People v. Appleton
| Decision Date | 15 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | H041332 |
| Citation | 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 637,245 Cal.App.4th 717 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Paul Jason APPLETON, Defendant and Appellant. |
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant Paul Jason Appleton: Julia Freis, Santa Rosa, under appointment by the Court of Appeal for Appellant
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent The People: Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Acting Senior Assistant Attorney General, Seth K. Schalit, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, John H. Deist, Deputy Attorney General
Márquez, J.Defendant Paul Jason Appleton met John Doe through Grindr, a social media application for smartphones. After a consensual relationship lasting several months to a year, Doe told police that defendant and two other men had forced Doe to orally copulate them.
Defendant pleaded no contest to false imprisonment by means of deceit. (Pen.Code, §§ 236
, 237, subd. (a).) The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and granted a three-year term of probation. Among other conditions, the court imposed two conditions at issue in this appeal: (1) Defendant's computers and electronic devices shall be subject to search for material prohibited by law; and (2) defendant shall not clean or delete his Internet browsing activity, and he shall maintain his history for a minimum of four weeks. Defendant challenges both conditions as overbroad, vague, and unrelated to his offense or future criminality.
We hold the probation condition allowing for searches of defendant's computers and electronic devices is unconstitutionally overbroad as worded. We will strike the condition and remand to the trial court to fashion a more narrowly tailored version of that condition. As to the second probation condition requiring defendant not to delete his browser activity, we conclude the condition by itself is valid, provided it supports a narrower, valid alternative to the first challenged condition.
At the time of the offense, defendant was a 43–year–old computer technology worker in Mountain View. In July 2013, John Doe contacted the police and made the following statement. In early 2013, he met defendant through Grindr.2 Doe was 16 years old at the time. For several months, defendant and Doe maintained a consensual relationship that involved kissing, handholding, and sleeping together, but no further sexual conduct. In July 2013, Doe stayed at defendant's residence for several days. Around midnight on July 12, defendant and Doe were sleeping in defendant's bed when two male friends of defendant entered the bedroom. The three men forced Doe to orally copulate them over a period of about 15 to 20 minutes. Doe left the residence at around 1:00 a.m. and called the police later that night. He told another witness one of the men had forcibly sodomized him.
Doe declined a SART exam. After he expressed suicidal thoughts, he was taken into custody under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150
.
Police interviewed Doe several days later. He made the following statement, which differed in some respects from his initial statement. He had met defendant on Grindr one year earlier, but they did not start dating until February 2013. At that time, defendant bought Doe an iPhone and performed oral sex on him. Defendant performed oral sex on Doe three other times, and the two slept together for a period of several days, but they engaged in no other sexual conduct. Doe reiterated that defendant and two of defendant's friends forced him to orally copulate them in July 2013 when Doe was sleeping in defendant's bed. Doe declined to make a pretext call.
The prosecution charged defendant by felony complaint with oral copulation with a minor. (Pen.Code, § 288a, subd. (b)(1)
.) The parties entered a plea agreement whereby defendant pleaded no contest to false imprisonment by means of deceit (Pen.Code, §§ 236, 237, subd. (a) ) in exchange for formal probation, credit for time served, and dismissal of the oral copulation count. In accord with the plea agreement, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and granted a three-year term of probation to include a jail sentence of 236 days.
The probation report recommended a probation condition requiring that "defendant's computer and all other electronic devices (including but not limited to cellular telephones, laptop computers or notepads) shall be subject to Forensic Analysis search." The report also recommended a condition requiring defendant not to delete his Internet browsing activity and to keep a minimum of four weeks of history.
The trial court modified the first condition somewhat. First, the court stated, "I know that there has been a significant discussion with respect to some of the suggested conditions so I want to make some modifications to the language." The court also stated that if either party encountered difficulty with the conditions, "you have the right to come back, put it on calendar, and I can hear your point of view and Probation's." The court then imposed the following two conditions, among others: The court explained that "the reason I'm imposing this condition is because social media was involved in this offense, and either social media or some kind of computer software, and so I think this is an appropriate condition given the nature of the charges and the conduct admitted to in this case." The court subsequently asked defendant, "do you accept probation on those terms and conditions?" Defendant responded, "I do."
The next day, defendant requested a calendar setting. The requested stated, "Defendant would like his objections to some of the probation conditions made clear on the record." Five days later, the parties appeared in court for that purpose, whereupon defendant objected to the two probation conditions noted above. He cited his constitutional rights to freedom of speech and association under the First Amendment, his privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, and his rights to privacy and freedom from unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. He further objected on the grounds that the conditions were vague, overbroad, and unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545
(Lent ).
The trial court responded:
Defendant contends both probation conditions are unreasonable under Lent, supra,
because they bear no relation to his offense or future criminality. He also challenges both conditions as unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First and Fourth Amendments. As to the condition requiring him to make his computers and all other electronic devices subject to search "for material prohibited by law," he contends that phrase is unconstitutionally vague. As to the condition requiring him not to delete his browsing activity, he contends the condition is vague and overbroad in the absence of a knowledge element.
The Attorney General argues that defendant's claims are procedurally barred under the doctrines of waiver, forfeiture, and estoppel. The Attorney General contends defendant accepted the conditions as part of his plea agreement, under which he agreed to accept all "standard" terms and conditions of probation. She argues that once the trial court pronounced sentence, the court lacked the power to modify the terms of probation because they were part of the negotiated plea arrangement. She also contends the challenged conditions are reasonably related to the offense and narrowly tailored for constitutional purposes.
As an initial matter, we consider the Attorney General's argument that defendant has waived or forfeited his claims on appeal. We conclude the record does not support the Attorney General's claim that the challenged conditions were part of the plea agreement.
The prosecutor explicitly set forth the terms of the agreement on the record. The terms included imposition of formal probation, but the prosecutor made no mention of the challenged conditions. Rather, the prosecutor stated, among other things, that "[t]he standard fines and fees will apply as well as other standard[ ] terms and conditions." Based on this statement by the prosecutor, the Attorney General argues that defendant agreed to the challenged conditions because they were included in the "standard" conditions made part of the plea agreement.
None of the authorities cited by the Attorney General supports this contention. First, she cites two cases concerning restrictions on computer usage—not computer search conditions. (See In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 925, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 584
; In re Hudson (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1, 11, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 74.) Second, neither opinion held that the probation conditions at issue in those...
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People v. P.O. (In re P.O.)
...M. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 478, 490, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 117 [recognizing minors' right to privacy]; see also People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 724, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 637 [discussing privacy interest in electronic devices].) We agree with P.O. that the electronics search condition is o......
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People v. Juan R. (In re Juan R.), A151254
...We, too, agree the electronic search condition implicates Juan's constitutional privacy rights. (See People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 719, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 637 ( Appleton ).) In Appleton , the defendant pleaded no contest to false imprisonment and admitted meeting his minor vic......
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People v. Wright
...did so using this "closely tailored" test. (See Valdivia, supra , 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 1142, review granted; People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 723, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 637 ; In re Ricardo P., supra , 241 Cal.App.4th 676, 193 Cal.Rptr.3d 883, review granted.)3 However, a more defere......
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People v. Ricardo P. (In re Ricardo P.)
...search condition is a proportional means of deterring the probationer from future criminality. (See People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 724, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 637 [finding electronics search condition reasonable because the defendant lured victim using " ‘either social media or som......