People v. Applewhite
| Decision Date | 09 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | 1-14-2330 |
| Citation | 2016 IL App (1st) 142330,68 N.E.3d 957 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Samuel APPLEWHITE, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Michael J. Pelletier, Patricia Mysza, and Elena B. Penick, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg and Brian K. Hodes, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
¶ 1 The defendant, Samuel Applewhite, appeals the dismissal of his petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2014)). On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition as frivolous and patently without merit when the court held that his 45-year sentence did not violate the eighth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. VIII ) or the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11 ). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 2 In October 2001, the State charged the defendant in case No. 01 CR 23488 with multiple counts of attempted first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4, 9-1(a)(1) (West 2000)), aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2 (West 2000) ), and armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2)-(4) (West 2000)). The indictment alleged that, on July 11, 2001, the defendant (a 17-year-old at the time of the offenses) "shot Lamar Smith about the body" and "took United States currency from the person or presence of Lamar Smith."
¶ 3 The State also charged the defendant in case No. 01 CR 23489 with multiple counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1)-(3) (West 2000)), attempted first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4, 9-1 (West 2000)), armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2), (a)(3) (West 2000)), and attempted armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/8-4, 18-2(a)(4) (West 2000)), and aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2) (West 2000)). These charges stem from a shooting incident that occurred on August 19, 2001, in which the defendant shot and killed Marshall Young.
¶ 4 On September 25, 2003, pursuant to a fully negotiated plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to one count of first degree murder of Marshall Young (case No. 01 CR 23489) and one count of aggravated battery with a firearm of Lamar Smith (case No. 01 CR 23488). The remaining counts were dismissed. Pursuant to the agreement, the trial court imposed the mandatory minimum sentence of 45 years' imprisonment for first degree murder. This sentence consisted of the minimum 20-year sentence for murder (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(a) (West 2002) ()), plus a minimum 25-year mandatory firearm enhancement (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2002) ()). The court also sentenced the defendant to 12 years' imprisonment for aggravated battery with a firearm (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West 2002) ()), to run concurrent with the murder sentence.
¶ 5 The defendant did not move to withdraw his pleas or otherwise appeal from the judgment entered on his convictions, though he did file a pro se petition for relief from judgment under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2010) ). He alleged, inter alia , that his plea agreement and concurrent sentences were void because consecutive sentences were required by section 5-8-4(d)(1) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(d)(1) (West 2012)). He argued that he should be allowed to withdraw his pleas and go to trial. The State conceded that the sentences were void, as consecutive sentences were required. Nevertheless, the State maintained that it could remedy the illegality by dismissing the aggravated battery with a firearm charge, leaving intact the guilty plea and 45-year sentence for first degree murder.
¶ 6 The trial court granted the State's request and vacated the defendant's conviction for aggravated battery with a firearm in case No. 01 CR 23488. As a consequence, the court issued a revised mittimus reflecting a 45-year sentence for first degree murder in case No. 01 CR 23489 and otherwise denied the defendant's petition. The defendant appealed, and this court affirmed the trial court's ruling. People v. Applewhite , No. 1-13-1549 (2014) ().
¶ 7 Thereafter, the defendant filed the instant pro se postconviction petition. In it, he alleges that the mandatory 25-year firearm enhancement, as applied to him, violates the eighth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. VIII ) and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11 ). He contends that the mandatory minimum sentence for first degree murder and the mandatory firearm enhancement, which resulted in his mandatory minimum sentence of 45 years' imprisonment, violates the constitutional principles announced in the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), and Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005).
¶ 8 In June 2014, the trial court dismissed the defendant's pro se postconviction petition at the first stage as "frivolous and patently without merit" because, unlike Miller , Graham , and Roper , the defendant did not receive the "harshest possible penalty" of natural life imprisonment. The court also noted that the defendant's sentence did not violate the eighth amendment or the proportionate penalties clause because the sentencing court was able to consider the defendant's "age and other circumstances." This timely appeal followed.
¶ 9 A postconviction proceeding is not an appeal of the underlying judgment; rather, it is a collateral proceeding where the defendant may challenge a conviction or sentence for violations of constitutional rights. People v. Tate , 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 8, 366 Ill.Dec. 741, 980 N.E.2d 1100. In a noncapital case, the Act creates a three-stage procedure for postconviction relief. People v. Harris , 224 Ill.2d 115, 125, 308 Ill.Dec. 757, 862 N.E.2d 960 (2007). At stage one, the trial court, without input from the State, examines the petition to determine whether it is frivolous or patently without merit. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1 (West 2012). A petition is frivolous or patently without merit only if it has "no arguable basis either in law or in fact." Tate , 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 9, 366 Ill.Dec. 741, 980 N.E.2d 1100. This is true if the petition is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as one that is completely contradicted by the record, or a fanciful factual allegation. People v. Hodges , 234 Ill.2d 1, 16–17, 332 Ill.Dec. 318, 912 N.E.2d 1204 (2009). If the petition is frivolous or patently without merit, the trial court must dismiss it. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2014). Otherwise, the proceedings move on to the second stage. Harris , 224 Ill.2d at 126, 308 Ill.Dec. 757, 862 N.E.2d 960. We review de novo a trial court's first-stage dismissal of a postconviction petition. Tate , 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 10, 366 Ill.Dec. 741, 980 N.E.2d 1100.
¶ 10 The defendant in this case contends that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his postconviction petition because he claims that his petition stated the gist of a constitutional claim. He argues that the 25-year mandatory firearm enhancement, as applied to a juvenile offender, violates the eighth amendment and the proportionate penalties clause because it deprives the trial court of the opportunity to make an individualized determination in sentencing the defendant by considering his age and culpability. We will address the defendant's eighth amendment and proportionate penalties claims in turn.
¶ 11 The eighth amendment, applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, (Kennedy v. Louisiana , 554 U.S. 407, 419, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 171 L.Ed.2d 525 (2008) ), provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const., amend. VIII. The cruel and unusual punishment clause prohibits "inherently barbaric punishments" as well as punishments which are disproportionate to the offense. Graham , 560 U.S. at 59, 130 S.Ct. 2011.
¶ 12 In support of his argument that the 25-year mandatory firearm enhancement violates his eighth amendment rights, the defendant cites the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Miller , Roper , and Graham . In Miller , 567 U.S. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2469, the Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment prohibits a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders, including those convicted of homicide. The Court stated that a judge must have the opportunity to look at all of the circumstances involved before determining that life without the possibility of parole is the appropriate penalty. Id. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2469. In Roper , 543 U.S. at 568, 125 S.Ct. 1183, the Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment prohibits the death penalty for juvenile offenders. The Court reasoned that the "death penalty is reserved for a narrow category of crimes and offenders," and that "juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders." Id. at 569, 125 S.Ct. 1183. And, in Graham , 560 U.S. at 74, 82, 130 S.Ct. 2011, the Court held that the eighth amendment prohibits life sentences for juvenile offenders convicted of nonhomicide offenses. Significantly, however, both our supreme court "and the United States Supreme Court have closely limited the application of the rationale expressed in Miller , Roper , and Graham ,...
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