People v. Antoine
| Decision Date | 12 August 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. D023183,D023183 |
| Citation | 48 Cal.App.4th 489,56 Cal.Rptr.2d 530 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | , 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6050, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9841 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Gary Joseph ANTOINE, Defendant and Appellant. |
Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, George Wiolliamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Holly D. Wilkens and Anne Marie Urrutia, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant Gary Joseph Antoine was convicted of two counts of carjacking, two counts of assault with a deadly weapon, two counts of robbery, one count of unlawful vehicle taking and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon. It was found true that as to all but the possession of a firearm charge, appellant used a firearm within the meaning of PENAL CODE SECTION 12022.52. It was also found true appellant had served a term of imprisonment within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b).
Antoine appeals, arguing the crime of carjacking is unconstitutionally overbroad, vague and denies equal protection, that the court abused its discretion in refusing to sever the firearm possession charge and made various instructional and sentencing errors.
On August 21, 1994, at approximately 3:30 in the afternoon, Gerardo Padilla and Leticia Flores were driving home in Padilla's pickup truck. Padilla noticed they were being followed by four men in an automobile. As Padilla stopped at his apartment one of the men, appellant, got out of the car, moved quickly to the truck, pointed a gun at Padilla and told him to get out. Padilla told Flores to run. She started to run but then stopped. Padilla got out of the truck, ran around to where Flores was standing, and the two ran. Appellant drove the truck away.
On the afternoon of August 21, 1994, Chuong Nguyen was at the apartment complex where appellant lived. Nguyen noticed appellant removing tires from a pickup truck later identified as Padilla's. Appellant asked and Nguyen helped him move the tires to an elevator at the complex.
At approximately 6:30 that evening, officers received a radio call that a truck was being stripped at appellant's apartment complex. The officers went to the location and found Padilla's truck. Its tires and radio had been removed. The officers interviewed residents and concluded the stolen items were in appellant's apartment. A search warrant was obtained for the residence. The ensuing search, conducted with the knowledge of appellant's wife, revealed the keys for Padilla's truck, its tires and stereo equipment.
On September 6, 1994, Detective Theodore Carignan was watching a location where he hoped to find appellant. At the location the detective saw appellant's wife. When appellant appeared, the detective and uniformed officers approached and yelled at him not to move. Appellant ran but was apprehended. The detective stated to appellant: "You are Antoine, you are under arrest for robbery." Appellant replied: Appellant repeatedly tried to convince the detective he was not Antoine.
The next day Detective Garcia showed Flores a photo lineup containing a picture of appellant. Flores picked out the picture of appellant as the man who pointed a gun at her and rated her confidence level in the identification as a nine on a scale of one to ten. The next day Padilla was shown the lineup and also picked out the photograph of appellant. Padilla rated his confidence level as 10.
Appellant's fingerprints were found on Padilla's truck, wheels and stereo equipment.
Jerry Jennings, a lifelong friend of appellant, testified that on the day of the Padilla-Flores robbery he was standing with appellant outside appellant's apartment complex when a man drove up in a pickup truck and asked if appellant wanted to buy the wheels on the vehicle. Appellant stated he did. Appellant and the man went to the back of the complex and later Jennings saw appellant rolling tires toward the elevator.
Another friend was at appellant's apartment the afternoon of the robbery. When he arrived a man whom he did not know was there. As the man left, appellant said to him: "Thank you for doing business."
A friend of appellant's family witnessed the arrest. She stated she did not hear the police make an announcement of authority when they arrived. Appellant's mother testified there were many drive-by shootings in the neighborhood and she had told appellant if he ever heard sounds like the start of a shooting he should run.
Appellant also attacked Padilla and Flores's identifications with general testimony from an expert on perception and memory by showing inconsistencies between their descriptions of the robber and appellant's appearance.
Appellant argues the crime of carjacking is unconstitutionally overbroad, vague and denies equal protection.
In 1993 the Legislature in the form of section 215 created the crime of carjacking. Section 215 states: "(a) 'Carjacking' is the felonious taking of a motor vehicle in the possession of another, from his or her person or immediate presence, or from the person or immediate presence of a passenger of the motor vehicle, against his or her will and with the intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person in possession of the motor vehicle of his or her possession, accomplished by means of force or fear.
Appellant cites legislative history indicating the crime of carjacking was enacted in response to a burgeoning problem of violent auto takings, often by thrill seekers or gang members undergoing initiating rites. This thrillseeking, nonlarcenous motivation created problems since the crime of robbery requires the intent to permanently deprive. The Legislature, therefore, created the crime of carjacking requiring an auto taking by force or fear but with no requirement for an intent to permanently deprive. (People v. Medina (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 643, 647-648, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 112.) The crime of carjacking has terms of imprisonment longer than those for second degree robbery, that is, longer than the term applicable to one who, before the enactment of section 215, committed a robbery by taking a motor vehicle. (Compare §§ 213, subd. (a)(2), and 215, subd. (b).)
Appellant argues the crime of carjacking is overbroad since, while the crime was enacted to deal with thrillseeking joy riders and others not intending to deny permanent possession, the section also ensnares "traditional" robbers, that is, those who took intending to permanently deprive, and who would, but for section 215, face shorter sentences.
There are at least two serious defects in appellant's argument. First, the overbreadth concept deals with statutes that are so broadly written they punish both constitutionally protected conduct, usually free speech, as well as acts which may validly be prohibited. (Vol. 7 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed.) Const. Law, § 292; Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 12-27.) Clearly, the crime of carjacking does not create a potential for the punishment of protected conduct.
More importantly, appellant's argument fails since its central premise is mistaken. It may be that the Legislature was moved to specifically make carjacking a crime because of its growing frequency among thrill seekers and because of the difficulty in convicting such individuals of traditional robbery. However, the reason for a special statute on the subject, with a penalty greater than that for second degree robbery, is that carjacking is a particularly serious crime that victimizes persons in vulnerable settings and, because of the nature of the taking, raises a serious potential for harm to the victim, the perpetrator and the public at large. (See generally Committee Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 6 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.); Sen. Floor Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 6 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 9, 1993; Sen. Rules Com., 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 6 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.).)
Whether a carjacker is seeking thrills or "wheels," the danger to the victims and to society is equally great. The intent of each is equally difficult to determine, and problems of proof regarding the intent to permanently deprive can arise as to both. It is meaningless to argue that somehow a "traditional" robber whose crime involves the forcible taking of a motor vehicle has been constitutionally disadvantaged by the application to him of the carjacking statute.
Appellant argues section 215 is vague in two respects. First, he argues the statements in subdivision (c) that the section shall not be construed to supersede or affect the crime of robbery as defined in section 211 and that "A person may be charged with a violation of [section 215] and section 211" are ambiguous since they provide no notice of when either a carjacking or robbery charge or a concurrent robbery and carjacking charge may be brought.
There is nothing ambiguous about the cited parts of the section. It is inescapably the case that some criminal acts and courses of conduct result in the commission of more than one crime. Section 215 clearly gives notice that it does not supplant section 211 and...
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