657.

The Woodard and Van Auker decisions demonstrate that the term exigent does not mean expedient. The officers in Woodard knew nothing more than that defendant lived in the house, not that he was in the house. The running they heard did not create...